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ENGLAND'S ÆGIS:

OR,

THE MILITARY ENERGIES

OF

THE CONSTITUTION.

BY JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

There were in Israel eight hundred thousand valiant men that drew the sword; and the men of Judah were five hundred thousand.

SAMUEL.

THE THIRD EDITION.

N.B. The First Edition made one Part of An Appeal, Civil and *Military*, on the Subject of the English Constitution.

VOL I.

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DEDICATION

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES JAMES FOX,

ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE.

DEAR SIR,

To whom, in the present conflict for empire and existence, ought to be dedicated THE ENERGIES OF ENGLAND, but to him who, of all her sons, possesses a mind the most energetic? To whom shall be dedicated a proud effort to restore to full vigour and energy THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, but to him who has the most comprehensive knowledge, and holds the purest principles, of that Constitution?

Although a Dedicator, I am no flatterer. I have occasionally differed, and I may again differ, from you in opinion on particular points. But if, when I were to be led to battle, I could have the choice of my General, it would not be him I should choose with whom I had never disagreed; but him in whom I found combined the greatest talents, with the truest devotion to the cause in which I was to contend.

When we are now to fight, not only for our fields and fire-sides, but for those laws and liberties which make an Englishman's field an Eden, and his fire-side an earthly heaven, we cannot but turn our thoughts to one in whom, by a singular felicity, are united the most popular accomplishments for inspiring union, confidence, affectionate attachment, and public enthusiasm; and, at the same time, a grasp of intellect for counteracting the gigantic schemes of the ruler of France; and a robustness of mind, for wielding the power of Britain.

Had, Sir, your ruling star gratified your early ambition with long possession of the reins of Government, perhaps no work of

real patriotism might ever have been dedicated to you. When a Government has received a deep taint of impurity, 'tis an infected habitation from which those who, in the full fire of their passions, have ever made it their abode, do not without a miracle escape in moral health. What statesman, in our time, has tarried in that habitation, and escaped without infection? Which of them can make the honest boast that HE RESTORED PURITY TO THE GOVERNMENT AND ENERGY TO THE CONSTITUTION?

Alas!—But, no: I will suppress the agitating emotions arising within me: From the hateful spectacle of freedom betrayed, a constitution trampled on, and the wicked audacity of unbridled power, I will turn to that school of political adversity, in which I trust you have acquired a mastery over your passions, fortified your integrity, matured your judgment, and plumed your genius for bearing you aloft in the region of a luminous and generous policy which, at the same time that it maintains the prerogative and raises the glory of a Sovereign, consults the rights, the interests, and the feelings of a free people.

Assist, Sir, in buckling the death-striking ÆGIS on the dread arm of BRITANNIA; that, so graced, and with her other attributes adorned, she may appear another Goddess of Wisdom; who, as poets sing, invented the distaff, the loom, and the ship; who patronized industry, and more especially the workers in wool; who bestowed on mankind the peaceful olive; but who was never otherwise attired than as she sprang, spear in hand, from the brain of Jove, IN COMPLETE ARMOUR.

* * * * *

Such, Sir, was the Dedication of the former edition of this work, then addressed to you as A RETIRED STATESMAN. The time is at length come when a call from that retirement is far more honourable to you, than the proudest triumph of a NAPOLEON can be to that victor. It is a call, when all other means have failed us, to restore by your wisdom and virtue the constitution of your country, *civil* and *military*, as the sole means of repairing the unparalleled mischiefs

of a pernicious system, a system by which our long-aggrieved country, in aggravation of debts and taxes almost insupportable, of wrongs and insults truly intolerable, has fallen, in the commonwealth of European states, from the high ascendant she was wont to enjoy, while her towering rival has reached the pinnacle of aggrandizement; and a system which has reduced ENGLAND to the necessity of arming all her sons in defence of her own shores, that *France* may not become her confident invader with armies familiar with the overthrow of kingdoms.

When, Sir, in such a state of things, the nation now sees joined with you in council ministers who for a while slighted your prophetic warnings, it is natural enough that the bosom of a long-abused public should give harbour to doubts, and be agitated with fears. The experienced and the intelligent indeed, did not need your late argument on the necessity of acting with a party, if you hoped to do good. They acquiescently approve the act, trusting to your wisdom and integrity that good shall be the result.

This part of the community know the

true condition of their country. Casting a retrospective eye over the whole political region of time lying on this side the year 1760, and having a knowledge of those sordid principles which have since been so prolific of misgovernment, which produced amongst other mischiefs the fatal American war, and gave birth also to the equally fatal European war in which, except for a short interval, we have now again been for thirteen years engaged, they well know that all our calamities and all our dangers have flowed from a two-fold source of evil—the corruption of the *civil*, and the oblivion of the *military*, branch of the CONSTITUTION. And the reformation, the recovery, and the re-union of these branches, they know to be England's security from every peril, her extrication from every difficulty.

And when the well-informed contemplate that body of statesmen to whom it is now confided to avert the threatened shipwreck of the state, confident are they that such men will not imitate the mock-Atlas who presumptuously thought, in contempt of the CONSTITUTION, to carry all things on his

own shoulders; nor the rest of the Titan crew, who rebelled against every constitutional principle; but that, too wise and too virtuous to substitute themselves for the LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION, such statesmen will glory in being their faithful ministers to dispense their blessings.

It has on several former occasions been the Author's employment, to exhibit the decay and ruin of our national REPRESENTATION, and to show the reforms necessary for rendering it once more our *civil* security. On the present occasion he trusts that in the following pages will be found a correct delineation of the decay and ruin of our original militia called the COUNTY POWER, and the simple means of its restoration, so as to become once more our *military* protection.

On the acknowledged necessity of parliamentary reformation innumerable and unanswerable are the authorities; your own, Sir, not one of the least powerful. On the subject of the military restoration proposed, we have one authority who is in himself a host, SIR WILLIAM JONES; but even to his persuasions I fear we should have remained in-

sensible, had it not been for the more energetic admonitions of that great human monitor, NAPOLEON.

On the subject of parliamentary reformation, the vehement spirit of delusion which maddened so many to oppose it, has, I trust, died with him by whose potent but perverted eloquence that evil spirit was conjured up for our affliction; and I trust will shortly expire also his several military delusions, with all the unconstitutional and anti-constitutional projects, nearly bordering on the *Ukase* and the *Conscription*, to which they have successively given birth.

If, Sir, as already intimated, we see united with you in the present endeavour to save your country those who for a while were estranged from your counsels, it would be monstrous to imagine that you had abandoned those constitutional sentiments, which were your guides, while in your own and your country's adversity you were building up that solid and lofty reputation that is the standard around which the patriotism of the country now rallies, instead of giving THEM credit for at length feeling a conviction of

your rectitude, and for determining to be influenced in future by your wisdom and public virtue.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, with the greatest respect, and the best hopes,

Dear SIR,

Yours very truly,

JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

EPISTOLARY ADDRESS

TO THE

VOLUNTEERS.

GENEROUS COUNTRYMEN!

AFTER so many states and kingdoms, vainly relying on what are called regular armies, numerous and well-disciplined, have successively passed beneath the Gallic yoke, or purchased precarious peace with dishonour, it was reserved for ENGLAND, standing alone, to teach mankind the true science of national defence; and for her gallant sons it was also reserved to render their country a spectacle, to the prostrate nations, of profound admiration, and her Government a subject of their contemplation equally august and affecting. May England become an example to those nations, worthy of her own former fame, and of their imitation!

It is not by the alliance of potentate with potentate, it is not by combining together discordant hosts of ar-

bitrary Governments, great and small, that our neighbours of Germany can obtain either safety or independence. Would Germany forbid the fell demon of the South to disturb her repose, or the mighty Magog of the frozen North to intermeddle in her concerns? let her Princes make allies of their people; let modern Germans, like their ancient sires, like the English also, and the English Americans, scions of the same stock, live under legitimate laws of common assent, made by delegates freely chosen; and throughout her numerous states, from the Rhine to the Boristhenes, from the Danube to the Dwina, let there be to her earthly thrones no other defence than the freeman's sword; nor to the heavenly throne be raised, in adoration, any other than a freeman's voice; and then, but not till then, shall Germany be capable of assured defence.

Let groves of nodding pikes, and moving spears of free and spontaneous growth, contribute, with the waving rush and quivering reed, to adorn the banks of her frontier rivers; and then, although a thousand bridges shall bestride each stream, it shall still be a barrier as impassable to hostile Gaul or Muscovite as fields of air to the wingless quadruped.

Without freedom, as, to their grief, the Batavians can tell you, MILITARY DEFENCE is only the evidence of complete subjugation; and the more triumphant the success the more hopeless the condition of the defended.

But would we understand how freedom and defence

are to go hand in hand, and how civil liberty is even to gain strength with the increase of military power, then that CONSTITUTION, which is the table of our duties, the record of our rights, and the depository of our liberties, must be the object of our study, and the guide of our steps.

To the sacred book of the CONSTITUTION, first composed in the Saxon tongue and the Saxon style, belongs an estimable leaf on the subject of military defence and common security, which unfaithful trustees, substituting in its place an interpolation of unsound doctrine, big with ruin, disease, and death, have long withhelden from the English eye, although its contents ought to be imprinted on every English heart.

To restore to the sacred book this leaf in its genuine purity, and thereby to illustrate those duties, to vindicate those rights, and to preserve those liberties which are the ends and objects of the CONSTITUTION, is the design of these pages.

Protect then, O, Protectors of your country, this work! It is the work of one who, equally with yourselves, wishes that country to be happy and illustrious; of persecuted mankind, the refuge; of enslaved mankind, the example; of civilized mankind, the glory.

In these pages, Gentlemen, you will see that this testimony of my esteem for your patriotism is not to be interpreted into an approbation of the Volunteer SYSTEM, which owes its existence to very improper motives in former ministers, which lays upon its members a very disproportioned share of a common burden,

and which, in a military view, for the purposes of national defence, is radically defective; and in case our country were to become the seat of war, must personally ruin a very great part of our brave defenders.

J. C.

PREFACE.

It will be discovered by the Reader that the second Volume of this work was written during the life-time of Mr. *Pitt*. As the author had no concern with that gentleman except as the minister of his country, he saw no reason to make any alterations in his work, because of his decease.

On the present occasion, it is the writer's endeavour to show that the systems of defence, respectively proper to a despotic and to a free state, are essentially different; and likewise to prove that, in the very texture of the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, there will be found, by those who shall seek it, a defensive *military* system for our country, as a free state, which, for excellence, has no parallel in the counsels of man.

If a free state, having long neglected her defensive institutions, shall fall into the error of defending herself, in an arduous struggle for preservation, on the principles which belong to states that are despotic, her government, *whatever be the event of the contest with a rival nation*, will inevitably become despotic; or, in other words, *that state will perish, and the people sink into perfect servitude.*

WHY, at this juncture, do the friends of their country endeavour to animate every bosom, and to nerve with vigour every arm, to resist the designs of *France*; but that its dominion would be a government of despotism, and subjection to such authority complete slavery? But, had we at this moment no better system of defence, than that which is common to all despotic states, the *enemy* need not bring hither his sword to destroy our constitution, and deprive us of our freedom.

At our very door we have seen the contrast between the opposite systems of defence. When *Holland* was defended, on a right system, against the Duke of *Alva*, and the arms of *Spain*, the result was *liberty* and *glory*; when recently defended, on a wrong system, against the arms of *England*, the result was *slavery* and *degradation*. The very success of that defence riveted her chains.

When free institutions have fallen into decay and oblivion, there are but few by whom they are understood or regarded; and if the habits of the people are become in any degree unfavourable to their revival, there are not many statesmen who will have sufficient force of mind, or energy of virtue, to set up for reformers of the people's habits, and the restorers of decayed institutions, however excellent in themselves, or how necessary soever they may be to the salvation of the state.

No other system of defence, indeed, as I trust these pages will make manifest, can in any respect compare with that of the *English* constitution. It

absolutely excludes the possibility of our country being *made the seat of war*; and, in that particular alone, it is of incalculable value; its purchase is above all price; its merit beyond all competition.

It is apprehended that, from a mere delineation in the second chapter of this volume, of the practical operation of the system, and how it would prove a security against that dreadful evil, the truth is established beyond a possibility of doubt; and that, in any rational mind, it must follow that the instant we shall be placed in a *constitutional* attitude of defence, in the same instant the *French* Emperor must abandon every thought of invasion. If this be so, as I most assuredly believe it to be, then it should seem that, so long as the enemy shall continue his invasive preparations, so long will there be unquestionable evidence that our system of defence is materially short of constitutional perfection; and Ministers cannot, in my judgment, have a much better test of the soundness of their own measures; neither can they, as I presume to think, receive better advice, than not to lose a single day in providing against the risk here alluded to.

On this reasoning, we must perceive that, as *Bonaparte* could not, in *March* 1803, speculate on the vulnerability of our Empire any where but at *home*, had he then seen us in such a constitutional attitude, we should have had NO WAR; for, daring as he may be, in risking hazardous enterprises, he has too much penetration to attempt impossibilities. When, therefore, we shall know how many millions

per month the war is costing us, we shall exactly know how many millions per month *an adherence to the military branch of our Constitution* would, on this occasion, have saved us.

And the inquiry will further lead us into the discovery, that our CONSTITUTION is no less our best shield against *invasion*, and the best bulwark of our *liberty*, than it is the best protection of our *purses* and *property*. Every successive accumulation of the national debt was the offspring of WAR. Of all human means for the prevention of war, a *cheap* preparedness for it, accompanied by a high martial spirit, is the best. But, obvious as it is that PEACE is the remedy against the evils of debt and taxation; yet, for want of employing the right means of averting war, not even Ministers the most pacifically inclined have been able to keep war from our gates.

From Sir *Robert Walpole*, down to Mr. *Addington*, instead of experiencing a *constitutional prevention* of the cause of national debt, that is, ARMED PREPARATION ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, the nation had been uniformly fed with the hope of an alleviation of its burdens, by the efficacy of a *sinking fund*; but notwithstanding the clearness of the calculations upon *principal and interest*, for proving the practicability of paying off, or keeping down, the debt, the nation had, as uniformly, found the hope delusive; and that it had been sinking deeper and deeper in the gulph of pecuniary distress; and such, if she will not restore her constitution,

must continue to be the case until she be overwhelmed.

Nor would such restoration only preserve us from attack at home, but be the most powerful prevention of war in general ; for, perfectly secure in our own island, the whole of our regular land force, and almost the whole of our navy, would be applicable to foreign services ; affording such an ample security to our foreign possessions as, to all human appearance, should discourage any rival power from attempting to molest them. It is thus, by a constitutional and virtuous government, rendering every individual particle of our physical strength available for our defence, both at home and abroad, that we might indeed put ourselves in a situation to benefit by a *sinking fund*, with a rational prospect, under Ministers moderately wise, provided they were honest, of continuing in honourable peace until we should have experienced the extinction of our debt ; whereas, a contrary conduct may speedily lead to the extinction of our state, and to a condition as abject as that of the *modern Romans*.

But, indeed, without looking any further for a motive to a revival and permanent establishment of the military energies of our Constitution, than to gigantic *France*, a country of thrice our population, under a military despotism, incurably hostile, and sure to strike at our existence, if ever for a moment off our guard ; no Englishman, pretending to fidelity to his country, can knowingly propose to us any system of military security short of THE BEST,

especially when that best system is A VITAL PART OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Much has been said on *offensive* operations being the best *defensive* system; and there is, indeed, mixed with the danger of the experiment, so much military wisdom in the *principle*, that we ought to be guarded against the misapplication of it in practice. The two principal arguments in favour of invading the enemy, who threatens you with invasion, are these: first, that you are thereby to make a diversion of his forces, and find him ample employment at home; and secondly, that it is in the nature of attack to raise the spirits of your own troops and nation, and has a tendency to depress those of the enemy. But when you set about invading the invader, you ought to be certain that he is *somewhere vulnerable* in a degree to give scope to your operations; and you ought to be able to act upon such a scale as to oblige him to employ a very material part of his force in opposing you, or hazard some considerable part of his dominions. And there are other very material considerations to be attended to. Now that all continental alliance is at an end, all ideas of invading the invader must also be at an end.

With regard to the effects to be respectively produced on the spirits of the opposite parties, by elevating those of *England* and depressing those of *France*, if those very effects can be *better* produced by a *defensive* system, carrying *infallibility* on its forehead, then, in that particular case, it is, for many very

powerful reasons, to be preferred. You cannot make a better diversion of the enemy's force than by effectually deterring it from attempting to execute its purpose. And how can you more effectually elevate the spirits of your people, than by placing them in a condition to laugh at the impotence of their enemy?

Restore but the military energies of the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, and then, from that instant, without any figure of speech, you make successful invasion an impossibility; and the enemy, unable to annoy you either abroad or at home, will probably be brought to reasonable terms of peace; for he will scarcely continue a commercial war, when a military war can no longer avail him. But should he still persevere, then will be your time to become yourselves the invaders. Having laid the solid foundations of your own security, your whole regular force might be employed to strike some stroke that should still more than at present deprive him of "ships, colonies, and commerce," and extort from him a peace glorious to our country.

But the offensive system, prematurely adopted, or without great ability, might be full of hazard. Although you should find a vulnerable point, it might not be an adviseable experiment. If you could not strike deep, your enemy might not even parry the blow; but at the same instant pour his troops upon your shores. If, before you hazarded the attempt, you should not have fully restored the military energies of your Constitution,

your offensive force must be comparatively small, and, experiencing a counter-attack, you might be obliged to recal your troops, and possibly under circumstances of disadvantage. In short, whether you meditate attack or defence, it will be found that you have a neglected system, which it is the first duty of every Englishman, from the throne to the cottage, to restore ; not only because, in a *military* view, it is the best system that has yet been the fruit of human invention, but because it is **A VITAL PART OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.**

Besides this idea of *offensive operations being the best defensive system*, there is another system which is directly its opposite, and yet is in high military and political estimation—I mean the *Fabian* system. Hence we see the necessity of looking with caution upon *systems*, and learning to think for ourselves. In consulting history, and the military science, we must learn to distinguish the *circumstances* under which every particular system is to be preferred to another. The two systems I have here noticed are *extremes* ; and it would be easy to show that, when injudiciously adopted, the danger of either of them may also be *extreme*. He, whose counsels should reduce *England* to act upon the *Fabian* system for more than **THREE DAYS** might be the author of incalculable evil.

The *Fabian* maxim even more plainly than its opposite *admits* a defencelessness of condition ; and it turns moreover on the idea of your country not

only becoming *the seat of war*, but of a *tedious and lingering contest*.

It is the object of this work to show that unless parliament and the executive government are unfaithful to their trust, the nation never can be exposed to any danger whatever from invasion, and especially never could be exposed to the grievous affliction of becoming the SEAT OF WAR.

ENGLAND'S ÆGIS;
OR
THE MILITARY ENERGIES
OF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

THE present situation of our country has abundantly called forth the voluntary services, not only of those who wield the sword, but, of those also who hold the pen. In neither of those capacities is it the first time the author has been upon duty. For thirty years of his life he bore the sword in the public service; and for as many, has he been in the frequent habit of holding the volunteer pen.

Seeing that, so far as he has had the means of observing, in the service he now wishes to perform he has not been anticipated by any other writer, and conceiving that service to be of the highest importance he strongly feels the obligation of submitting to his country, and particularly to its brave defenders, his well-considered sentiments.

It is his object to show what are the true *principles of defence*, by which our COUNTRY, in the comprehensive and majestic sense of that word, is to be preserved. It would, of course, be a very negligent performance of this task, were he not to examine the present *temporary mea-*

asures of defence adopted by ministers, and detailed in the statutes which, at their recommendation, and with abundance of confidence in those statesmen, have been passed; and equally would he be to blame, were he not also to pay due attention to that part of the system which they, in common with all modern ministers, consider as their *permanent* reliance, namely, the standing army: or, should he omit to place in comparison with this mixed system of temporary and permanent establishments, that which he conceives to be the true system of our country. To this end, he must retouch the outline of that plan of defence which, five years ago, he drew up and soon afterwards published, in his '*Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Subject of the English Constitution.*' In this plan he pretends not to any originality; but merely to report the wisdom of one mightier than himself, in whose steps he treads, and the latchet of whose shoes he merely hopes he is not unworthy to loose. It is the excellence of this plan that it combines in perfect harmony the rights, the duties, and the liberties of Englishmen; and that, having the simplicity of nature, it has likewise its force; and now, that we are called upon by the presiding minister, to draw the sword in defence of our "*property, our rights, and independence* *," it ought to be no slight recommendation of this plan to him, that it constitutes an essential, a vital part of the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION; which is not a mere civil

* See the speech of Mr. Addington on the 20th June, 1803. "I have no doubt whatever that, should circumstances render it necessary, the great body of the population of the country would, upon an appeal from their sovereign, stand forward in defence of their *rights and independence.*" Perhaps "it is happy for the future interests of this empire that the occasion now offers, of which we should decisively avail ourselves, to show that any projects of attack upon our finances, (*property*) and independence, such as the French government seems to entertain, must be vain and futile."—Mr. Addington was minister when the first edition of this work was published.

government, in the ordinary acceptation of the word *civil*, but a two-fold and admirable system of *civil and military* polity, most happily combined; whereby these two characters, like the faculties of intellectual ability and bodily force in man, are inseparably interwoven, and constitute a complete state or *free* government.

In the ordinary concerns of life, success is not expected to follow, if we despise common prudence, or reject knowledge. In art and in science *false principles* are sure to produce disappointment and discredit; and if, in their contests with *France*, we have seen mighty and confederated nations fall in succession before her, how infinitely important to us is it that, when *England*, single-handed, has to maintain the struggle, she should conduct her defence on *right principles*! He that should deviate through error would be entitled to our compassion; but he who should set right principles at nought, by intentional violation, would incur the deepest blame.

On the mere volunteer adviser of his country lies a weighty responsibility not to trifle with *principles*; how incumbent, then, is it on those, who, by office or station, are responsible for the plans on which that country is really called upon to act! It is, therefore, to be hoped that, at a crisis on which hangs every thing valuable to society, even the existence of the state itself, and thereby perhaps the welfare of a large portion of mankind, that *there are none in public trust and responsibility* who could be capable of *rejecting or erasing*, that which they knew to be imperatively required at their hands by the constitution of their country.

On the subject of *defence*, it is proposed in this work to set before ministers *that* constitution; trusting in their candour not to shut their eyes against truth; and relying on their integrity that their own system, wherever it shall appear to be necessary, shall receive early amendment.

Perhaps it will appear that that part of their system which they make only temporary and occasional, ought to be permanent; and that which they consider as permanent ought only to be temporary and occasional: but let us enter upon the comparison with impartial and dispassionate minds; for that is the only way for arriving at a satisfactory conclusion.

In the preamble to the first of the statutes touching a general arming, (43 Geo. III. c. 55.) we find it properly laid down, that his Majesty has vested in him, *by law*, the necessary powers for repelling invasion; but, in the second statute (c. 96.) it is *improperly* said that he has the *prerogative* of requiring, on such occasions, “*the military services of all his liege subjects.*” Prerogative being defined to be “a discretionary power of acting for the *public good*, where the positive laws are silent*,” it should seem that the application of the word *prerogative* in this latter statute, to express the executive power, is by no means correct; because, in respect of the king’s power to command, on all proper occasions, the military services of all his people, the positive laws are by no means silent; but the contrary.

What in our law books, speaking locally, is called the *posse comitatus*, or power of the county, is, when wanted, the king’s power; and this power in the Saxon times, being properly organized and officered, was the sole *militia* of the land, and infinitely the best it ever experienced. Notwithstanding militias of different descriptions were afterwards, in the reigns of William the Norman, Charles the Second, and George the Second, unhappily introduced, yet that original militia, the *posse comitatus*, disgracefully as it has been neglected†, has, in proof of an intrinsic excellence, to this hour maintained its legal existence, and, as it is expressed by Sir

* Locke on Gov. 2. § 166.—Black’s Com. I. 252.

† Inquiry into the legal Mode of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence, p. 10.

William Jones, it includes "the whole *civil* state, from the duke to the peasant*."

As *law*, nothing indeed is better known than that every able-bodied man belongs to this power, and that every such man is bound to obey the king's proper representative, not only in repelling invasion, but in putting down rebellion or insurrection, or even in suppressing an ordinary tumult; and that the *number* of the *posse*† to be called forth on any such occasion, rests in the discretion of the sheriff or other magistrate, or in that of the king's generals. Here there is no *prerogative* in the case; but a well-ascertained *legal power*, which is a much better thing.

Now, such being the duties of a *posse comitatus*, it is necessarily their duty to be armed equal to such services; as it is incumbent on the legislature also, and the executive government, to look well to the performance of that duty, and to enforce it whenever, through indolence, it is neglected. Whenever, as it is well known, there is such a failure in the duty of common defence, that any one's house, or other premises, is pillaged or destroyed, such failure in the eye of the law is a *crime*, and the whole neighbourhood is *punished*, by the levying on them a fine to the full extent of the damage. This principle indeed is so deeply ingrafted into our law, that the county in which a traveller is robbed on the highway, between sun and sun, must make him amends for not having either prevented the robbery, or, by its *hue and cry*, recovered his property. Here, then, we see the *reason*, on which rests the duty of common defence:—as every one is to have the *benefit*, so every one is to bear the *burden*.

But the *hue and cry* is for the *instant* pursuit of robbers,

* Inquiry into the legal Mode of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence, p. 11.

† *Ib.* 23.

felons, murderers, and other desperate persons*; and the “*cry made for weapons to keep the peace*,” is to suppress riots and rebellions, and to resist enemies†, or to oppose “the sudden coming of strange enemies into the realm‡;” when there is no time to send arms some hundreds of miles; much less for the preparative of “*training and exercise*.” The conclusion is obvious. With such a CONSTITUTION—for it is not by mere *law*, but by inherent right, and from inherent duty, that, as free men, we are ever to be armed,—with such a CONSTITUTION, I say, what must we think of our country, after a ten years war, at the cost of three hundred millions, in which, as we were told, we were fighting for social order, for religion, and for THAT CONSTITUTION itself, being, at the revival of the war in March last§, as utterly unprepared for repelling invasion as was *Belgium* or *Hanover*, when their people respectively were too late called upon to rise *en masse*. There has long been somewhere a mass of blame of great magnitude touching the matter now under consideration; and it were devoutly to be wished we could see a sincere disposition in the administration of executive government to benefit their country by a substantial amendment.

On the part both of the legislature and the executive government in early times it was the sound and *honest* policy to preserve alive the energies of the *posse comitatus*, or *Saxon* militia, and wholesome statutes from time to time were enacted for that purpose; besides which the books abound with reports, in which the duties of its members are clearly laid down||; which statutes and reports, and the

* 13 Ed. 2. c. 4.

† Jones's Inquiry, 27. Poph. 121, 122.

‡ Disc. on Estab. National Const. Force, by Lord *Liverpool*, 1791, p. 23. § 1803.

|| See this part of the law brought into a focus by Sir *H. Jones* in his Inquiry.

whole of the law, except only its *finer and punishments*, it has been the misfortune of later times to see “disgracefully neglected,” as six and twenty years ago was feelingly lamented by Sir *William Jones*, but alas ! to little purpose.

The arming in ancient times was properly regulated by the pecuniary ability of the party ; as we see by the 13th of *Edward the First*, (called the *English Justinian*) § 2. c. 6. which commands, “ That every man have in his house
 “ harness for to keep the peace after the *ancient* assize :
 “ that is to say, every man between 15 years of age and
 “ 60 years shall be assessed, and *sworn* to armour according
 “ to the quantity of their lands and goods ; that is to wit,
 “ from 15 pounds lands, and goods 40 marks, an hauberk, a
 “ breast-plate of iron, a sword, a knife, and a horse ; and
 “ from 10 pounds of lands, and 20 marks goods, an hauberk,
 “ a breast-plate of iron, a sword, and a knife ; and from 5
 “ pounds lands, a doublet, a breast-plate of iron, a sword,
 “ and a knife ; and from 2 pounds land, and more, unto 5
 “ pounds of land, a sword, a bow and arrows, and a knife ;
 “ and he that hath *less* than 40 shillings yearly, shall be
 “ sworn to keep gis-arms, knives, and other less weapons ;
 “ and he that hath *less* than 23 marks in goods shall have
 “ swords, knives, and other less weapons ; and *all other* that
 “ may shall have bows and arrows *out* of the forest, and *in*
 “ the forest bows and bolts. And that *view of armour* be
 “ made every year two times. And in every hundred and
 “ franchise, two constables shall be chosen to make the
 “ view of armour. And the constables aforesaid *shall pre-*
 “ *sent* before justices assigned such *defaults* as they shall
 “ see in the country about armour, &c. And the *justices*
 “ assigned *shall* present at every parliament unto the king
 “ such defaults as they shall find, and the *king shall pro-*
 “ *vide remedy therein.*”

Such indeed was the provident care to keep the people armed, and in readiness for the performance of their duties,

the law of Hen. VIII c. 9. every man was to have "a
 bow and arrows ready continually in his house; every
 "servant of 17 years of age was to have a bow and four
 "arrows continually for himself, at his proper costs and
 "charges;" and for every "man-child being of the age of
 "seven years and above," the parent was to keep "a bow
 "and two shafts;" and all were to be regularly "trained
 "and exercised" to the use of these arms, whether in war
 or in peace, under severe penalties. Now if it be not more
 the duty of the taxed householder than of those of lower con-
 dition to keep arms, and to learn the use of them, it certainly
 is more his *interest*; for, in whose keeping can the property
 of a nation be so securely placed as in that of its owners?
 And on whom falls the disgrace and the punishment, when
 rioters commit spoil and mischief, but on those who are as-
 sessed to the taxes? Nor, indeed, is the law and obligation
 of arms-bearing merely just and equitable; for, if we value
 either our honour or our freedom, it is indispensably neces-
 sary, since it is that condition precisely which distinguishes
 free men from slaves. A modern writer has well observed
 that, "where the government only is armed, there despotism
 "is established*;" and certainly nothing can be more self-
 evident. The words of *Aristotle*, much older than Chris-
 tianity, are likewise striking: "Those," says he, "who
 "command the arms in a country are masters of the state,
 "and have it in their power to make what revolutions they
 "please†." Hence, so long as the government of this
 country keeps up a large standing army, if *many times the*
number of that army shall not in the *civil* state be in the
 habit of arms-bearing, the liberties of the country must as in-
 evitably perish, as the liberties of every other country, in
 which the government only was armed, have perished.

* Young's Travels, 550.

† Polit. vii. 9.

Sir *William Jones*, considering how arms-bearing, in consequence of court-policy on one hand, and the indolence of the people on the other hand, had fallen into disuse, is careful to remove, for the benefit of cautious persons, every doubt on that important duty. He first quotes the weightiest legal authorities, and then draws these, amongst other conclusions: "That since the musquet and bayonet are found
 " by experience to be the most effectual arms, all persons,
 " who constitute the power of a county, are bound to be
 " completely skilled in the use of them.

" That since the only safe and certain mode of using them
 " with effect is by acting in a body, it is the duty of the
 " whole civil state to know the platoon exercise, and to
 " learn it in companies *."

Aware, however, at the time of his writing, of the profound ignorance of some, and of the extravagant prejudices of others, he recommends that such companies as shall have
 " voluntarily associated for the sole purpose of joining the
 " power, when legally summoned, and, with that view,
 " have learned the proper use of their weapons, street-firing,
 " and the various evolutions necessary in action," should be
 " taught, in the most private and orderly manner, for two or
 " three hours early every morning, until competently skilled,
 " and not unnecessarily march through streets or high roads,
 " nor make any the least *military* parade, but consider
 " themselves entirely as of the *civil* state †."

It is lamentable to think of our country having been so circumstanced, that a man of profound wisdom and exalted virtue, while expounding the law, should feel the necessity of recommending such circumspection in obeying it that, in so doing, his countrymen should not incur the displeasure of their rulers!—*of those rulers who were in the perpetual neglect and violation of THEIR duty, in not enforcing universal obedience to the law.*

* *Jones's Inquiry*, 19.

† *Ib.* 37.

In the year 1782, I had the honour to consult Sir *William* on the correctness of a "*Declaration of Rights, without which no Englishman can be a Freeman, nor the English Nation a Free People*;" as well as upon the propriety of notes that were subjoined. To find such a man speak with satisfaction on "the similarity of our political sentiments," and call the declaration "an excellent paper, which ought to be written on the heart of every Englishman," I need not say was highly gratifying; neither need I state with how much complacency one who had the approbation and friendship of a Sir *William Jones* could smile at illiberalties* he has since experienced on account of those "political sentiments." The postscript to that letter, dated May 23, 1802, is in these words: "It is my deliberate (though private) opinion, that " the people of England will never be a people, in the majestic sense of the word, unless *two hundred thousand* of " the *civil* state be ready, before the first of next November, " to take the field without rashness or disorder, at twenty-four hours notice."

We have seen that the late statutes already referred to, in declaring the general obligation to military service, for preserving the peace, putting down rebellion, or resisting invasion, have spoken only the language of the constitution and common law, and, if ministers, for reasons best known to themselves, have thought fit, while the danger of *invasion* still hangs over us, and while the courts in one part of the united kingdom have been occupied in trying and condemning many persons for *rebellion*, to SUSPEND the operation of those

* The Anti-Jacobin Reviewers are not to compliment themselves by supposing this expression alluded to them; as it was not until six weeks after the first publication of this work the author met with their scurrilities of May, 1803, on his *Letter to the Electors of Nottingham*. He should think meanly of his own labours in the cause of *English* liberty and honour had he not obtained their cordial hatred, and provoked their vulgar and profligate criticism.

statutes, as to the training and exercise of a large majority of the *posse comitatus*, that is a matter, not for me, but, for them to explain. It is not, however, very consistent with the doctrine laid down in those statutes of the universal obligation to come at the king's call to suppress *armed* rebels, or to encounter *the veteran legions of French invaders*, that ministers should do any thing to discourage a great majority of the people *from qualifying themselves to perform those duties*. This is somewhat different from requiring all men to be “*sworn to armour two times in every year* *;” and from levying penalties on them if not provided with arms and with butts to shoot at; or for neglecting but for a few weeks to “*use themselves in shooting* †.”

When we contemplate the nature and principles of our government; when we see the extremely perilous situation of *Ireland*, and the necessity to be at liberty, if the war be carried into that country, to send thither every disposeable soldier in *Great Britain*; when we consider the hostility and the power of *France*; when we reflect on *the state of our finances*, and on the pressure of taxes for supporting the enormous expense of our military establishment in a standing army, under the two denominations of regulars and of militia; and when we take into our recollection that the *posse comitatus* is an actual MILITIA, *an essential part of our constitution*, the cheapest of all means of defence, and at the same time infinitely the most powerful; when, I say, we allow due weight to all these considerations, I confess that I should have thought much better than I do of the statutes in question, had it been the object of them to have revived the genuine *posse comitatus*, instead of introducing *various novelties* of a very different character.

As in voyaging across a dangerous sea in a tempestous season, the preservation or the loss of the ship must very greatly

* See p. 7.

† Hen. VIII. c. 9.

depend upon the keeping of a true or a false reckoning, so, in a vindictive conflict between two rival empires for the mastery, the preservation or the loss of the state which is attacked, will probably in a very high degree depend on the defence being conducted on true or on false principles. Hence the importance of knowing what *are* our true principles of defence, and where to find them.

Happily in our own case they are easily pointed out; and it is still more happy for us that, making vital parts of that CONSTITUTION for which we are to fight, an *English People* will be disposed to adopt them with fervour, and to act upon them with enthusiasm; for a CONSTITUTION whose *military* excellencies are fully equal to its *civil* perfections, must, especially at such a trying crisis as the present, be doubly endeared to the hearts of those who are to live under it.

It must be almost superfluous to observe that those who administer *such* a CONSTITUTION have in their hands the *two* fountains,—of national UNANIMITY and national ENTHUSIASM. May their fidelity and their wisdom set free those fountains, and present, in the presence of admiring earth and approving heaven, the sublime spectacle of a great nation drawing the sword in defence of its rights, determined to live free, or to die fighting!

Let ministers, however, be jealous of officious partizans who may attempt to promote a spurious unanimity on false foundations; for all such attempts, being against *Defence on Right Principles*, may but too probably, in the hour of trial, be found to have produced effects the most pernicious.

As, in time of peace, a total absence of the military in support of the civil powers of the Constitution would soon bring it to a dissolution, so, in time of war, if we ignorantly attempt to supersede its civil energies, under a false idea of increasing its military strength, we shall soon make havoc of the whole.

For the honour of his country, the author hopes he shall never see an *English* general lead an *English* soldier to battle, deprived of his reason—of his *intellectual ability*—by the use of *Turkish* opium, or *French* brandy, in order to inflame his courage, and cause a momentary augmentation of *bodily force*: and he equally hopes never to see the *English* government put the *English* nation in *military* array under any species of intoxication, that should cause it for one moment to forget its *civil rights* and its *civil duties*. No; give the slave opium, and the soldier of despotism brandy, to intoxicate him for the battle with the fury of a beast! The free man's courage is highest when his reason is most clear, when he knows the inestimable value of that for which he fights, and when he enters the conflict conscious of being, in the full sense of the word, a man. Seeing liberty in victory, and slavery in defeat, the battle has no terrors; for nothing he dreads but degradation and shame. Such men may be slain, but cannot be conquered. And, as a stimulus to glorious actions, to endurance of privation, to perseverance under all difficulties, how infinitely the god-like enthusiasm of such men surpasses the drunken fury of brutalized wretches who fight in chains for the choice of masters; or the infatuation of those, who, by having surrendered their liberty to an unprincipled usurper, have become the mechanical instruments of his ambition!

The author trusts that these views of his subject will fully justify the course he has taken, in unfolding the principles of defence on which we now ought to act. It is not mere WAR in which we are engaged: it is a conflict with a rival and a despotic state for our POLITICAL EXISTENCE. We are not, therefore, to resort for advice exclusively to the camp; nor to study our defence under those only to whom war is a trade and soldiery a profession: we must not place our sole reliance on martial tactics and discipline, on trenches and manœuvres, on plans of field operation and displays of

generalship. These are but of *secondary* consideration ; and when we contemplate the nature of our state as above delineated, we shall find that, for the purposes of *defence*, we attach to what is *scientific* in the art of war far more importance than it merits ; and as we have already had cause to caution our readers against too readily adopting certain favourite opinions on the subject of *defence*, so we shall even discover that some of the most celebrated maxims in the science of war are mere fallacies, calculated to mislead us into dangerous and disgraceful error.

It is not meant to depreciate the military character, which has shone so illustriously on many a well fought field ; but merely to show that, *for national defence on English land*, we depend not in the smallest degree upon any other species of military force than that which is inseparably interwoven with civil freedom in the very texture of our CONSTITUTION ; which by making every citizen a soldier, has placed our security infinitely above the trumpery of the modern parade, and even above all that is called *science* in modern war. Would Englishmen, therefore, understand the true principles of national defence, let them resort not only to the camp but to the CONSTITUTION !

CHAPTER II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENERGIES FOR REPELLING
INVASION.

How much, for some years past, we have been warned against *innovating* upon the Constitution, the reader need not to be reminded. He will find no innovation in the plan of defence now about to be submitted to him : but it will enable him to fix the stamp of *dangerous and ruinous innovation* upon other systems, which, unhappily for our country, have at different periods found introduction ; and particularly on the new system of defence of his Majesty's ministers.

It is to be kept in mind that our free *Saxon* militia wholly rests on *civil* foundations, and that arms-bearing is only a part of the duty of every *citizen*, who, although occasionally *military*, is not so in the modern sense of the word, by which we now understand a soldier, hired for his "SOLD," or his pay, and subject to military law ; that is, to the mutiny act, and to articles of war framed *by the crown alone*. In the early periods of our constitution, before its genuine *Saxon* institutions were debased by the *Norman* alloy, the same elections gave at once civil power and military command ; as must needs be the case when it was the object at once to organize the whole community for the purposes of regulation and security. How admirable the institution which gives the choice of military commanders to those whose liberties are the objects of preservation ! and which never creates a military officer of important rank without constituting at the same time, and in the same person, a civil magistrate, necessitated to become conversant with the laws of his country, and having no interest but in preserving the Constitution !

Although we admit that, in the constitution of a standing army, election by the *soldiers* would not be a right principle in the appointment of *officers*, yet we must not carry our *military* ideas into the organization of *civil* society, even when its martial purposes are under consideration. Nor are the elections here spoken of to be by the *soldiers* of the *posse comitatus* after formed into their respective corps, nor without proper qualifications, as will be hereafter seen in its proper place. A *standing army* and a *posse comitatus* are of totally different natures, and to serve totally different purposes. The former is for foreign services, for which the latter is wholly unfit; and the latter for home defence, for which the former is both unfit and inadequate. A standing army is a body hired for certain purposes BY the *posse comitatus*—for the *posse comitatus* is “the whole *civil* state from the duke to the peasant*.” The constitution of a standing army is, and to make it good for any thing must be, *despotic*; the constitution of the civil state is, and to preserve it must be, *free*.

The standing army of *Charles VII.* of *France*, was the first in *Europe*. His pretended fears of an invasion from the *English* in order to recover their lost territories in that kingdom, together with the dread his subjects had of such an enemy, prevented them from seeing the danger to public liberty from this measure. *It soon brought the military power of the feudatory barons into contempt, and their services in the field into disuse* †.

Similar causes have produced similar effects on the condition of the modern representatives of the ancient barons of *England*: which causes, together with the consequences of the civil policy of *Henry VII.* have shorn the peerage of much of its ancient honours, and of its dignified estimation in the eye of the people; as well as of its influence on

* Jones's Inquiry, 14.

† Robertson's Charles V. vol. i. p. 113.

the happiness of the country. The military commands in highest estimation, and which hold precedence in the field, formerly the grand theatre of the noble, are no longer theirs; but in the hands of a profession. A nobleman now, if an insurrection spring up under his nose, or if a privateer land to pillage his estate, has no *power of the county*, to come at a call and repel the insult, or restore the public tranquillity. What could be so degrading to nobility, the descendants of ancient barons, as the infamous riots and conflagrations at *Birmingham*, when peers of the realm were seen soothing and flattering, and beseeching the miscreants they ought to have been in a situation of deterring from showing their impious heads; or to have crushed by the strong hand of military power, the moment they had commenced their mischiefs?

And can the nobleman and man of family and fortune look back to that day of England's foul dishonour, when her capital was in flames, and at the mercy of the veriest brutes that ever bore human shape; while lords were skulking from their habitations in affright? Can they, I say, look back to such events, and not rejoice in helping to restore to full vigour and energy those laws which must at once give into their hands, under an orderly system regularly depending upon the crown, the whole military force of the kingdom, and to their country assured tranquillity and repose, although the storm of war were ravaging and afflicting every other state in *Europe*?

In the enrolment of a militia, the first step dictated by reason is to secure, and to enforce, the arming of all without exception, to whom the *property* of a country belongs, and to whom its tranquillity is most an object of interest. This, in the writer's plan that has been spoken of, as published a few years ago, was therefore proposed. But in the case of the clergy, of female householders, a few official persons, and those above sixty years of age, the law was to describe some

fit person, such as a relative, a domestic servant, or natural connexion, on whom the obligation should fall, of using the arms provided by the principal; which, agreeably to ancient law and sound wisdom, should ever be kept in *the house of the owner*. On authority of the calculations of Mr. Pitt, of these householders, I reckoned *eight hundred thousand*.

Upon “*cry made for weapons to keep the peace,*” who are the persons to whom that cry should be directed? who the fittest to be armed and come forth on the instant? Those to be sure who are most interested in preserving tranquillity,—the persons of property, the householders who pay the taxes. But by the General Defence Act of 1803, c. 96, the arms of volunteers are ridiculously ordered to be deposited in “the church or chancel, or” &c. “under the custody and care of the churchwardens, elders, constables, schoolmasters, and other parochial officers;” so that insurgents intending mischief first collect on a sudden at the depot and add twofold force to their naked strength by seizing the arms which ought to be employed against them; and even should they find musquets without locks, still they arm themselves and disarm the civil power!!! Such is the trash of *dependent* creatures when they gabble about “the population of the country standing forward in defence of their *rights and independence!*” What conceptions must these courtiers have of the *rights and independence of Englishman*, who, after training and exercise to qualify themselves for resisting a *French* tyrant, are not even to march home to their own houses with the honours of war, but are to have their arms taken from them by “the churchwardens, constables, and schoolmasters” of the parish! I certainly cannot express the feelings of others, but the constable who should have offered me such an indignity would have stood in danger of feeling my bayonet in his body

Then, in order to give this militia all the strength of its original institution, and in consideration of the inability of those beneath the condition of taxed householders, to bear the expense of fire-arms and accoutrements, it was proposed to provide arms at the public expense for *four hundred thousand* more: those arms being committed to the care of the tax-bearers, to whom of course they belonged, to be kept in the houses highest rated in every parish to the window tax, and, as nearly as might be, only one stand of such arms in a house; being at the same time deposited as near the dwelling of him who was to use them as possible. These *four hundred thousand* may be taken by ballot, from the untaxed part of the community, between the same ages as before, namely, 15 and 60; and such only as are able to bear arms.

‘ But *all* such persons, some one may say, are members of ‘ the *posse comitatus*, that is, of the proper *militia*; *all* are ‘ liable to the burden of defence, as *all* partake of the benefit ‘ of protection.’ It is very true: And *all* may be armed, according to their pecuniary ability; some with pikes, or spears, or swords, and some with *staves*, now the ordinary weapon of the constable. As I am not now penning a statute, it is not necessary here to go into all the minutiae of organization; but it may be well to say that the proposal of keeping the fire-arms, purchased by the holders of property, in their own possession, does not proceed from a desire of *disarming*; for all those of the ballot, for occasionally using those arms, ought to have arms of their own also, such as they could conveniently purchase: nor would I even debar such as chose it from arming themselves, at their own “ costs and charges,” with musquets, and keeping them in their own houses. Happy were it for our country had she a hardy peasantry, too high-minded to take the field with borrowed arms; and, armed as *property* ought to be, and fortified as it ought to be, by a law of arms and

police suited to such a state of things, individuals of evil dispositions would feel a much tighter curb on their licentiousness, than any thing experienced since the original laws of the *posse comitatus* fell into disuse.

It was proposed to divide *England* into eight military districts ; one of which should comprehend a large portion of the central country, rich in population ; and each of the other seven, an extensive tract of coast, with a depth of country in-land, until it there abutted upon the central district ; excepting only the S. W. district, which was made to extend from *Abbotsbury* to the *Land's-end*, and from the *Land's-end* again to *Bristol*. Lines of bisection, from the coast inwards, were to cut each external district into two sub-divisions, of equal magnitude as nearly as might be : But here again the peculiar situation and form of the S. W. district dictated a bisection from *Dartmouth* to *Biddeford* ; that is, from coast to coast. The bisection of the central district ran from *Leicester* to *Ledbury*. But the whole distribution will be seen in the map prefixed to this work. I have now, for reasons that will arise, to suggest, in its proper place, a further distribution of the maritime districts into *border* and *interior* ; the border to extend about fifteen or twenty miles from the coast.

“ It is proposed that each of the first seven of these military districts should be wholly answerable, to the utmost of its ability, for the defence of its maritime border ; and liable to sustain the charge of this defence by an equal assessment on property throughout its territory ; with the exception of fortifying docks, or for other objects properly *national*, and for which parliament ought to provide ; and with the further exception of having, on occasions of real attack, such a certain reasonable reimbursement of a part of the expense from the central district, (to which every maritime district would be a protection) as parliament should direct. Thus the inhabitants of the coast, and of the most inland parts, would be com-

pletely *linked together in one interest and one duty*, and the exertion of all would be equally insured. On the same principle of law that we now, in cases of loss by riot or insurrection, recover our damages of the *Hundred*, because it was the duty of its inhabitancy to have defended our property, every person who should suffer in his property from invasion of foreign enemies, ought equally to have his remedy at law, against the whole inhabitancy of the military district, or sub-division; not only as a matter of justice, but of sound policy.

“ But as the 5th, or South West military district, would have a double maritime frontier to defend, with comparatively a small inland territory and population for the supply of military strength; and as the central district would have no coast of its own, and would be very fruitful in people, it ought at all times of danger to furnish strong permanent succours towards the security of that weaker and more exposed district; especially as places of such importance as *Plymouth* and *Bristol* lie within its limits.

“ Nor is this all the military service to be required of the central district; it being intended as a resource to all the others; and its military force designed as an *army of reserve*, for supporting any and every other district that should stand in need of assistance: abutting upon every one of them except the 5th, for whose support provision is already made, its succours would always be at hand, and the intelligence of an enemy's appearance would be its signal for assembling a competent part of its force in the most convenient quarters, to be held in readiness for a march: but such force ought not to advance until actual necessity required, and the proper orders, by telegraph or otherwise, should arrive.”

Here, in central districts, is a body which probably would not be less than *one hundred and sixty thousand* strong, that must ever remain as a true *army of reserve*. The circumstances attending the recent raising of one mercenary force

of 40,000 for *Great Britain* only, called an *Army of Reserve*, and another of 60,000, called *Supplementary Militia*, are sufficient evidences that our military system wanted a complete reform. In a future page something will be said on the expense incurred on this occasion.

But, in order that neither the industry of the country might be too much interrupted*, nor its tranquillity unnecessarily disturbed, it is proposed that each military sub-division (being a more considerable tract of country than almost any ancient *Grecian* state) should, *in the first instance*, be answerable for repelling invasion on its own particular frontier, if such invasion were not very *formidable*; nor should the forces of the other part even of the same district march to its assistance without express orders from the commanding officer of that district: much less should the succours from the central district pass their own boundary, without a like order.

If, under such a system as we have proposed, the possibility of an hostile descent could be supposed, advantages not yet noticed would result.

As the *borders* of the maritime districts would always be the first scenes of action, it should be made the duty of all officers, residing within the same, to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the ground; and a general, together with an engineer, should at appointed times act as their instructors. As these officers of militia would necessarily have the post of honour, they would doubtless be ambitious to show themselves worthy of it; studying to view the country with a military eye, and to distinguish all its points

* The use of standing armies depopulates in two ways: it not only deprives industry of so many hands as the armies contain, but it greatly discourages matrimony, and the rearing of families. Besides which, the dissolute manners of a professional soldiery have pernicious effects in society; which it should be an object of every wise statesman as much as possible to prevent.

of strength, where an invading enemy could be best checked, or most effectually resisted; by means of woods, morasses, rivers, cliffs, the intersection of hedges, ditches, or walls; or the positions of houses, mills, &c. &c. They would observe where roads could most easily be broken up, and would keep in their minds the situations favouring an ambush: into which it should seem not difficult to draw an enemy on first entering a country, unless he employed a circumspection that must impede his progress.

Thus every gentleman of sense and reflection would become in a considerable degree a general and an engineer: he would feel confidence in his own powers, and have the confidence of those who served under him. No such officer could at any time traverse the country, whether on business or pleasure, without naturally amusing himself with its military capabilities. Besides, the *borders* being thus perfectly known to those charged with their defence, to excite their vigilance and inflame their courage, their own property and dwellings, their wives, parents, children, and kindred, would be the immediate objects of their protection. These are considerations of no small importance; but which are wholly defeated by the present rule, of always removing the militia from its own county. The inhabitants of the interior part of each sub-division, being equally subject to all *expense* from a protraction of the war with those lying nearer the coast, would be prompt in bringing forward their succours, and ready with their purses for all measures calculated to keep distress and danger at a distance from themselves. The least they can in reason do is thus to contribute equally to all *expense* with the inhabitants of the *borders*; who, in addition to their pecuniary contribution, must necessarily be the first to experience all the evils and all the dangers of invasion.

But when not only a full contribution towards all *expense*, but towards making good also all *damage* that might be done by invaders on the *borders*, should be certain of fall-

ing upon the more inland inhabitants of a sub-division, it would give them the feelings, not of mere auxiliaries to those on the borders, but of *principals* in the whole contest ; it would keep them alive to the probabilities of an original attack, and render them impatient to share in the defence.

The consciousness of being a member, if I may so express it, of a well organized *local* state, destined to act a distinct part for the good of the whole, would, to a general love of an *Englishman's* country, add a powerful and glowing sentiment of local patriotism, in which every one would feel his own personal utility and importance, more than while contemplating himself as an individual of a kingdom or empire composed of separate nations. This local state would be the theatre on which each man, in the discharge of his military duties even in times of peace, might hope to establish the reputation of a good citizen, and on which, in case of invasion, his achievements must be performed under the eye of those with whom he passed his life ; and within a neighbourhood where his name and character would be universally known. How such a system framed with judgment might be made productive of public virtue, to the benefit and happiness of society, the discerning must perceive. In modelling such a system it would require but ordinary skill in legislation, to give it a military soul, compatible with all the occupations of civil life, causing martial exercises to be a perpetual source of pleasure and honest pride, and laying the sure foundations of an exact and strict discipline while in the performance of military duties.

Such a system, instead of producing “ *distant movements*,” such as were spoken of in General Orders at *Colchester*, on the 30th of December 1803, and mortifying and harassing marches and counter-marches by reason of an insufficiency of force for every where facing an enemy attempting to land, would provide for always meeting an enemy *on lines of the shortest distance and in spaces of the shortest time*, which constitute the perfection of military movements :

and the œconomy of *power* as well as of *money* which it must occasion, must be beyond calculation. When we observe the same regiments for ever shifting their stations from east to west, and north to south, traversing and re-traversing the three kingdoms in all directions, what waste of money and what waste of power must attend all these movements! And when, instead of providing for always meeting an invading enemy with an adequate force, *on lines of the shortest distance and in spaces of the shortest time*, we see parliamentary provision under which our volunteers may be marched from *Cornwal to Scotland, from Scotland to Kent*, and from *Kent again to Cumberland*, as exigencies should require; and when we observe a system which from its own nature is likely to call for such marches, what a contrast we must discover, and how much we must lament that such advantage should be given an enemy threatening our country either with destruction, or with desolation!

Why is the ship owner, besides his fair quota of public expense, to have thrown personally upon him an extra charge for any peculiar equipment of his coasting vessels? Why, in addition to his proportion of every tax, is the farmer inhabiting the *border*, to devote to the artillery the horses without which his land cannot be tilled? Why are the *borderers* to be at the sole expense of batteries, or lines, or other defences, on the coast, by which the inhabitants of the interior are thereby *equally* benefited, and *far more protected*? It is a case somewhat in point that, in the last war, a few individuals on the *Lincolnshire* coast, through zeal for the public service, erected beacons, flag-staves, &c. for making signals, and found in the end that their zeal was to be its own reward; for no soul contributed a farthing to the expense, nor was it defrayed by government.

He, who has ever read Doctor *Franklin's* admirable tale of a horseman losing his life by neglecting to replace in time a single nail in the shoe of his horse, will easily comprehend

the fatal consequences that may ensue to the whole kingdom, from the want of a right system of union, between those who inhabit the *border* and those who dwell in the *interior*, in matters of common expense, and mutual protection and support.

The whole of this system would receive its life and energy from the nobility and gentry of the country, as then being the civil magistrates and military officers by whom it must be carried into execution ; and whose prime interest it would be to watch over the principles of its foundation, to cherish its spirit, and, by a due obedience to the laws enacted for its existence and regulation, carefully to guard against its neglect and decline. Thus would the noblemen and gentlemen of *England* once more rise from that dangling court dependence and frivolous insignificance, to which a mistaken government has in a great measure reduced them, to situations of real dignity and importance in the state ; and, by taking their proper posts, civil and military, in such an organization, they would have every influence in their counties, and all that affection and attachment of their neighbours which are so grateful to men qualified to shine in such a sphere.

In respect to engineers and artillery, let the present corps, as seminaries, remain. But a contemplation of the foregoing system will show it must put an end to all jealousy on the part of government ; and, consequently, to whatever obstructs a complete defence of the country. In every subdivision of England, then, there ought to be at least four particular rallying-points, or *military stations* ; which should be the depots of its cannon, with all their ammunition and apparatus. At these military stations, while the cavalry and light corps flew to the point of descent, to reconnoitre and to harass the enemy, the grand columns of infantry should first rendezvous, and with their own overwhelming numbers advance to put an end to the invasion and the in-

vaders: not by attacking in bodies of unwieldy or unnecessary magnitude, but proportioned to that of the enemy; so that every man of the body making an attack might get into close fight; and so that, if the first attack failed, another with fresh troops might be made; and still, if necessary, another, and another, until further resistance should be beyond the powers of exhausted human nature to support. But, whenever our superiority should be great, no attack ought to be made without first sending a summons to surrender, in hopes of preventing the effusion of human blood.

Cold and unfeeling must be the heart, and clouded the understanding, of that statesman, who does not provide for his country's defence in its *freedom*. What an idea do we form of the energies of liberty, when we contemplate *Attica*—whose territory was far less extensive than one sub-division of our proposed military districts—resisting the invasion of the *Persian* monarch, the powerful descendant of the all-conquering *Cyrus*!—We see the *Persian*, to make sure of his prey, pour into this little *Grecian* state 100,000 chosen men. Ten thousand *Athenian* citizens arm, and march; and they are joined by one thousand *Platæans*. Meanwhile the invaders penetrate to within twenty miles of *Athens*. Jealous of the *Athenian* fame, and anxious to share with their ally in the glory of defending their common country, or to perish in the attempt, the hardy sons of *Lacedæmon* march two hundred and ten miles in three days*.—Unpa-

* According to Dr. *Gillies*; but it seems to be an error. Although the question, respecting Greek measure, may not be decided among the learned, still the improbability of such a march being within the powers of an *army*, is strongly against the opinion of those who contend for the stadium being of so great a length as some represent. *Isocrates* calls this march 1200 stadia, which, at 604 English feet to the stadium, according to *Guilietiere*, brings it down to 137 miles and a fraction. This being nearly 46 miles a day, is still a surprising march for an *army* to continue for three successive days. This admeasurement corresponds tolerably with the distance between *Sparta* and *Marathon*, upon the maps in my possession.

ralleled effort! Glorious enthusiasm!—But they have the mortification to arrive too late. The eleven thousand have already triumphed, and immortalized the field of MARATHON!

The artillery should be first provided by parliament: but ever after upheld at the expense of the military sub-division to which it belonged. The military stations might each be the residence of a general officer, and a staff adapted to the system; and their best positions would be at a distance of some miles from the sea, not merely to guard against surprise, but for the purpose of pouring down upon any given point in the greater force; for the latter of which reasons these parks of artillery should be formed at those points from whence branched off the greatest number of roads to the different parts of the coast. And regard should likewise be had to their lying upon roads of ready communication between the sub-divisions of the same district. And the system itself is on so very large a scale as to furnish the means of greatly lessening at least, if not of wholly obviating, the inconveniencies which might be supposed to result to our present military officers, whenever the army might be reduced. If any thing of that kind remained to be done, the nation ought to do it amply and nobly.

It will at one glance be seen that, although the writer retains the true principle and spirit of *Alfred's* military system, yet he has endeavoured to accommodate it, in a somewhat more complete form than he found it, to our future defence. Seeing the enormous power to which *France* has attained, and looking forward to that period when she must have at her command a powerful navy, as well as to the *possible* separation of *Ireland* from our empire, (unless justice be done that much-injured country) it has appeared to the writer to be the truest wisdom not to lose a moment in forming arrangements, whereby *every portion and every point of our coast* would, at all times, have the most com-

plete security; and by means of which every particle of national force might, on one uniform, simple, all-embracing system, with ease be brought into action, with the utmost celerity and the most perfect order. *And, when the state is sinking under its pecuniary burdens, and cannot much longer, in any considerable degree, defend itself by the extravagant invention of hired armies, the absolute necessity of cutting off the expense of them has in no small degree confirmed him in his admiration of the ancient constitutional system.* And perhaps a wise statesman will think the present the fittest time for so radical a change in our military system; as the necessity of the greatest preparations, and the enormous weight of the expense, are now both strongly impressed on the public feeling, and must in the highest degree tend to recommend a system, which gives *invincible strength, without exertion; and perfect security, without expense*: for surely it were an affront to manhood to call the mere military exercise an *exertion*; and equally an affront to our understandings, to call a saving of many millions per annum an *expense*.

If the mercantile part of our volunteers now experience an inconvenient *tax upon their time* in acquiring the military capabilities, by which they are to become a rampart to their country against *Gallie* irruption, the necessity has been caused by that criminal neglect of the military energies of the Constitution which is complained of in these pages. Our statesmen are now bending the stubborn oak, because their predecessors did not bend the supple osier. Had every *Englishman* been made expert in military evolutions when a boy at school, we should not have had all this laborious drilling in advanced age. Had the whole community been early trained to arms, the use of them would have been through life easy, familiar, and pleasant; the occasional exercises at stated periods might be made agreeable recreations from business; and an annual meeting might be ren-

dered an interesting military festival. *So methodised*, military attendances would not interrupt mercantile business ; but *so prepared*, ENGLAND WOULD NEVER KNOW THE DANGER OF INVASION, NOR HEAR THE THREAT.

Considering that our rival is become a military despotism of the most formidable character, and that, in consequence of the recent additions of pay and allowances, *fifty thousand* troops now cost us more than *one hundred thousand* did ten years ago, every able citizen must now either become a bearer of arms, or too probably a hewer of wood and drawer of water.

Between two rival *nations*, both of which were *completely* armed, if either could entertain the mad idea of invading the other, the defensive nation, if she acted with common prudence, must soon wear out the other with expense. In order to *invade*, armies must be kept in the field, in all the forms, and with all *the expense* of war ; whereas, the nation to be attacked, especially if a sea intervene, may be carrying on all her productive operations of the plough, the anvil, and the loom, much the same as in peace ; and with no more troops in actual pay than just sufficient for centinels on the coast. Her country is her camp : on a signal she is under arms ; and wherever an enemy can land, he must be shortly met by a force infinitely superior, and one that must hourly increase in magnitude, as his melts away.

How far the author's proposed military districts and subdivisions of the kingdom, and the defensive arrangements locally belonging to each respectively, may be considered as an improvement of the ancient system, or preferable to modern districts without such arrangements, must be left to the decision of military and political judges.

To proceed a little further in explanation, without attempting to go into very minute detail, he would then propose that each military sub-division of England should be further divided into *weapontakes*, agreeably to the ancient

military division of our counties; and that as many parishes, hamlets, and townships as should contain 1800 taxable houses, (as nearly as might be) should be formed into one *weapontake*. Then supposing, (for sake of the explanation) 1800 to be the precise number, each *weapontake* would furnish its *brigade* of 2700 men. This force, with a view not only to national defence, but to the counteracting also of any inconvenient notions of equality, might be thus distributed:

No. I.
EACH WEAPON TAKE.

Denominations.	Battalions.	Troops, or Companies.	Number in a Company.	Number in a Corps.	Number in the whole Establishment.
<i>Cavaliers</i> - - - - -	0	1	60	60	26640
<i>Gentlemen at Arms</i> - - - - -	0	1	60	60	26640
<i>Grenadiers</i> - - - - -	1	10	50	500	222000
<i>Light Infantry</i> - - - - -	1	10	50	500	222000
<i>Riflemen</i> - - - - -	0	1	62	62	27528
<i>Column</i> - - - - -	3	18	51	918	407592
<i>Reserve</i> - - - - -	1	8	50	400	177600
<i>Light Artillery</i> - - - - -	0	4	50	200	88800
<i>Total in a Weapontake</i> - 2700					1,198800
<i>Add the Fraction</i> -					1200
<i>Total in England</i> - - - - -					1,200,000

As the *cavalry* would of course consist of none but men of rank, family, or fortune, as best able to keep at all times a military horse and furniture, the term *cavalry* would necessarily become a title of honour; and, if it should be thought the application of the same term to the hired dragoons that might at any time be raised for foreign service, would counteract that effect, we might, by only reviving the well-known English name of *cavalier*, secure to the gentle-

men who bore it the elevation and distinction here intended. The *gentlemen at arms*, being then taken from the most respectable persons for birth and property after the cavalry or cavaliers had been selected, would constitute another marked link in the chain of distinction ; and might have amongst them many even of the highest classes who might prefer the foot to the horse service.

Contemplating, not a momentary spirit of patriotism for a temporary occasion, but a permanent or rather perpetual and steady organization of national force, on the durable foundations of nature and simplicity, I cannot approve of men being lifted out of their natural stations in society, and set on horseback by the strength of private subscriptions ; for that breaks down the line of distinction which sound policy requires to be preserved.

In general, such a troop of horse and such a company of foot, as here proposed, might perhaps include all the persons in a *weapontake* entitled to, or desirous of, a particular distinction. But as, in this system, contrary to that of a standing army, by conferring rank, elevation, and distinction, instead of loading the *public* with expense, we gain pecuniary resources, so there could be no objection to leaving these two corps open for as many *volunteers* as should choose to serve in them, and who possessed the necessary qualifications appointed by law. And the same and other beneficial purposes would be answered if, in time of war, the cavaliers of a military sub-division should unite themselves into squadrons, of four troops each, and choose among themselves three field officers to each squadron ; in which case the vacancies made by such election should be filled up again, so as still to have each troop fully officered without any field officer interfering with the separate business of a troop. And the like practice, with regard to the gentlemen at arms, might also have good effects. Nay, indeed, I see not why such unions might not be serviceable also in peace ;

and therefore become a regular part of the system. Our country, from the great prevalence of inclosures, being little adapted to cavalry, we ought to guard against an excess in that species of military force; especially as an enemy could not bring with him much horse.

But here it seems necessary to distinguish between the extent of the duty of personal service and the extent of the duty of pecuniary contribution. The former is unquestionably in all men equal, while the latter as evidently ought to be in proportion to men's estates. Our forefathers, as we see by the 13th of *Edward* the First, already quoted in page 7, adverted to this distinction; but, as an amendment on their rule, I shall now propose that after the *cavaliers* and *gentlemen at arms* shall have been armed and accoutred at their own expense, all the rest of our militia shall be provided with their arms and accoutrements out of the public revenue; but yet, as soon as they shall be delivered to the individual they shall be his property for life, to be kept in repair at his expense, but descendible to heirs by a rule to be laid down. All ammunition to be provided at the public expense, by rules of universal application, and completely independent of the favour or *discretion* of ministers.

The following table will exhibit at once the force of each *weapontake* and the particular number of persons holding each rank in the whole kingdom; in which will be seen, at one view, the ample provision made against too much equality.

Denominations.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	Totals.
Cavaliers - -	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	3	2	49	60
Gentlemen at Arms	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	3	2	49	60
Grenadiers - -	1	1	1	10	20	0	0	20	20	20	407	500
Light Infantry	1	1	1	10	20	0	0	20	20	20	407	500
Riflemen*	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	3	2	51	62
Column - - -	3	3	3	18	18	0	18	36	36	36	747	916
Reserve - - -	1	1	1	8	8	0	8	16	16	16	325	400
Light Artillery	0	0	1	4	8	0	0	8	8	8	163	200
In a Weapontake	6	6	7	53	78	1	27	109	109	106	2198	2700
In 444 Weapontakes	2664	2664	3108	23532	34632	444	11958	48396	48396	47064	975912	1,200000
												Fraction
												96792 Non-Commissioned Officers.
												79032 Com. Officers.

Here let me obviate two opposite objections which may be started. On one hand, it may be said that this arming, powerful as it may appear, falls yet short of the principle of the constitution; for, where all are free, all of course are to be armed, or the Constitution will be violated: On the other hand, it may be observed that here are already more armed men than are necessary to *defence*.

In answer to the first objection, I fully admit the principle of the universal duty of arms-bearing; without which it is evident that his majesty cannot, as emergencies may re-

* The suggestions of Captain Barber, on this species of force, merit particular attention.—See his very intelligent “Considerations upon the best Means of insuring the Internal Defence of Great Britain.” *Egerton*.

quire, have the full benefit of "the military services of all " his liege subjects ;" nor will I violate that principle. But men are to be differently armed, according to their pecuniary means ; so that those who remain, after our arming in the manner and to the extent above mentioned, may, as I have before intimated, be armed with pikes, spears, swords, or even with staves, which are the ordinary weapons of our constables ; which inferior arms, considering the provision of superior arms already made, may be very sufficient for supporting on all occasions the civil magistrate in keeping the peace ; and may also, in the repelling of hostile invasion, be as much as convenient, to those who should act as pioneers, drivers, &c. &c. in an army.

In replying to the second objection, I must first, with Sir *William Jones*, recommend that we acquire "*distinct ideas*" on our subject, before we offer plans. Now, little as it may be suspected, the word "*defence*," according to the mouth that utters it, has widely different meanings ; and indeed, *defence* itself, as a motive, has with different rulers different *objects*. The objects of *defence* to an arbitrary ruler are two in number ; first, *his own despotic power* against his own subjects ; secondly, the country he governs, that is, *his own territory and dominion*, against other powers. Here all centres in *self* : but the ruler of a free state feels the duty of defending *the people, their property and peace* ; and even personal power, if it stand in the way of the public good, will be surrendered. Too much praise, in this respect, cannot be given to the act of his present majesty, by which the king's judges were deprived of a dangerous power, which they had long exercised against law, to the oppression of persons tried on a charge of libel ; from which oppression they are now *defended*.

But, to keep at present to military considerations, the arbitrary ruler, contemplating *his two objects*, and possibly with views also of aggrandizement, and counting his *pecu-*

niary means and resources, arms upon CALCULATION; whereas the ruler of a free state, not being so limited, nor having any interest hostile to the interest of the public, arms according to the PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF THE STATE. If the country of the despot be in danger of attack, he still arms upon CALUCLATION; he still arms upon a principle as hostile to his people as to his foreign enemy. He merely CALCULATES how he shall *ultimately* preserve the country and the dominion to *himself*. Instead of reading instruction in the book of danger, so that his people may have the blessing of freedom and he the benefit of their physical strength, he still cleaves to despotic power, and its cruel, its infernal policy.

As to the devastation that may take place in the fields of his unhappy subjects; the devouring of their harvests and burning their habitations; the ruin, the famine, the rapes, the butchery, and all the unspeakable miseries of having their country THE SEAT OF WAR, all these, provided they do not defeat his object, of *ultimately* holding the country to *himself*, are of little account; nay, he himself will adopt desolation as a part of his military system, and aid in ruining his subjects that he may continue to rule over them, as well as that he may distress his invading enemy. To call such detestable policy by the sacred name of DEFENCE is to profane the heavenly gift of speech.

The examples in history wherein subjugation and tyranny have been introduced from abroad, under the mask of friendship and *defence*, are infinite: and the domestic examples of freedom destroyed by surrendering, in hopes of being defended, the national sword to the sovereign, are precisely as many in number as the instances of that insane policy.

But the defence taught and provided by the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION is defence indeed. At all times, and in all seasons, it is equally at every point of the coast, and at every man's door. Restore but THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THAT CONSTITUTION to "full vigour and energy," and

then neither *French* ravagers can make your country the SEAT OF WAR, nor can riot or insurrection ever disturb your internal repose. I trust it is now seen that, in the proposed organization, there is not one man, nor one musquet too much.

Our constitutional system gives a cavalry of above 26,000, easily capable of an increase to any necessary amount; and an equal number of a peculiar corps of infantry; both of which must be formed of noblemen, gentlemen, and persons of the best property; the majority of whom, having sufficient leisure for practice, would early acquire the necessary skill: also a body of grenadiers of nearly 180,000, and as many light infantry, both in the prime of manhood, and consequently apt by nature to learn their military duty with alacrity, while the country remained in danger. And even of serjeants and corporals it furnishes 95,000 men; and of superior officers above 76,000 more.

The officers, with the serjeants and corporals in an army, says an acute observer, are the *ligaments* and the *nerves* of that artificial body;—"the ligaments of military union, and the organs of military sensibility and judgment*." This being the case, it will appear that, by bestowing particular attention on the training of these, we lay the foundation for bringing the whole mass into a state of sufficient discipline in a short time, whenever appearances of danger should call for more than that ordinary attention, which should ever be kept up to the use of arms in times of peace.

If you once violate principle, in steps "the fiend discretion," with *exclusion* in one hand, and *monopoly* in the other, and liberty is no more. Now, no one, I believe, will maintain that those who are our taxed householders are those who should compose armies for *Gibraltar*, the *East* or *West Indies*, or for *Canada*; nor can any one show the propriety

* William's Letters on Political Liberty, p. 51.

of keeping up at an immense expense an hired army in *England*, always equal to the supply of such services. Here then is an unanswerable reason for training to fire-arms a great mass of those who are not householders, so that all foreign services may be promptly supplied by men used to such arms ; and wanting nothing but the finishing touch of the adjutant to make them capital soldiers. Now the larger the mass of men fit for such services unquestionably the better ; and the more easily, promptly, and economically they will be furnished : besides that, in the eye of every wise statesman, to diffuse as widely as possible the true genuine military spirit is to exalt the national character.

For further arguments in favour of this strength, I refer my reader to the consideration of the rivalry of *France* ; of her immense power ; of the folly there would be in our disarming *in time of peace*, and, finally, whether the author of these pages be not right in proposing a system by which the most energetic invasion, by that energetic despotism, might be defeated with as much ease, as a well armed city quells a paltry riot in its streets. *England* once armed as he proposes, were all *Europe* to crusade it to her holy land, no heart would palpitate with apprehension ; no countenance would be overcast with gloom. There would be no bustle in the cabinet ; no crude acts to frame in parliament ; no alarm ; no trouble ; no *expense* ; no hurry-skurry through the country ; no motley medley of military associations to form ; nor costly armies to be encamped here, nor barracked there : but an armed people, with a dignified serenity, enlivened only by an animation and ardour natural to the occasion, would come forth to smite the daring foe, as a bridegroom cometh out of his chamber, and as a strong man rejoiceth to run a race*.

In order, if necessary, to pay still further attention to the

* This paragraph has not been composed in 1806 ; but, with the exception of a single word, is a literal copy of what was written in 1798.

civil ranks of men, than appears already visible on the face of the system, those of the infantry who were of the superior orders in society, might have an option, provided they had the bodily qualifications, of serving in the *flank companies*, (not meaning they should be either grenadiers or light infantry who are intended to compose distinct corps) who, on that account, should be entitled to wear some mark of distinction; and these distinctions in favour of rank and property might be rendered particularly subservient to the interests of the service, by requiring the cavaliers, the gentlemen at arms, and the flank-company' men, as well as all officers, in proportion to their rank, to contribute more largely than others to the local contingent expenses of the service.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the grenadiers and light infantry ought to be selected, not for being particularly tall or short, but for activity and bodily vigour; there should be in fact no difference but in name, as matter of utility, and the whole should be made capable of acting either in a body or as riflemen; and a distinct draught, as a reserve, should be composed of the striplings and the aged. To the latter, of course, would fall all stationary services, and such as partook of the nature of garrison duty; as well as convoys and escorts, the superintendence of pioneering, intrenching, breaking up of roads, &c. for it is only in the last resort they ought to engage an invading enemy.

The next question is how to train so immense a body of troops as 1,200,000; for although we have seen in *France* as great a number brought to the highest capacities of service, it will be said, we must not expect the like exertion, without a like necessity*; and it may be thought that, in time of peace, our armed *posse* would degenerate into as errant *trained bands*, or rather *untrained bands*, as were ever in *London* the objects of derision. But those, who are apt to

* Written originally in 1792. All ideas of difficulty must now have vanished.

underrate what are called undisciplined soldiers, will do well to recollect the battle of *Jemappe*, and the early victories of *Pichegru*: nor may it be amiss to consult *Lord Clarendon*, who, speaking of the battle of *Newbury*, says, “The London trained bands, and auxiliary regiments, (of whose inexperience of danger, or any kind of service beyond the easy practice of their postures in the artillery-garden, men had till then too cheap an estimation) behaved themselves to wonder; and were, in truth, the preservation of that army that day; for they stood as a bulwark and rampire to defend the rest, &c. &c.” b. 7, p. 347.

I should not now go further than principles and outlines, were it not necessary so far to touch on detail as to obviate superficial objections, which might create a prejudice to the true constitutional system of arming; in which I must request the patience of the instructed reader, while I address a few observations to those of less information.

The foundation of the system being the legal obligation of *all men*, under high penalties, to obey the civil magistrates “upon cry made for weapons to keep the peace *,” in order forcibly to suppress all riot or insurrection, as well as to join the king’s generals, for repelling invaders; it follows that *the possession of arms*, and arms adequate to such services, is the DUTY of all who are of ability to purchase them †.

The many ancient laws for musters of arms, and for giving skill in the use of them, ought to be judiciously revived; the spirit of them to be preserved; and all those defects which occasioned their falling into disuse, ought to be judiciously amended, by applying the intention of them to the arms now in use, and by introducing into those laws a *self-enforcing* principle. If England have men deserving the name of statesmen, this, notwithstanding the luxury

* Popham, 121, 122. *Jones’s Legal Mode of suppressing Riots*, 27.

† Popham, 28; and *Sharp’s Free Militia*, 7, 9, 10, 11, &c.

and the commercial spirit of the age, might doubtless be done.

The great and excellent Sir *William Jones*, in his work before referred to, (p. 10) had said, "In this awful interval a question occurred to me, which must naturally have presented itself to many others: *Whether the still-subsisting laws and genuine constitution of England had not armed the CIVIL STATE with a power sufficient, if it had been previously understood and prepared, to have suppressed ever so formidable a riot without the intervention of the military.*"

"If no such power legally existed in the state, our system, I thought, must be defective in a most essential point; since no people can be really and substantially free, whose freedom is so *precarious*, in the true sense of the word, as to depend on the protection of the *soldiery*; and even our protectors, who for several days possibly could not, but certainty did not, act at all *, might have been necessarily called away, in the most dangerous moment, to defend our coasts and maritime towns: if, on the other hand, such a power of self-protection did exist, our laws, I concluded, must have been *disgracefully neglected*, and OUGHT TO BE RESTORED TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY."

Afterwards, in p. 34, he says, "To what fatal cause must we ascribe a neglect so shameful and so dangerous? I answer boldly, yet I hope without arrogance, since I use the very words of *Blackstone*, to the vast acquisition of force arising from the riot-act and the annual expedient of a STANDING ARMY; which has induced a disposition, cherished by the indolence natural to man, and promoted by the excessive voluptuousness of the age, to look up solely for

* He is speaking of the London riots in 1790.

“ protection to the executive power and the soldiery ; *a disposition which must instantly be shaken off, if any spark of virtue remain in our bosoms.*”

Skill in the use of arms should be made an essential and indispensable part of the education of youth. Like swimming, it is an art best learnt when we are boys, and never leaves us when men. From this single regulation all *future* difficulty, in having a community of free soldiers, vanishes in a moment : and, when the importance of the duty is duly considered, it ought by the strictest sanctions to be enforced.

Although it has been suggested that persons in the highest ranks and of most opulence should form the cavalry, it is not proposed to have a stable at every school, filled with military horses. Let the foot exercise alone be taught at the seminaries of learning. It will be soon enough for the cavalry exercise, when the students shall have left their tutors. It is conceived that no exercise can be more healthy, and few exercises so delightful to the youth of large schools, as military manœuvres ; which are in fact beautiful practical lectures on mechanics ; at the same time that they are manly and animating in a high degree.

The author could undertake to furnish a short essay on *military language*, which renders the whole science of manœuvres perfectly simple and intelligible. The best writers on military manœuvres appear to have fallen into the same sort of mistake that, Mr. Tooke says, Locke fell into, in respect of his celebrated Essay on Human Understanding ; by not considering how much it was a treatise on *words*.

“ ’Tis not laboured explanations of the minutiae of manœuvres, but a correct and universal application of *words* of command, in which lies the true secret of manœuvres. The accidence alluded to does the whole business : it is perfectly easy to learn ; and, if it were once made the rule of the service, there is no manœuvre, whatever, which a bat-

tion would not perform at the mere *word of command*, although neither the officer who gave the word, nor his manœuvre, had ever been seen or heard of by the battalion before that moment.

The next generation being thus prepared, the present age, in consequence of the vast military force—vast when considered as a *hired* army—now on foot, can be at no loss to get competently instructed; and, indeed, the most extensive application to the military exercise throughout the kingdom happily removes every possible doubt as to the practicability of this part of our system. The labour of the work, in fact, is in a great measure already accomplished; so that all we want, for rendering the good effects permanent, is “to restore to full vigour and energy” our ancient arming laws.

Although the poverty of the public finances makes it necessary to get rid of our enormous military expenses as expeditiously as possible, yet the security of the country must at all events be, in the first instance, provided for; and the disbanding of these forces should proceed gradually, according to the progress made in arraying and training the inhabitants. In this disbanding of the present soldiery, those who had trades and occupations to return to, and were desirous of their discharge, should be the first released.

“The *supplementary* branch alone of our proposed national force would be able to receive into it, and enrol, *the whole of the present army*; and their arms might be purchased as before provided for*. Thus restoring to agriculture, arts and manufactures, an immense body of men, for productive labour, to sustain and enrich the state by their

* In the minutes of the council in the reign of Elizabeth, there is this entry—“That order be taken, that arms may be served at *reasonable rates* at the armourer’s office at Plymouth.” *Defensive War*, 83. I see that government has wisely adopted this rule for supplying such of the armed associations as choose to provide their own arms. And the base condition of returning the arms of other associations, it is to be hoped, will be changed into a payment in money of the value of them.

industry; instead of lying as they now do in an unproductive state, a grievous burden on the industry of the remaining part of the community.

Here it is material to notice certain words which fell from Mr. *Yorke*, while Secretary at War, on the 20th of June, 1803. Our military system he thought so defective, it required to be "probed to the bottom," and completely reformed. "At the commencement of war," he remarked that "the state of our military preparation has never at all corresponded with the means of exertion which the country possessed." And how should it, if that preparation is to consist of standing forces, unless we had a military peace establishment which no attainable revenue could maintain, and with which no freedom could exist? During the continuance of peace, preparedness for war, with *economy in finance*, and security to freedom, can only be had by restoring the MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, and preserving it in FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY. Out of a mere standing army, no additional force, on the commencement of war, can of itself shoot forth: such an army can only be augmented by dint of expense.

In mere *bounty money* alone, the *Army of Reserve*, as an augmentation to the regulars, has, this year*, taking the average no higher than *thirty-five pounds* per man, cost Great Britain in the first instance, not less than *one million four hundred thousand pounds*; and calling out the supplementary militia, prior to 1804, of *sixty thousand* men, at the same time cost *two millions one hundred thousand pounds* more. Then comes numerous repetitions of the bounty, in consequence of desertions; followed by the parochial maintenance of soldiers' families, the great increase of wages in husbandry, from the scarcity of hands, and many losses resulting from an actual want of labourers: Thus the entire burden of first raising, and then maintaining

the armies of *England*, is an impressive call upon her statesmen, to “*probe to the bottom*” her military system. And what expense, *in this way*, can insure us peace, so long as *France* shall retain her present strength, and the command of the sea-coast from the *Danish Sound* to the *Venetian Gulph*!

Wretched, in every view of it, is a wrong military system. But that system once properly corrected, then all in an instant would be economy, strength, and security. Had it been the first care of Mr. *Addington's* administration to have seen *twelve hundred thousand* men armed, as proposed in these pages, where the work is only a second edition of what was published early in 1799, *he would not have needed to have made an humiliating peace, nor would he have been driven at all into a new war*; and, in such a case, for a French Consul to have imposed upon his subjects the burden of building gun-boats, and to have threatened us with invasion, would have been to have made himself the laughing stock of *Europe*. Had we even been vulnerable in any distant quarter of the world, and had *France* possessed the means of conveying thither her armies, out of our supplementary militia of *four hundred thousand* men, our regular forces might at any time have been rapidly augmented; for, *out of an armed and warlike population, regular armies, at the disposal of the crown, as spontaneously grow as bursts from the wide branching arms of our native oak a luxuriant foliage*.

Thus have we, at once, probed our military system to the bottom; and shown the mode of its complete reform. Defective as may be the new statutes, in having a duration only for the continuance of the war, and likewise in other respects, they will nevertheless have made no inconsiderable advance in the road of military reformation; and will have put in training such a proportion of the civil state as to facilitate an early completion of that work. As fast as that training,

and the formation of distinct corps can be carried into execution, the present expensive military establishments may be reduced, *even in the time of war*; for, with a *posse comitatus*, or *natural militia*, such as it ought to be, and such as it speedily may be, whenever ministers will energetically set about it, we assuredly could not of necessity need any more regular forces than our foreign services should require; as I trust will hereafter more clearly appear. And how strongly does the magnitude of our debt, the weight of our taxes, and the probable length of the present struggle, if not wisely conducted, inculcate such policy!

Lord Liverpool, in 1757, speaking of the pecuniary burden of standing forces compared with that of a militia, supposing the latter to be in pay only during its days of exercise, says "*it will surpass it in expense by almost twenty times the sum.*" But we now see a *militia* itself, of nearly *an hundred thousand men*, made *standing forces**, and maintained at the full charge of troops of that description. And so much have the troops of these descriptions been of late courted, by an augmentation of pay and allowances, that the burden is become truly intolerable; and the very cost of our defence, unless we adopt a wiser system, must be our ruin. And after such an addition to *an immense standing army*, augmented also by corps of fencibles and other cavalry, raised all over the kingdom by *very expensive modes*, and upheld by dint of grievous taxes, what is the result of the whole?—Why, truly, the country is not safe, without an act of parliament for a general arming of the inhabitants!—without calling on every individual man to offer his *personal* services for public defence!—Is it in the power of ridicule, so completely to expose the fatal error of our policy, as it is exposed by the passing of such an act? After paying for *one year's defence* of our island, very much more than *its whole rental*, and experiencing the

* Written in 1798.

most dangerous inroads on our constitution into the bargain, we are come at last to personal service, where we ought to have set out, and by which, regulated according to the constitution, we might have saved at least nineteen parts in twenty of our land expense! Can the genius of ridicule, I again ask, produce such a satire on the system of "the three last centuries"?

Recollecting our distinction of the self-armed, and the supplementary, the first consisting of 800,000 and the latter of 400,000, we see that the nation may, not only be eased of an immense burden, by speedily disbanding the whole of what is now called its militia, and, for aught that I can see to the contrary, a considerable proportion of its regular force also; but that, in the very act of so doing, it would furnish itself with a supplementary *posse comitatus* of disciplined soldiers, equal in number to the diminution of the mercenaries; whereby it would not only have the benefit of a vast saving, but it would restore to agriculture and manufacture the powers of a greater production. Ministers would no longer, from the poverty of the treasury, notwithstanding the pressure on the people of a war taxation, be under the necessity of rejecting the services, and wounding the feelings, of volunteer corps in all parts of the kingdom. And while the spirit of the people is flowing in a full tide of patriotism to take up arms for their country, and that country has already military instructors enow for training its *posse comitatus*, ministers have no impediment to encounter: but have the strongest invitation, and the most powerful inducements, to render their country this great and invaluable service; more great, and more glorious, in my mind, than was rendered her either by *Magna Charta*, or the *Revolution*.

This grand improvement in our situation once made, our statesmen could no more lament our future unprepared-

ness for war ; and would thereby be enabled early to obtain, and then to preserve to us, honourable and permanent peace. But what an impression it would make on all those nations around, now crouching under the rod of *France*, to see *England*, not only contending single-handed with the giant they dread, but, in the midst of the conflict, reducing her war taxes, disbanding and sending to their homes her mercenary troops, and growing stronger and stronger, as she more and more confided in the swords of her citizens !

O ! where is that statesman whom modern degeneracy had not reached, and the features of whose character had the hardihood of antiquity ! No state chicanery, no narrow system of vicious politics, sunk him to the level of the vulgar great. Without dividing he destroyed party ; without corrupting he made a venal age unanimous. *France* sunk beneath him. With one hand *he smote the house of Bourbon*, and wielded in the other the democracy of *England* * !

But let us proceed : Although the officers of a *posse comitatus*, to follow the good *Saxon* custom, ought to be appointed by election, yet, consulting the repose, the dignity, the strength, and permanency of government, at the same time that we look to the solid securities of freedom, it might be sound policy not altogether to overlook those gradations in society which are created by birth, station, knowledge, and property, which contribute to order and subordination ; wherefore suitable qualifications for holding the different military ranks might be required. With regard to the question—In whom should reside the power of election ? The answer undoubtedly must be, in the community for whose use and protection the power is to be intrusted, and to whom those who exercise it are to be responsible. The

* Extracted from a character of Lord Chatham, circulated as a hand-bill.

basis of this power should doubtless be in the general court of the *weapontake*, consisting of all taxed householders; with a right of resuming to itself the full exercise of that power, if ever the delegations of it, dictated by convenience, should be abused. Thus a suitable responsibility of the military officers throughout the kingdom might be established.

By thus returning to the election of all officers of the militia, we should but be so far on our way to a reform of our civil elections. The constitution certainly intended, and for several ages as certainly provided, that all magistrates and officers, whose functions immediately affected the people, should be elected by the people; because it is fit that the salutary influence of true popular election should have a perpetual operation, and influence, on the mind of every person exercising power on which the people's peace, protection, liberty, and happiness immediately depend.

I must be understood to speak of *reformed* elections; for in contemplating elections, I cannot be supposed to mean such as should expose our nation to the reproach of having the democratic branch of its legislature, the proper basis of which is public virtue, founded on elections exhibiting a brothel filthiness, a *Hottentot* stupidity, and an infamous profligacy. Look, *Englishmen*, across the *Atlantic* and blush!

The people of every decennary or tithing, or ten households, formerly elected not only the constable, then called chief-pledge, or tithing-man, who was at once both the civil magistrate and the military commander of the tithing, equivalent in military rank to the modern *serjeant*, but they elected also “ the *hundreders*, (who had the civil authority of high constable and *justiciaries*, and the military rank of *captains*) “ and the viscounts or *sheriffs*; and likewise the *heretochii*, “ or leaders of the armies; the same (says the learned Judge

“ *Atkins*) as, in the dialect of the present age, may be called the lord-lieutenants or deputy lieutenants *.”

And *Atkins* also observes, that “ Sir *Edward Coke*, in his 2d Institute, in his Exposition of the Stat. of Winchester, 1 cap. 10, concerning the elections of *coroners* by the freeholders †, (which ever was so, and so still continues) says, there is *the same reason* for election of *sheriffs*, and so it anciently was, by writ directed to the coroner. In like manner were the conservators of the peace chosen, in whose place the *justices of the peace* now succeed. These were great and high liberties, and did belong to the *freeholders from all antiquity*, &c. ‡”

Here we see how well founded was Mr. *Pitt's* observation, “ that the *principle* of the English constitution is REPRESENTATION.” It is indeed its very soul, and once pervaded every member and every fibre with life and energy. All magistracies, civil, military, and judicial, were elective; and juries were drawn with such impartiality, from the mass of the people, as to have the true quality of representation; even the office of *King* amongst the Saxons was elective originally. I shall only add, that, whatever may be thought of the necessity of other magistracies and authorities being representative, it is indispensable that three of them be strictly so: viz. *The House of Commons*, *Juries*, and *the Military Commands* in an armed inhabitancy.

It is impossible that LAWS should be “ *the state's collected will*,” unless made by those who are elected by, and truly represent, the people: it is equally impossible to be

* *Sharp on Congregational Courts*, p. 196.

† By *freeholders* is meant *liberi tenentes*, the free-holders in burgage tenure, viz. the “householders.” *Ib.* 197.

‡ *Parliamentary and Political Tracts*, 253, 254.

tried “*by God and our country*,” unless the law be *vox populi*, which makes it *vox Dei* *; and unless our jury be drawn from the mass of the community with such impartiality and fairness as virtually, and in all rational effect, to be that “*country*” by which alone an Englishman can be legally judged. And it being an admitted principle that no nation can preserve its liberties, unless it keep the sword in *its own hands*, it were the height of absurdity for *an armed people* not to elect all those under whose guidance they should be arrayed and led to battle.

But, as to the king alone it appertains to have intelligence of the designs and movements of foreign enemies, and to plan the general operations for defeating invasion, we see the reason why generals, being intrusted with the execution of these plans and operations, should be of the king’s appointment.—How admirable is this whole system ! How invaluable the genuine constitution of *England* !

First, the people, by their *representatives*, are to make their own laws : Secondly, by their *representatives*, those laws are to be applied to their own actions : And, thirdly, in *their own persons*, under the guidance of *representatives* elected for the purposes of order and regularity, they are to defend their laws and liberties with *their own swords* ; for this last is a case to which, by a law of nature, it is ordained that representation cannot extend : for that nation which parts with its sword parts with its liberty ; and the sum of its subsequent enjoyment is mere legal protection, at the discretion of those who have got possession of the sword :—So true it is that “ the possession of arms is the distinction “ between slaves and freemen.” And how grand a feature

* It is not in a vulgar and presumptuous sense this ancient sentiment is quoted ; for if our law be “ the gathered wisdom of ages ” and “ the “ perfection of reason,” then it is not only *the voice of the people*, but figuratively (and the figure is beautiful and expressive) it is *the voice of God* also.

it is in the character of the ancient *Saxon*, and how true to nature, that the form of manumitting his slave, was the gift of A SWORD AND A SPEAR*! How sinks in the comparison the Roman woollen cap?

Here I would expostulate with those who “despair of “the commonwealth,” and, exhausted of all hope of *reform*, see no prospect of liberty but in a *Revolution*. By those best acquainted with constitutional learning it has been an old observation that, if the constitution were utterly lost and forgotten, could but its principles be re-discovered and collected, its existence would be soon restored. If such a restoration has been considered as a natural effect of such a cause under such circumstances, how encouraging are our prospects, who have never lost a knowledge of these principles; who must now practically, and daily, feel their intrinsic excellence; and to whom it must be apparent that either a settled despotism, a revolution†, or a reform, must be the termination of the present state of things! for that a decided and vast majority of the nation, even of those whose confidence in ministers, and whose blindness to corruption and abuse have been the most remarkable, will, in the hour of peril, when the storm threatens to burst, prefer reform to either despotism or revolution my mind is not of a texture to doubt.

It is obvious that, on the first revival of the system of the *posse comitatus*, much legal regulation would be wanting that afterwards would become useless; and that different regulations would also be necessary in peace and in war: it might, therefore, be adviseable to frame *three* distinct statutes. The *first* should lay foundations only. The *second*

* *Historical Dissertation on the Antiquity of the English Constitution*, 185.

† Whether we would avert a revolution by domestic convulsion or foreign conquest, we must fly to *reform*.

statute should carry up the superstructure, and include every thing necessary to giving it effect in time of PEACE. And the *third* solely apply to WAR.

By this act, the duties of war might be clearly pointed out, and the most prompt alacrity secured; not merely on the cold principle of military obedience, but on those also of a common duty and interest, felt and understood, of national honour, which should not fail to operate; and of genuine patriotism, which should excite the most lively enthusiasm. To each of these statutes should be assigned, with accurate discrimination, its proper class of enactments; so that the separate provisions of each should have the most complete perspicuity.

Here, then, are our means of raising the people *en masse*, for national defence; and of calling into orderly action every particle of the physical power of the state. If these means were not found by the *Emperor* in his need, it was because an arbitrary government, forbidding the means, is of course denied the end. It is the prerogative of a free nation alone to be unconquerable except by extermination. Although an arbitrary government be formidable indeed to its own disarmed, ignorant, enslaved, and oppressed subjects, it is too feeble to resist the attacks of an armed people; and in the day of trial must fall!

The sole material difficulty attending the whole system will be that of framing the second of the three proposed statutes. The care of our ancestors, to insure *the possession of arms*, is seen in their various enactments to that effect; “and as much as our progenitors are famed for sometimes indulging their genius, a butt of Malmsey could not find its way into their cellars without a sheaf of arrows for its passport*.” We may, indeed, easily secure an effectual *muster of arms*, which is in fact THE ROCK OF OUR

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 32, 58, 63.

FOUNDATION; and we may, without difficulty, enforce a sufficient training of select corps, and of “the nerves and ligaments” of our military body; so as on any alarm of danger, to be soon in a posture of unassailable defence. But he who has read the human heart, and has any taste for that policy which from early antiquity to the present hour has been the admiration of the wise and the good, will know how desirable it is to aim at higher and nobler ends; and to a wise lawgiver how practicable it is thus to unite the exercise of rights with the performance of duties; thus to combine public services with public honours; and thus to render even manly pastimes, and elegant pleasures, subservient to the noblest purposes of public good; so as to give to a law for upholding in constant vigour this system, at once so comprehensive and so grand, A SELF-ENFORCING PRINCIPLE, adequate to the great end in view—that of preserving, in full splendour, during the security of peace, those military virtues that are our safety in war; on which account it was that “the public games of ancient governments consisted principally of martial entertainments.” And from the noble author I am now quoting, I must also transcribe an account of a military festival observed by the modern *Swiss*, which is worthy of admiration: “The surprising acts of valour, which the *Swiss* militia has performed, has induced an ingenious writer to draw a parallel between the military achievements of this little collection of cantons, and those of the free states of *Greece*: He puts in competition with the battle of *Marathon* that of *Morgarten*; where 1300 *Swiss* routed the army of the Archduke *Leopold*, consisting of 20,000 men, and killed twice their own number: He considers the action of *Sempach*, where the same Archduke lost his life, and 20,000 of his men were routed by 1600 *Swiss*, as a more surprising victory than that of *Platea*;—and, to crown all, the battle that was fought in the pass of *Weren*, in the canton of *Glaris*, is a copy that exceeds its

“ original which was fought at *Thermopylæ* ; for as 300
 “ *Spartans* tried to repel the army of *Persia* in those straits,
 “ and all perished in the attempt , so, in such another defile,
 “ 350 *Swiss* attacked at least 8000 *Austrians*, and gained the
 “ field of battle.”

“ It is surprising,” says this author, “ what a spirit the
 “ remembrance of this action instils into this people: they
 “ yearly celebrate it by a public procession on the spot where
 “ it was fought; and where eleven pillars, erected for that
 “ purpose, shew the places where those heroes eleven times
 “ rallied: at each pillar they offer up thanks to God; and,
 “ when they come to the last, one of their best orators
 “ makes a panegyric in praise of these three hundred and
 “ fifty men, and at the end of his oration reads a list of their
 “ names, in the same manner as the *Spartans* had the names
 “ of those who fell at *Thermopylæ* carved on brass, to
 “ transmit their fame to posterity.”

To frame institutions for preserving alive a true martial spirit in the profound security of peace, is indeed a task demanding the penetration of an *Aristotle*, the genius of a *Plato*, the energy of a *Lycurgus*, and the virtue of an *Aristides* ;—in short, demanding one worthy to tread in the hallowed footsteps of the godlike *Alfred* ; but, alas ! the tear which rushes to my eye reminds me *Jones* is no more ! —What he could have achieved alone must therefore be extracted from the collected wisdom and joint labours of several : and thus the system receive the last finishing touch of excellence ; fitting it to impress on the national character the indelible stamp of dignity and independence, and the military aspect of high-souled freedom. And it is our consolation that in our books, and I trust also in the hearts of thousands, are to be found the principles on which our system must rest; and that we have men capable of their application.

The author has himself, in his late work, entitled “ THE

"TRIDENT," suggested, and pointed out the advantages of periodical GAMES and FESTIVALS, as well as of occasional celebrations of naval and military TRIUMPHS, at a magnificent *hieronaulicon* or *naval temple*, proposed to be erected on a great scale near the metropolis, as a monument of national glory, a nursery of national art, and a school of national manners and public virtue.

It would not only add great lustre to such festivals for a large brigade of the ARMED PEOPLE to assist at the celebrations, but it must likewise produce effects the most beneficial.

Such a brigade, draughted in proportion to population from all the military districts of the kingdom, and the individuals taken, partly by *right*, in consequence of *recorded merit*, and partly by *election*, would constitute, as it were, a body of deputies from a martial nation to a congress of national art, arms, emulation and glory. Previously encamped at the *Hieronaulicon*,

"Sacred to virtue, valour, genius, taste * ;"

to prepare for their evolutions in the presence of an assembled people, flocking from all parts of the empire, and from every civilized state ; and in the presence, more especially, of the best soldiers of all countries, attracted as were the Greeks to *Olympia*, to witness the gay, the solemn, and the splendid spectacles, how would it be possible, for the armed citizens of such a brigade, not to feel the same inspiration as formed such men as *Xenophon* and *Epaminondas* ? And what a perpetual stimulus would here be, throughout the whole *posse comitatus*, to secure the honour of being in the brigade on these occasions ! How would it be possible, that such institutions should not elevate the national character, and improve the national taste ; or not be productive of excellence of every kind† ? Here, then, is one of those *self-en-*

* Trident, p. 87.

† By an act of the *French* senate we see that games on the principle here recommended three years ago are now adopted for *France*.

forcing principles, by which our revived *posse comitatus* might be preserved from future decay.

The following composition intended for insertion at p. 197 of "*The Trident*," in a second edition, being not unsuitable to the present occasion, as alluding to the two grand essentials, *civil* and *military*, of the constitution, is here presented to the reader, who must suppose himself at a national festival in the *Hieronauticon*, where, after the repast, the musical entertainments are introduced by this

III ELUDIUM.

1.

CELESTIAL maids! High-minded youth!
Bright gems of chastity and truth!
Adorn your festal Bard! Smile mantling bowls!
Joy's circling flood, then, drowning cares,
Breathe, Harp, æolian wild-note airs,
Shall waft a keen delight to nautic souls.

2.

With hapless damsel, hopeless swain,
In melting melody complain;
With jocund lay salute successful love;
But grandly pour the strain along,
Sublime as soaring Milton's song,
The steadfast patriot's lofty mind to move.

3.

Responsive to a wondrous hand,
Thou once obey'dst a king's command,
Where glory's fav'rite child thee, slumb'ring, woke,
Camp'd hosts to quell; the Muses woo;
Fell Pagan hearts to Faith subdue,
And mildly mould them to the civic yoke.

4.

Now tell us of his tender care
Of England's liberties, and where,
His laws among, their shield may e'er be found;
Then, sweeter than the sweetest note
Of Philomela's warbling throat,
Thy harmony his deathless praise shall sound.

5.

Now, now, brave Youths, to glory dear!
 My birth-right arms! my sword! my spear!
 And don, sweet Maids, my robe, rich type of law,
 With duties wrought, and rights of man,
 Sage legislation's noblest plan,
 A state well-pois'd to rule, and statesmen awe.

6.

Let these grey locks, and wrinkled brows,
 Gay Freedom's classic cap enclose,
 Dark Mona's sacred branch these temples crown *!
 O then, belov'd companions, I,
 In fiery song that seeks the sky,
 Will consecrate our Albion to renown.

7.

While I, immortal Alfred! sing,
 Strike thou the sounding Saxon string †!
 Th' arousing strain be, patriot spirit shine ‡!
 In Albion's cause each bosom fire!
 A love of liberty inspire,
 Intrepid, pure, unperishing, divine!

Supposing the *weapontakes*, so formed as has been stated, to be at the same time our elective districts for returning one member each to the House of Commons, perhaps there could not be a more suitable division of the country, or of the community, for such a purpose. It is apparent, that in the formation of either *weapontakes*, or *elective dis-*

* The author, since composing this Preludium, has been gratified in discovering that *Milton* speaks of "a poet, soaring in the high regions of his fancy, with his *garland* and *singing robes* about him."—See *Reasons of Church Government* in *Birch's Collection*, i. 59.

† As all English liberty and good government flows from the clear and wholesome fountain of our Saxon Constitution, to that fountain, whenever the stream becomes obstructed, or turbid with impurity, we must ascend, for the waters of political life; taking care to restore their free and healthful current; and to exclude from their channel the sluggish, foul, and noxious waters of servitude and debasement.

‡ In the *strain of Alfred*, let parliaments and princes legislate and rule, and then, they need no *higher* felicity or praise.

tricts, the right principle of division is by *population*; whereas the formation of military *districts* will best be governed on principles of *space*. And if, on the mature consideration of military men, it should appear that our districts and sub-divisions, as well as the arrangements proposed, are rightly calculated for answering the ends in view, it would then at least be *desirable* that no difficulties should stand in the way of correcting the present extreme and very inconvenient inequality of our counties; and of completing our system by new modelling them: for as a principal part of the merit of the system consists in having an armed inhabitancy to constitute the strength of the *civil power*, so that system must attain to the highest degree of perfection, when the civil and military divisions of the country are correspondent, and the arrangements of the two services go hand in hand, mutually serving and supporting each other. This union of the two duties was strictly attended to by *Alfred*; although he left the disproportions between the counties much as we have found them. When we contemplate the simplicity, uniformity, and exact proportions of the other parts of his system, we must conclude some insuperable difficulty stood in the way; or that he would have perfected the divisions of his kingdom by an equalization of the counties.

But, doubtless, had the *Danes* been as formidable to him as the *French* are to us, he would have made all minor considerations give way to the indispensable one of *combining with every portion of the coast, its full proportion of the inland country, by an indissoluble union* for its support and defence, as proposed in these pages; where it will be seen that the sea-shore of every sub-division is, as it were, the front of an immense military column reaching to the very centre of the kingdom; organized into every useful species of corps, but under one supreme head; ever in readiness at a moment's warning; and its collected force consisting of an army immensely more numerous than any

that could possibly be brought against it. “Having shown,” says Sir *William Jones*, “the nature and extent of the “*posse comitatum*, and proved that it is required by law “to be equal in its exertion to a *well-disciplined army*, “I have established the proposition which I undertook to “demonstrate*.”

Should it ever be thought advisable to equalize the counties, the number of them might be kept nearly the same as at present, by comprehending three counties in each military sub-division, making in the whole forty-eight, instead of fifty-two. In this distribution, an annexation of adjoining *weapontakes*, equal to about the third part of the *surface* of a military sub-division, would constitute a county.

Should either prejudice or other more substantial reason stand in the way of perfecting our system of defence, on the best and clearest principles, by altering the present limits of counties, perhaps it might be a good expedient to form our districts and sub-divisions by throwing into them the counties as they now stand, which might be done thus, viz.

<i>First.</i> Northumberland Durham Yorkshire	Norfolk Suffolk Cambridgeshire Huntingdonshire Northamptonshire
<i>Second.</i> Lincolnshire Nottinghamshire Leicestershire Rutlandshire	<i>Third.</i> Essex London Middlesex

* Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, 34.

Hertfordshire
Bedfordshire
Bucks
—

Kent
Sussex
Surry

Fourth.

Hampshire
Berkshire
Dorsetshire
—

Wiltshire
Gloucestershire

Fifth.

Devonshire
Cornwal
Somersetshire

Sixth.

Monmouthshire
Glamorganshire
Carmarthenshire
Pembrokeshire

Cardiganshire
Brecknockshire
—

Merionethshire
Carnarvonshire
Anglesey
Denbighshire
Flintshire
Montgomeryshire
Radnorshire

Seventh.

Cheshire
Lancashire
—

Cumberland
Westmoreland

Eighth, or Central.

Derbyshire
Staffordshire
Shropshire
—

Herefordshire
Worcestershire
Warwickshire
Oxfordshire

To those unreflecting and timid persons who may still imagine a general arming to be *dangerous to government*, it may be advisable to say a few words. What then more decisive can be said than that *Alfred*, when he armed the whole community, thought not so? Nay, by his penetrating mind, it was seen that it is *the universality of arms* which is the very secret for giving a government of *freedom* and

law undisturbed tranquillity and resistless power. All that is wanting to this effect is simplicity of arrangement, and strictness of regulation.

Nor are we left to mere reasoning on this question ; for there is no historical fact better established than that in his reign, and owing to the very system of an universal arming, the authority of *law*, and the energy of the *civil power*, which comprehend the whole of *government*, were carried to a height of perfection never exhibited to the view of mankind in any other age or nation. Let any man compare this with what has so often happened in our own times, and he cannot be at a loss to see to which system, that of an armed inhabitancy, or that of a standing army, a preference is due. Let him look back to the first establishment of turnpikes, or to the first raising the partial modern militia both in *England* and *Scotland* ; when insurrectionary proceedings caused the effusion of much blood : Let him call to mind the hundreds of tumults that have disturbed the public tranquillity, particularly in our large towns : Let him take a retrospect of what happened in *St. George's Fields*, in the beginning of the present reign, the infamous conflagrations at *Birmingham* in 1794, and the infernal proceedings in the capital in the year 1780, and then let him ask himself, if any one of these events, so alarming and so calamitous to the people, and so disgraceful to government, could possibly have taken place, had the system of the immortal *Alfred* been in use and vigour.

After the celebrated example of that great king's reign, it cannot be said this is only *supposing* the arms will be employed in *support* of law, in which case the irresistible power of government is admitted : nor can it with propriety be asked, what would be the consequence, if they should be turned *against* it ? I confess I should not know how to answer such a question, better than by asking such another.—What, then, would be the consequence *if* the waters of the

Thames, the *Severn*, and the *Humber*, and of all our other rivers, were to turn against their own sources, to climb the hills from whence by the law of nature they descend, and to pour their streams into the country instead of the ocean? Can any one, pretending to reason, imagine a free people, having a legislature in which they were substantially represented, and their community regulated and preserved by a law emanating, through such a medium, *from themselves*,—can any one, I ask, imagine, such a people so circumstanced, capable of uniting the power of their own arms, to destroy their own work, their own prosperity, their own happiness?—Has any man yet dreamed the people of the *American States*, because really a free armed people, are therefore likely to use their arms against their own governments; which, so far from having a standing army, have not amongst them a single professional soldier? The supposition is too absurd to stand for a moment.

But no man can look into history without perceiving that, *wherever mercenary soldiers and standing armies have been introduced, there the true government of the state has invariably been subverted, by those who had the command of the armies.*

Look through the annals of the world,” says Lord *Liverpool*, “and see if any one instance of a militia can be produced, that was seditious of itself; or of a people who, when the sword was put into their hands, converted it to their own destruction. Free states have almost always been subject to commotions, and the same have generally been defended by a militia; but that the military establishment of such a people were the cause of their commotions can never be proved;—the republic of *Carthage* is a singular instance of a free people that owed their defence to mercenary soldiers; and yet she was nevertheless fertile in dissensions;—and though *Rome* had as many soldiers as citizens, though her senators and plebeians had frequent contests for power, where the balance was un-

“ equally adjusted, yet her people, when in their greatest
 “ fury, and when driven by injustice almost to despair,
 “ never once had recourse to arms : they urged their claims
 “ by supplications and secession ; and, though disciplined and
 “ ready at all times to take up arms in defence of their coun-
 “ try, they never lifted up a hand against it : for several
 “ centuries not a life was lost in all their contentions ; and
 “ it was not until *the nature of their armies was changed*,
 “ until their legions *received pay*, were transported into
 “ *distant provinces*, and never suffered to return to their
 “ *domestic occupations* ; in a word, not until the honest
 “ militiamen of *Rome* were changed into *standing forces*,
 “ that their contests blazed out into civil wars destructive to
 “ the commonwealth *.”

By a system of *defence on right principles*, we should not only reduce the expense of our army but of our navy also ; which, by a large increase of pay, and many indulgences unknown when I was upon service, is become much more expensive than formerly ; for, so far as the defence of *Great Britain* should be in question, we need scarcely detain a ship from services of real utility ; and, consequently, if our ships are now properly denominated our *wooden walls*, a very great expense might be saved, or many more ships might be employed to guard *Ireland*. Let us put a case. I will suppose an attempt at invasion in the county where I live, and that the enemy's force collected in the ports of *Holland* may choose their time for coming over. They shall have fifty thousand men ; of which five thousand shall be cavalry, and a plentiful train of artillery. I will suppose our first intelligence the sight of their approaching fleet. Signals give the alarm, and our whole military sub-division is instantly in motion. It will be remembered that it has four parks of artillery at its military stations ; which I should sup-

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 49.

pose might be advantageously fixed as follows ; namely, one at the midway point on the high road between *Grimsby* and *Louth*, or nearly so ; one, at the point where the turnpike road from *Alford* unites with the turnpike road from *Louth* to *Spilsby*, or nearly so ; one, at *Tattersal*, where there is a bridge across the river *Witham* ; and one, at or near the point where the turnpike road from *Donnington* unites with the turnpike road from *Sleaford* to *Bourne*, which is part of the road from *London* to *Barton*, through *Lincoln* : Each of these parks I suppose to be provided with thirty pieces of horse-artillery. By consulting the recent returns of population, I perceive the *sub-division* cannot contain so few as 60,000 fighting men ; that the other sub-divisions of the district must contain 60,000 more, total 120,000 ; and that the central district abutting upon the interior boundary of these two sub-divisions, being much more populous, could, even after providing a succour of 20,000 men for the S. W. district, as formerly proposed, furnish at once 70,000, to be added to the former 120,000, besides holding back a reserve of 70,000 men, for succouring, if necessary, any other part of the coast that might be attacked. Here, then, for encountering 50,000 invaders, we have, exclusive of pioneers, and men attached to the cannon, carriages, &c. &c. a total of 190,000 men completely armed ; of whom 6200 would be cavalry ; and the total of their artillery would amount to 300 pieces of cannon.

When I consider the magnitude of the supposed enemy's equipment, the arranging of their ships, the disposition for the debarkation, the landing of their artillery and ammunition, camp equipage, stores, and provisions, these may well be supposed to take up more time than the assembling of 60,000 men, to oppose them in front, and the bringing up at least ninety pieces of cannon. Meanwhile, the horses and draught oxen being driven off, but no other *driving of the country* depriving us of a single peasant, or confusing our

operations, the progress of the enemy, so opposed, as I have said, must necessarily be very slow. But we will not, for a while, oppose him too obstinately; we will only, availing ourselves of our superior knowledge of the country, gall him at every step; constantly engaging, but still retreating from hedge to hedge, and bank to bank, breaking up the roads by which his artillery and carriages must pass, and compelling him to fight for every inch of ground. Thus obstructed, how many miles a day can he advance?

After incessant marching, and incessant fighting, for three days, his numbers every hour diminishing, ours every hour increasing, and having been harassed with alarms at least of his camp being stormed each night, and perhaps real attacks, we will suppose him advanced fifteen miles into the country: I had rather it was thirty; and therefore it shall be so admitted. By the fourth morning, if not sooner, he must find upon each of his flanks a new army much greater than his own, and of fresh troops; and corps likewise penetrating on each side into his rear; and the army in his front now also double its original number.

It must be unnecessary to carry our suppositions any further: and the truth is that, let but our preparedness for war be only such as it must be, if both government and people do not shamefully desert those duties which all ought to know, and do not abandon to its overthrow a constitution which all ought to support, no invasion of our country at all would ever be dreamed of; for, were we duly prepared, no enemy in his senses could expect even to make good a landing without losing half his force, nor to penetrate a single day's march without a total surrender, like that of our own army at *Ostend*, after passing but a single night on the sea-beach.

This was an army of *fifteen hundred* men, who had been tempted to hazard a landing when they could not retreat on account of the weather, in consequence of their

intelligence that the enemy had *only a small force at Ostend, Newport, and Bruges*; but at day break the next morning they found themselves surrounded, as Captain *Popham* in his letter expresses it, “by several thousands of the *national* troops.”

In *Ireland*, on the contrary, where defence depended on a *standing army*, and where Lord *Cornwallis* had *twenty thousand* troops on foot, nine *hundred Frenchmen* landed at *Killala*, gained advantages over the army of General *Lake*, lost *eight days* in waiting to be joined by the *Irish*, then advanced, “drove the country, and carried with them “all the horses*,” and penetrated to the heart of the kingdom before they were overpowered.

It will be observed that, in this drama of an invasion, I have not consigned to the flames the corn-stacks of the farmer, nor driven his flocks and his herds into the interior; but merely contented myself with simply removing out of the way of the enemy, as his resources, *horses and draught oxen*. This is no oversight; for as I am certain of subduing that enemy, I see no necessity of committing any such waste and destruction, but the contrary; for when we shall push an army into his *rear*, we shall ourselves want the cattle and grain for our subsistence; and I should think the pike or spear-armed peasantry much better employed, as *pioneers and drivers of cannon*, than as *desolaters and drivers of cattle*. On this part of my subject something more remains to be said hereafter.

I have, indeed, here supposed only one invasion; whereas we might be invaded at two, or three, or four points at the same time. But if I have supposed only *one* attack, it will be remembered that it was with a large army, and yet that I put in motion for the defence only *one* maritime mili-

* General Lake's Letter.

tary district; leaving all the rest in *perfect tranquillity*, and without diminishing their own means of a similar defence, by drawing away from them a single man. Let us then suppose that, instead of one invasion, we have four; and, if you please, on the same day; two of the hostile armies containing 50,000 men each; and the other two 25,000 each; beyond which, it is imagined, no man will carry his ideas of probability, until another *Paul of Muscovy* may unite with *France*, and carry into the confederacy *Denmark* and *Sweden*. Now having, as it will be recollected, left in the central district 70,000 men, and 60 pieces of cannon, each of our two maritime districts, that is attacked by an enemy 50,000 strong, has the same means of defence as I have already described; and the other two, respectively attacked by only half the force, have means of resistance still greater in proportion, and more concentrated.

Here, then, although your whole navy were guarding *Ireland*, or otherwise wholly out of the question, and you had in one and the same day four such invasions on any four points of the coast at the option of the enemy, the inhabitants of the three individual districts not attacked might, in fact, be following the plough or their other occupations in perfect tranquillity, and without any necessity of sending succours beyond their own limits, within which there would remain 360,000 fighting men. I would have it likewise noticed by the reader that, although I begin with *defensive* fighting, mine is not a *Fabian* system, so much celebrated by historians, but which, God forbid, should ever be practised in this country! When *Hannibal* invaded the *Romans*, he maintained himself in their territory *fifteen years*: But when *Bonaparte* shall invade the *English*, if he be not sick of his enterprise in *fifteen hours*, and have not surrendered in one third part of *fifteen days*, those who are responsible for the defence ought to lose their heads.

CHAPTER III.

EXPOSTULATION WITH THE AUTHORS OF THE STATUTES,
COMMONLY CALLED THE GENERAL DEFENCE ACTS.

IT must have been noticed, by all observers of what passes in parliament, that our most eminent statesmen, while discussing the means of security, all directed their thoughts more or less to the constitutional mode of defence, by *posse comitatus*, and all seemed to speak as if it had been taken as a guide to their judgment. I particularly allude to Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Windham; Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Yorke, (then Secretary at War, but now Secretary of State) and the presiding Minister. If, therefore, the statutes for arming the people have not come from their hands so perfect as might have been wished, perhaps we ought, in candour, to make for them the same apology as Sir William Jones, no unlearned constitutional lawyer, and one who had not then on his shoulders the burden of a public office, appears to have made for himself, when he wrote his admirable *Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, with a constitutional Plan of future Defence*; in which he carefully treats the subject of the *posse comitatus*; and as he more particularly proceeded therein to make for gentlemen in general.

“It is,” says he, “in every one’s mouth, that, on all violent breaches of the peace, the sheriff of the county is not only authorized but commanded to raise the *posse comitatus*, and forcibly to suppress the tumult: but, if most of those who use this expression will examine their own minds, they will presently perceive that they utter words which convey to them *no distinct idea*, and

“ and that the *power of the county*, like many other powers in nature and jurisprudence, is very ill ascertained, and very imperfectly comprehended.” (p. 11.)

In observing upon the system of defence adopted by ministers, let us be as much disposed to give them praise, for what they have done well, as to question the fitness of those parts of their work of which we cannot approve; but, putting personal praise or dispraise out of the question, let us look impartially at the plan itself; let us try it by the test of the constitution; let us try it on military principles; and let us try it by the rules of plain reasoning; for *plans of defence, on which all men are to act, all men ought to understand.*

On what I may think defects in this plan I mean to touch very lightly; but it were greatly to be wished the authors of it would scrutinize it, with a sincere desire to free it from whatever may be unconstitutional, unmilitary, or ill calculated for *combining, in one convenient, simple, energetic plan of resistance, those who dwell on the coast with those who inhabit the interior.*

I have already shown how the CONSTITUTION wisely provides for that *combining* of the external with the internal parts of the community, on a plan which all can understand, and upon which all, for that reason, can act without confusion or disorder; and, as nearly as may be, without the possibility of an erroneous movement. A plan, *by means of which, every particle of national force might, on one uniform, simple, all-embracing system, with ease be brought into action, with the utmost celerity, and the most perfect order,* must inspire into all hearts a confidence which cannot be inspired by any other system.

But, let us recommend to the authors of the new system a thorough investigation of it, arranging their observations as follows: namely,

1st. On the proposed continuance of the *military* service of the *civil* state:

2d. On volunteer and optional services :

3d. On the conditions of acceptance :

4th. On the mode of arming :

5th. On the classes :

6th. On the liability of persons in the *civil* state to be impressed and daughted into the ranks of the mercenary troops, and subjected to the articles of war :

7th. On the discretionary and suspending powers conferred by the statutes :

8th. On the express provisions for desolating our own country every where in front of an advancing enemy ; and

9th. On the security given our country of not being made
THE SEAT OF WAR.

First, then, seeing that under the statute (43 Geo. III. c. 96) the “military services” of the volunteers and all others enrolled are only to have continuance “*during the present war*,” let it be considered how this corresponds with the *constitution*, with a necessary economy in our future military establishment—and with national security either in war or *peace*, while *France* shall remain a gigantic military despotism, grasping at universal dominion with a keener appetite, and a far broader basis, than ancient *Rome*. When on these several points we shall have acquired “*distinct ideas*,” it will be seen, I presume, that instead of a mere temporary substitute for THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, it ought to be “RESTORED TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY,” to give permanent security for the *peace* and *the existence* of the state.

Secondly, touching *volunteer* and *optional* services, although the question is open to other remarks, the author will now do little more than repeat a few words which the act of the late war, now for the most part copied by 34 Geo. III. c. 55, formerly drew from him :

“ This, at first sight, may appear conciliating ; but it is calculated to make wrong impressions, and to perpetuate the

present great IGNORANCE of the *English* constitution ; which is, unquestionably, one of the greatest OF ALL OUR NATIONAL MISFORTUNES. That constitution—a constitution of liberty and beneficence—knowing it to be *equally the duty of every man* to defend the laws and liberties of his country, and the peace, property, and happiness of the community of which he is a member—confidently, justly, honourably, and wisely PRESUMES *every* man a volunteer in such a cause ; and consequently it dictates only an organization of the collective force, the means of rendering it effective, and the regulations under which it shall be exerted. To ask, therefore, each individual, if he be a volunteer or not in the service now proposed, is at least to cause a doubt in his mind, whether it be his constitutional duty or not ; or rather, it insinuates that no such duty exists prior to an invitation on the part of the crown. Hence, the question seems to be either distrustful, ensnaring, embarrassing, or inconvenient ; and the act, in this respect, does not appear to be consistent either with the constitution or with the leading words of its own preamble.”

It is not to perform a common and universal duty, which none can refuse without legal penalties or moral infamy, that we beat up for *volunteers* ; but when we propose to men to do that which is *not* a duty, or *more* than a duty. In respect of *defence*, it is *after* the enrolment of all able-bodied men that we come to the objects of *volunteering*. If peculiar services will expose men to more than common expense, or fatigue, or danger, volunteering is then meritorious, and here is its proper sphere.

Thirdly, touching conditions of acceptance, we find that no volunteer services can be accepted, unless the offer extend “ to march to any part of Great Britain ;” and not solely in the case of “ invasion,” but in that of “ insurrection” also. From this condition, as well as from the fact of *suspension* relative to the power of calling out the population of the

country in arms, we are unavoidably led to conjecture that no settled regular plan of defence can have existence ; but that it must depend upon the circumstances of the occasion, and upon the talents of the commanding general.

Under a complete revival of THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, every man could easily calculate the extent to which he would be liable to march from his home and his domestic affairs, and the time for which his services could be required ; and, as before observed, he would be acting upon a plan by which he must be inspired with the utmost confidence of a successful, and very speedy, termination of his exertions. A close comparison of the two systems in these respects is earnestly recommended to his Majesty's ministers.

Fourthly, as to the *mode* of arming ; being for the most part by arms issued by government, and which, at the expiration of the war, are to be recalled, ministers will here again, by consulting the constitution, see cause for an amendment of their system. The reader has seen how *Englishmen* were armed in ancient times, even under princes of the *Norman* line ; and those again of the house of *Tudor*. None of those princes were much distinguished for their tenderness towards national liberty ; and yet, in those times, an *Englishman's* arms were to be *his own*, and kept in *his own house* : *two times a year* he was to be sworn to the possession and the property ; nay, when all other goods and moveables were seizable for debt, his "*horse and harness*," as a member of the *posse comitatus*, were sacred even from the touch of the sheriff, although armed with the king's writ*.

Let the ministers, then, of a king of the house of *Brunswick*, whose glory it is that that house was called to the throne of these kingdoms as the guardian of freedom and

* See 13 Ed. I. St. i. c. 39.

the constitution, take especial care that none of their measures shall derogate from the reputation of the prince they serve ; nor from the high character of the nation they now call upon to assert its own rights, to maintain its own dignity, and to preserve its own liberties !

Fifthly, touching the classing of those who are liable to bear arms ; perhaps, upon an amendment of the new system, it might be advisable to avoid the present complexity. In the formation of corps out of the general mass, those *indiscriminately* of most vigour and activity should be selected for grenadiers, light infantry, and riflemen ; those next in prowess, for the general column ; while the striplings, and those of declining years, would of course form the reserve. Such is the simplicity of nature.

In the present system there is, indeed, an amiable feature, in putting forward those who are unmarried and are without children, as the first to face danger ; but it has been the policy of wise nations, rather to rely upon the arms of those whose personal interests were more interwoven with those of the state, through the medium of the tender connections arising out of connubial life ; and, when *the whole* of the two systems now brought into comparison shall be taken into contemplation, there seems to be little doubt but that a right judgment will be formed.

Sixthly, respecting the liability of persons in the civil state to be impressed and draughted into the ranks of the mercenary troops, subjected to the articles of war, and liable to be marched, as Mr. *Sheridan* expresses it, “ to *Cornwall* or to *Scotland*,” it seems better for the most part to address privately to ministers the observations that occur on this topic than to make them, at this time, part of a public discussion. On the present occasion, therefore, the author will only request his reader to consider whether, on a system of *defence on right principles*, that is, on a restoration of THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION TO FULL VIGOUR

AND ENERGY, any thing so uncongenial with the feelings of an *Englisman* could, under any possible circumstances, become *necessary*.

Seventhly, in respect to the discretionary and suspending powers, conferred by the statutes ; here, again, is very serious matter for the reconsideration of those by whom those statutes were framed.

When the law of self-preservation, which is the first law of nature, when the common law, and when the constitution of *England*, all enforce the duty of common arms-bearing for common defence ; when every man is liable to be called on by the magistrate, at all times, and at a moment's warning, to suppress *armed insurrection*, to put down *open rebellion*, or to repel *the invading enemies* of our country, and is exposed to the pains of law for disobedience ; and when we have experienced the most vindictive threats of invasion, and of the very extinction of our state, by a nation of the greatest military power that has appeared since the time of the universal dominion of the *Romans* ; how are we to account for what we see ?

Possessed of a *permanent* but *neglected* military system, which, on the true principles of order—the very bond of society—by a beautiful, refined, yet simple mechanism, organizes a community of free citizens into an invincible army ; which communicates the sensibilities of the individual to the aggregate of society ; and which causes those energies, for resenting menace and repelling assault, that characterize a brave man, to adorn and dignify a great nation ;—a system which, in short, holds over every other military system of human invention, a glorious pre-eminence ; why do we not see it *restored to full vigour and energy*, instead of the introduction of a *temporary* and a *discretionary* substitute without its most essential attributes ?

When the nation is called on by ministers, in little pamphlets circulated beyond all example, on every consideration

that can influence the human mind, to stand forward as one man in defence of our country, why do we see them any where damping the spirit they themselves have raised, by the rejection of services, by the slowness in providing arms, and, above all, by a suspension of the far greater part of the powers of their own act for general defence?

Surely, while the pressure of necessity is upon us, and while the national pulse beats high in favour of constitutional energy, they will seize the happy moment for completing our system of defence, to which we are invited by so many considerations relative to economy, tranquillity, security, freedom, and happiness!

Eighthly, touching the parliamentary provisions for completely desolating our own country every where in front of an advancing enemy; we must not too readily censure ministers for their adoption, because they stand on high military authority. The successful execution of this measure by *Francis I.* when invaded by *Charles V.* and whereby he saved his kingdom, being perhaps the most celebrated in history, it is no more than reasonable to suppose it is the example which all subsequent generals and war ministers have had in their eye; but the example is so horrible as to put us rather on considering how the practice is to be avoided, if possible, than how it is to be carried into execution.

On the occasion before us, one of the most happy provinces of *France*, about an hundred miles long and fifty wide, of an extent equal to the three counties of *Kent*, *Sussex*, and *Surry* united, was, as a mere measure of precaution, reduced to an uninhabited and frightful desert. Two only of the cities being fortified, “ the inhabitants of the “ other towns, as well as of the open country, were compelled to abandon their houses, and were conducted to the “ mountains, to the camp at *Avignon*, or the inland provinces. Corn, forage, and provisions of every kind, were “ carried away or destroyed; all the mills and ovens were

“ruined, and the wells filled up or rendered useless. The
 “devastation continued from the *Alps* to *Marseilles*, and
 “from the sea to the confines of *Dauphiné*; nor does his-
 “tory afford any instance, among civilized nations, in which
 “this cruel expedient for the public safety was employed
 “with the same rigour. The execution of this plan *Francis*
 “committed entirely to *Montmorency*, who was the au-
 “thor of it; a man wonderfully fitted by nature for such
 “a trust; haughty, severe, confident in his own abilities, and
 “despising those of other men; incapable of being diverted
 “from any resolution by remonstrances or entreaties; and
 “in prosecuting any scheme, regardless alike of love or
 “pity*.”

Good God! if such be the *prudence* of war—if such
 are to be its effects, wrought upon our own country by our
 own hands, dreadful indeed must be this scourge of the
 human species!—Here is the picture of a country extend-
 ing as far as from *Dover* to *Chichester*, and from the south
 coast to *London*; which presented even to its ruthless in-
 vader a face of so much desolation as to strike him with
 horror, and chill his soul!

And when this policy is an acknowledged part of the
 science of modern war, in which all the learned in that sci-
 ence seem to be agreed; to us, who inhabit an island ac-
 cessible (on any other than the constitutional system of
 defence) on all sides, it becomes a question truly interest-
 ing, whether such a desolation of our borders on the ap-
 proach of an enemy be really necessary. If attacked at
 once on the east, the west, and the south coast, to carry
 this desolation to the extent it was carried in the instance
 before us, our whole island must be destroyed; for, by the
 powers of the statute, 43 Geo. III. c. 55, the country
 is to be made a desert wherever the enemy may be

* *Essay on Defensive War*, 39.—*Roberts*. ch. v. vol. ii. 398.

advancing, so that this spoil and desolation may easily reach the heart of the kingdom, and extend in all directions. And incalculable even would be the destruction and the calamities, supposing this desolation to extend only twelve miles from the coast; as seemed to be in the contemplation of government, when the sheriffs were lately directed to make a return of the stock within those limits*.

But I ask the statesman and the soldier, if, on the true principles of military defence, *any* such desolation be necessary? If he have not yet from the perusal of these pages made the discovery, I will tell him:—This monstrous policy is a fundamental error in the science of war, originating in *a violation of the fundamental principles of civil government*. It is in the practice of war its science is formed; and all the modern kings and generals by whom it has successively been cultivated, and brought to its present degree of perfection, have contented themselves with adapting their military rules to *that state or condition of society which fell under their experience and observation*. Seeing every where that monopoly of arms which forms *standing armies*, and the bulk of every nation consequently *disarmed*, from this wretched condition of society, experience uniformly proved the practicability of penetrating into any country even with an army inferior to its own; and for a while at least being master of a portion of it. It was this danger, a danger certainly threatening a complete conquest, especially if the invader happened to be superior in strength or generalship, that dictated this celebrated expedient, and ingrafted it into the science of modern war.

At the period when *Francis I.* according to *Robertson*, “ saved his whole kingdom by *sacrificing* one of its pro-

* Written in 1798.

vinces*," a standing army had been introduced in *France* between *ninety and one hundred years*; and we are told that, "in less than a century after their introduction, the nobles and their military tenants, though sometimes summoned to the field, according to ancient *form*, were considered as an *incumbrance* upon the troops with which they acted†." Here was an early operation of "the policy of the three last centuries." It is worth remark that the same government which first introduced *standing armies*, was the first to experience their inadequacy to *national defence*, and to feel the necessity of calling for that purpose to their aid, the horrid expedient of desolating a fair province.

But let any man, instead of the miserable system of defence by a standing army, only contemplate the noble and irresistible system of the great *Alfred*, and he must instantly see that so dreadful an infliction of calamity on ourselves never can be in the smallest degree necessary; but that provision of every kind may be left in its place, without enabling an enemy to advance one step the more into the country; and consequently that no other removals would become a matter of prudence, than merely a removal of the horses and draught oxen, the infirm and helpless part of the community, and of money or other valuables lying within so narrow a compass as to be objects of pilfering or pillage.

"Herein then our system has a new recommendation of the greatest magnitude and importance. Let any man only calculate the destruction of the property lying in any county within twelve miles only of the coast; let him imagine the confusion and the countless miseries of depopulating such a border; the permanent ill effects in the poverty it must occasion; the years it would require to restore to the country the same face of cultivation and plenty;

* Rob. chap. v. ii 398.

† Ib. chap. i. 91.

and the burden upon the public purse to make even some compensation to the sufferers (for a complete compensation is out of the question); and he will shudder at the idea of such a cruel sacrifice being necessary to our safety, as often as *France* may find means to make a descent upon our coast. And there is yet another consideration. If, instead of the complete security and enjoyment afforded to the people by the constitutional system of defence, they should experience the devastation of the other system, the degree of discontent and alienation of heart from the common cause, which it might occasion, ought seriously to be taken into the account.

The returns lately made from my own township having led me to a consideration of the effects of the present erroneous system, in case an enemy should approach the coast of the county in which I live, I have endeavoured to state it in such a form as to convey some idea of the inconveniencies to be foreseen*.

The bending shores of *Lincolnshire* being an hundred miles in length, there are consequently contained within twelve miles of the coast 768,000 acres of land. From these deducting an eighth part, for roads, drains, and actual wastes, there remains a clear total of 672,000 acres of cultivated land. Considering then that this tract of land contains all the fine sea marshes, and much other rich pasture land, as well as the richest of the tillage land, formerly fen, the stock about harvest time, which is a season particularly attended to by invaders, cannot be estimated at less on an average than six pounds per acre, allowing for fallows; which makes a total value in *mere provisions* of flesh and grain of above *four millions* of pounds sterling. And here we are to remember we are calculating only to a breadth of *twelve* miles; a space over which an unobstructed army would march in three hours: In the instance

* Written in 1798.

we have taken from history, it reached *fifty* miles in-land. Now it is pretty evident that, in case of driving the country, the greater part of the stock must be *destroyed*; for, if it take up every farmer two or three weeks to lead his hay and corn from his own field to his own yard, how is it possible to convey it *on a sudden* many miles on the appearance of an enemy? and no general will think of the cruel expedient of *driving* until the moment of imminent danger. Even cattle and sheep must in a very great degree be destroyed; for where are the immense herds and flocks from the sea-coast marshes and pastures to find food, if driven into the interior, where every man has already as much stock as his land can support?

If there be eloquence in the affecting sentiment of true patriotism, or in that of general humanity; or if tenderness for kindred, for parents, for children, or for the objects of our warmest affection, can touch the heart, then, in the contemplation of a plan of which the *driving* system is a feature, there are arguments for the system of defence, recommended in these pages, which no *English* bosom can resist. Instead of *calculations* on the proportion of such a *national scourge* which shall be endured, while troops to face an invader shall be collecting from the distant parts of the kingdom, subject to all the diversions that might be occasioned by collateral attacks, give *Englishmen* their proper *constitutional* defence, and then you shall see them meet an invading enemy with a confident smile, and with this salutation,—*Behold our wealth, and touch it at your peril!*—Instead of the *driving* of your maritime borders, spreading dismay and consternation through your own interior, by obscuring the sun with clouds of dust ascending from innumerable herds and flocks, and filling the air with the hurrying yells of the herdsmen and shepherds, mingling with the piercing cries and wailings of women and children, flying in terror and confusion before the face of *French* ravagers; instead, I say, of thus disgracefully *driving* the

country, stand to your arms, preserve your property, defend your females, and *drive the Frenchmen* into the sea !

Instead of a panic-spreading movement from your border to your interior, substitute the fear-dispelling torrent of a real *posse comitatus* pouring down in a contrary direction, filling highways and bye-ways with column after column in endless succession ! Instead of the piteous cries of children, and the wailings of terrified women, let the shouts of the brave, seeking the battle, be heard from afar ! Instead of the discordant yells of cattle-drivers, and the yelping of shepherds' curs, let the air resound with patriotic songs and martial music ; sights and sounds appalling the stoutest-hearted invader !

These ideas having produced the following song, it is given to the reader :

THE CIVIC WARRIORS;

OR

THE COUNTY POWER OF ENGLAND.

1.

NIGHT yields her empire o'er the air ;
 Aurora beams ; the wind sits fair :
 What sec'st thou, Watchman, from thy tow'r ?
 A countless forest seems to rise—
 On wings of war, it thisward flies :
 'Tis glory's call, brave patriot *Power* !
 Your right hands, all, O, raise on high,
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

2.

To arms ! to arms ! the chiefs command ;
 Array'd the ready warrior's stand,
 Impatient for the victor's crown :
 Wave, banner wave ! speak ratt'ling drum !
 With rapid step, we come, we come,
 In life, or death, to gain renown !
 Your right hands, all, O, raise on high ;
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

3.

A prince, who feels the common cause,
 And fights for liberty and laws,
 To battle leads; on, on, ye brave!
 With warlike shouts the welkin rend;
 Your homes, your babes, your fair defend;
 Their charms from foul dishonour save.
 Your right hands, all, O, raise on high;
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die!

4.

Hark! hark! invaders' cannon roar;
 See! see! their legions reach the shore;
 As rav'ning tygers, fierce and fell;
 But lo! upon the tyger foe
 Thy lions rush, and lay them low,
 Nor one returns the tale to tell.
 Your right hands, all, O, raise on high;
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die!

5.

Now parent, infant, maiden, wife,
 All flock around in tender strife
 Who first shall kiss a victor's hand;
 Who first shall deck a victor's brow,
 With sweetest native flow'rs that grow
 On Freedom's high-fam'd happy land.
 Your right hands, all, O, raise on high;
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die.

As patriotic songs can produce little effect unless, by the enchanting sweetness and the animating strains of music, they captivate the public taste, and touch the springs of national enthusiasm, the publisher of the first edition, by authority of the author, advertised a prize of twenty guineas, or a sword of that value, for the best musical composition to which the foregoing ballad might be sung; and, as soon as the adjudication had been made, the author again directed the fact to be advertised, but the author of the successful composition, who triumphed over eleven competitors, has not yet put in his claim.

Ninthly, and lastly ; we arrive at this very serious question—What is the security given our country, of not being made the *seat of war* ?

To clap a helmet on the head, and a corselet o'er the breast, does not secure invulnerability. *Thetis* omitted to defend only the *heel* of *Achilles*, and there he received the wound of which he perished. With all due deference to military science and skill, our constitution has wisely ordained that our dependence shall be on the *physical strength of our population*. When we speak of a contest of military genius, we admit the possibility of any disaster. Supposing the superiority of generalship on our own side, yet a general may be killed, or taken sick ; or mere accident, in various other shapes, may frustrate the best concerted plan depending on tactics, or military talents. Not so, when we “*organize a community of free citizens into an invincible army.*”

Here, being matter for the minds of our statesmen and legislators to work upon, I shall drop the subject, in hopes it may induce them to revise their plan of defence, which has in it this merit, and that is not a small one, that it has thoroughly prepared the minds of the community for a complete restoration to *full vigour and energy, of the military branch of the Constitution*, and even made no small progress in the execution of that important work.

CHAPTER IV.

THE OPINIONS OF STATESMEN, HISTORIANS, AND PHILOSOPHERS, ON STANDING ARMIES.

A DUE consideration of that part of our military establishment, which consists of a *standing army*, being an essential part of the task which the author has undertaken, and absolutely necessary towards forming an enlightened judgment on the grand question—*How are we to form a system of defence on right principles?*—We must now that way direct our attention.

It is not in ordinary circumstances that the unreflecting discern the intrinsic merits of a constitution of government; neither is it under considerable difficulties, or considerable dangers merely, that they truly appreciate such an institution; but it is when *the case comes to be extreme* that truth flashes on the mind, and they discover those latent excellencies which they before overlooked. It is the very same in morals and religion, as every day testifies: instead of a conduct strictly right, men satisfy themselves with plausible *substitutes*: instead of the constant practice of genuine virtue, they fall into the *habits* of open *vice*, or of *spurious* morality; nor is it until their reputations are on the point of being forever blasted, that they become convinced that *honesty is the best policy*, or feel themselves struck with other simple truths; nay, indeed, it is every day's observation that those precepts of religion, which are so plain that he who runs may read, are yet constantly neglected, and in fact unknown, until they become *death-bed discoveries*. It is even thus, by the long use of a sorry *substitute* for constitutional security, by a *spurious* and *pernicious* system of defence, and by a settled *habit* of deviation into a *vicious* practice, that our political salvation is at this moment a matter of anxious solicitude.

Availing as a death-bed repentance may possibly be to the individual sinner, a STATE that trifles with its fate to the last extremity is still more foolish than the thoughtless profligate; for, to a STATE, a *death-bed* repentance assuredly comes too late.

In what I shall say of standing armies, I certainly shall not utter a syllable with intent to give offence, either to the present army or to the present rulers of our country. The army did not form itself; neither was it the creation of our present sovereign, or of his ministers. They found it part of the machinery of government, and they continued to use it as such. Nor was it until very lately our situation was seen to be that *extreme case*, which was calculated to awaken our rulers to a sense of the right principles of defence, or to the peril of acting upon wrong ones. They are already partly awakened: they have already, on a *temporary* plan, armed a number of free citizens considerably exceeding the number of the standing army. They are going on with the work: seeing the progress they have made, let us give them credit for right intentions, at the same time that we offer them our best aid towards perfecting the system, and saving the state.

At the awful hour of approaching dissolution, the sick man must steadily look his sins in the face, if he would discard them; and the assisting pastor would ill perform his duty, should he attempt to prevent the dying man having a right sense of his moral situation, by disguises, or palliations, or silence, on habitual and notorious breaches of the moral law. In like manner, the political adviser and consoler of his country must be highly deficient in fidelity were he not, in her extremity, to point out her past errors, and to urge upon her attention, how unwelcome soever they may be, those truths, *without which she cannot be saved*.

As in this duty the author wishes to stand as clear as possible of *personally* playing the censor, he will chiefly lay be-

fore his reader the sentiments of great and wise, and venerable men; statesmen, historians, and philosophers; men who have highly adorned, not only our own country, but the great republic of letters; whose opinions will have infinitely more weight than any thing he could offer on the subject.

He will begin with a panegyric on the army, delivered by one of the greatest of modern *Englishmen*, the first WILLIAM PITT.

“ Formerly,” says his elegant historian, “ he had distinguished himself by his opposition to a standing army; and, in pursuance of this principle, had espoused every restriction that had been proposed upon the despotism of military law. Now he pleaded for an extension of that law; and opposed a bill, whose object was to have created such a rotation in the army that, in a few years, every peasant and artisan in the kingdom would have understood the business of a soldier; and the people in general have probably concluded that a standing army was altogether useless. — Our liberties existed,” he declared, “ solely in the dependence upon the DISCRETION of the Sovereign, and the VIRTUE of the army. To that VIRTUE,” said he, “ we must trust, even at this hour, small as our army is. To that VIRTUE we must continue to trust, should we espouse all the precautions our warmest opposers can desire. And without this VIRTUE, should the Lords, the Commons, and the People of *England*, intrench themselves behind *parchments* up to the teeth, *the sword will find a passage to the vitals of the Constitution* *.”

Here, then, delivered by the most splendid genius of our age, is the panegyric of a *standing army*; a panegyric at which every lover of his country, while he reads, must trem-

* Life of Lord Chatham, p. 48.

ble ! But the law of nature, which has impressed it on the heart of every one who has not degenerated from the character of a MAN, that political liberty and *arms of defence* are his right ; and the deep wisdom of *Alfred*, who taught the happy organization by which a whole nation, as one man, may ever stand prepared for and armed against all danger, have left us in *a substantial representation* and *an armed inhabitancy*, a better security, methinks, for our liberties and our possessions, than either the DISCRETION of a sovereign, the VIRTUE of a standing army, or the PARCHMENTS of a standing parliament. It completes the picture of a standing army to say that, in a military view, it exhibits exactly what, in a political view, we see in the borough faction—the concentration of the power of a nation in the hands of a few ; a power which never can be otherwise than dangerous in the extreme ; nor, indeed, other than an actual despotism, while monopolized.

It is this concentration of *legislative* power, at the disposal of a minister, which both tempts and enables him to cripple liberty by unconstitutional law ; and it is this concentration of *military* power which also tempts and enables him to complete its destruction by the sword ; and, when once a legislative foundation for despotism is laid, we always find the greatest impatience for finishing the work. Standing armies are not, as some may imagine, only resorted to when the very existence of a state demands it ; but, in every government where they have taken root, will in due time be employed on the most ordinary occasions.—King *Charles II.*'s standing army was employed, in the west of *Scotland*, in aid of Episcopacy ; where *Burnet*, speaking of the zealous presbyterian ministers, who had been commanded by proclamation “ to give over all further preaching, or serving the cure, “ and to withdraw from their parishes immediately,” says, “ And the military men that lay in the country were ordered “ to pull them out of their pulpit, if they should presume “ to go on in their functions.”

By regular gradations, discontents were worked up into a spirit of rebellion, which was crushed by General *Dalziel* at *Pentland Hill*: This, of course, produced new severities; when, by the influence of Archbishop *Sharp*, the civil government put one *Maccaill* to the torture. “He bore the torture with great constancy; and, either he could say nothing, or he had the firmness not to discover those who trusted him. Every man of them could have saved his own life, if he would accuse any other: But they were all true to their friends; *Maccaill*, for all the pains of the torture, died in a rapture of joy*.”

The forces were now ordered to lie in the west, the principal theatre of discontent, “where *Dalziel* acted the *Mus-covite* too grossly†. He threatened to spit men and to roast them; and he killed some in cold blood, or rather in hot blood, for he was then drunk, when he ordered one to be hanged, because he would not tell where his father was, for whom he was in search. When he heard of any that *did not go to church*, he did not trouble himself to set a fine upon him, but he set as many soldiers upon him as should eat him up in a night. By these means all people were struck with such terror that *they came regularly to church*; and the clergy were so delighted with it that they used to speak of that time as the poets do of the “golden age.” And this is the account given us by an honest bishop‡.

He afterwards says, “A severe prosecution of conventicles was set on foot, and a great deal of money was raised by arbitrary fines; Lord *Athol* made of this, in one week, 19,000*l.* sterling. I did all I could to moderate this fury. Duke *Lauderdale* broke out into the most frantic

* History of his own Times, I. 333.

† He had been in the service of the Czar.

‡ History of his own Times, I. 334.

“ fits possible. When I was once saying to him, *Was that*
 “ *a time to drive them into rebellion?* Yes, he said, would
 “ to God they would rebel, that so he might bring over an
 “ army of Irish papists to cut all their throats*.”

Swift, in his letter to *Pope*, 10 Jan. 1721, says, “ I had
 “ likewise, in those days, a mortal antipathy to standing
 “ armies in times of peace; because I always took standing
 “ armies to be only servants, hired by the master of the fa-
 “ mily, for keeping his own children in slavery; and be-
 “ cause I conceived that a prince, who could not think him-
 “ self secure without mercenary troops, must needs have a
 “ separate interest from that of his subjects: although I am
 “ not ignorant of those *artificial necessities* which a cor-
 “ rupted ministry can create, for keeping up forces *to support*
 “ *a faction* against the public interest.”

Sir *William Temple* tells us, “ standing forces, or guards
 “ in constant pay, were no where used by lawful princes
 “ in their native or hereditary countries, but only by con-
 “ querors in subdued provinces, or usurpers at home; and
 “ were a defence only against subjects, NOT AGAINST ENE-
 “ MIES †.” ➤ *Ulm* and *Austerlitz*!

It is justly observed, by *Trenchard*, that “ *Harrington*
 “ has founded his whole *Oceana* upon a trained militia;”
 and that “ Lord *Bacon* in several places bears his testimony
 “ against a standing army, and particularly tells us that a
 “ mercenary army is fittest to invade a country, but a mili-
 “ tia to defend it; because the first have estates to get, and
 “ the latter to protect.”—Again, “ None of which nations
 “ (the *Israelites*, *Athenians*, *Corinthians*, *Achaïans*, *La-*
 “ *cedemonians*, *Thebans*, *Samnites*, and *Romans*) whilst
 “ they kept their liberty, were ever known to maintain any
 “ soldiers in constant pay within their cities, or ever suf-

* History of his own Times, I. 476.

† I. 70.

“fered any of their subjects to make war their profession ;
 “well knowing that the sword and sovereignty march hand
 “in hand :” and, besides these, he afterwards cites the ex-
 ample of several other nations that were enslaved by their
 own armies *.—Again, “The first footsteps I find of a
 “standing army in *England*, since the *Romans* left the
 “island, were in *Richard* the Second’s time, who raised four
 “thousand archers in *Cheshire*, and suffered them to plun-
 “der, live upon free quarter, beat, wound, ravish, and kill
 “wherever they went ; and afterwards he called a parlia-
 “ment, encompassed them with his archers, forced them to
 “give up the whole power of parliament, and make it *trea-*
 “*son* † to endeavour to repeal any of the arbitrary consti-
 “tutions that were then made. But being afterwards
 “obliged to go to *Ireland* to suppress a rebellion there, the
 “people took advantage of it, and dethroned him. The
 “nation had such a specimen in this reign of a standing
 “army, that I do not find any king from him to *Charles* I.
 “that attempted keeping up any forces in time of peace,
 “except the Yeomen of the Guard, who were constituted
 “by *Henry* VII.—Nor would they suffer our kings to keep
 “up an army in *Ireland*, though there were frequent re-
 “bellions there, and by that means its subjection was preca-
 “rious ; *as well knowing they would be in England when*
“called for.”

But, says he again, “Thus what our court, for above a
 “thousand years together, had never effrontry enough to
 “ask, what the *pensioner parliament* could not think of
 “without astonishment, what King *James’s* parliament

* Tracts by Trenchard and Gordon, I. 10. 25.

† When such reigns as those of *Edward* II. *Richard* II. and *Henry* VIII. are alone distinguished in English history for the creation of
 “wild and new-fangled treasons,” as *Blackstone* calls them, all creators
 of new treasons must of course fall under the suspicion of treading in the
 steps of such brutal rulers.

“ (that was almost chosen by himself) could not hear debated with patience, we are likely to have the honour of establishing in our own age, even under a *deliverance*.” This was written ten years after the *Revolution*, in the reign of King *William*; who, in return for a crown, bequeathed to the people who gave it him the *standing army* and the *funding system*. *Trenchard* proceeds to unfold the policy which accompanies such armies, and observes that “ an army, kept in *Ireland*, is more dangerous to us than at home: for here, by perpetual converse with their *relations and acquaintance*, some few of them perhaps may warp towards their country; whereas, in *Ireland*, they are kept as it were in garrison, where they are shut up from the communication of their countrymen, and may be nursed up in another interest. This is so true, that it is a common policy among arbitrary princes often to shift their soldiers’ quarters, lest they should contract friendship among the natives, and by degrees fall into their interest.”

And he adds, “ If the army should be continued a *few years*,” [It has now been continued an hundred years] “ they will be accounted a part of the prerogative, and it will be thought as great a violation to attempt the disbanding them, as the guards in *Charles II.*’s time: It shall be interpreted a design to dethrone the king, and be made an argument for keeping them up*.” We have lived to see *Scotch* soldiers employed to keep the peace in *England*, and *English* Soldiers enforcing the execution of the laws in *Scotland*, and plenty of both nations teachers of loyalty to the people of *Ireland*: But we have also witnessed what *Trenchard*, shrewd as he was, had not sagacity enough to prophesy—our country covered with

* Tracts by *Trenchard* and *Gordon*, I. 63, 64. 87, 88. 103.

barracks, nay an *English militia* constantly kept at a distance from “*their relations and acquaintance*,” and even employed in *Scotland and Ireland*!!!

Again: “Were not the *French* as powerful in *Charles II.* and *King James’s* time as they are after this long and destructive war [1697], and a less alliance to oppose them? And yet we then thought a much less army than is now contended for, a most insurmountable grievance; insomuch that in *Charles the II.’s* reign the grand jury presented them, and the pensioner parliament voted them, to be a nuisance: sent *Sir Jos. W—son* to the Tower for saying *the king might keep guards for the defence of his person*, and addressed to have them disbanded*.” The late minister could maintain with impunity that the king can bring into the country as many foreign mercenaries as he should think proper.

Trenchard had before said, “If I must be a slave, it is very indifferent to me who is my master; and therefore I shall never consent to be ruled by an army, which is the worst that the most barbarous conquest can impose upon me. Nay, in many respects an authorized standing army is far worse than a foreign invasion, and a conquest from abroad; for there we have a chance for it: But this is a conquest in cold blood, which may not be resisted; and we lose the inseparable right of the conquered, which is to rescue and deliver themselves, and throw off the yoke as soon as they can†.”

Doctor *Gilbert Stuart*, in his *View of Society in Europe, in its progress from rudeness to refinement*, tells us “It was chiefly the enormous dissoluteness and irregularity of manners, introduced by the mercenaries, which

* Tracts by Trenchard and Gordon, I. 26.

† Ibid. I. 20. 40.

“ deformed *England* so much in the reign of *Edward I.*
 “ that the ordinary judges were thought unable to execute the laws. This, it would seem, made *Edward* invent a new tribunal of justice, which had power to traverse the kingdom, and to inflict *discretionary* punishments on offenders *. Yet,” says he, “ a court so inquisitorial was a daring insult to a free nation, and infinitely a greater calamity than all the disorders which prevailed. That country is miserable where the discretion of a judge is the law †.”

After repeated mention of the *mercenaries* whom our kings were in the habit of hiring whenever they had money, “ the introduction,” says he, “ of these banditti into a feudal army, was the *utmost violence to its nature* : It offended infinitely the barons, and the military tenants, that they should be called to mingle with persons so ignoble. Yet the princes of Europe, finding the advantages of troops whom they could command to their purpose, and march at their will, were disposed to encourage them. They perceived that they could possess no power ‡ without mercenaries: and no mercenaries were to be had without money. Hence the passion for wealth they were to discover; hence their ruinous projects to acquire it ;” hence the proness to war.

“ The mercenaries, which were made *necessary* by the disorders of the fiefs and chivalry, were to lead to misfortunes and misery.” (123). — The necessity here spoken of is the state necessity of restless savage princes, delighting in foreign war, and unable to get themselves a name, but by mad expeditions to the Holy Land,

* Trelman, Gloss: *voc.* TRAILBASTON.

† How inferior this English Justinian to an Alfred ! And how deeply tainted with the despotism of the Norman imperial law !

‡ We should have said no *arbitrary* power.

or to *France*, and by the slaughter of their species. But where was the *national* necessity, in a military view, of such expeditions; or of any military force not to have been found in the *posse comitatus*, preserved in full vigour and purity? Now mark the consequences which flowed from our kings imagining mercenaries *necessary*.—"Mercenaries," says Mr. *Stuart*, "were scarcely known, when the princes of Europe invented the art of extorting the wealth of their subjects; and of *employing it to oppress them*. THUS MERCENARIES GAVE RISE TO TAXATIONS IN EUROPE!!!" (123.)—Ammirable premises, for conducting us to the Doctor's conclusion, that a standing army of many thousand mercenaries is become *necessary* to us!

And Mr. *Stuart* observes that "the victory of the kingly authority, over the liberty of the people, continued in many princes the power of taxation; and this power, and the command of mercenaries, are *the completion of despotism*."

But let us go on: "Mercenaries," says Mr. *Stuart*, "were the strength of armies; but to collect such multitudes of them as were necessary for great and vigorous efforts, required an *inexhaustible revenue*. They had, besides, no principle of attachment or honour. An object of terror to the people, and of suspicion to the prince, they were employed and detested."

Charles VII. of France, it seems, began about the year 1440, the system of standing armies, by raising a standing force of 9000 cavalry and 16000 infantry; and, according to Mr. *Stuart*, "succeeding princes were to add to, and improve upon, the regulation of *Charles*;—and from *this period*, the monarchs of *France* were to be in the full capacity of levying taxes at their pleasure; and of *surveying, in mockery, the rights and pretensions of their subjects*."—And to the same effect *Robertson* says,

“ He not only established that formidable body of regular troops, which has been mentioned, but he was the *first* monarch of *France* who, *by his royal edict, without the concurrence of the states general of the kingdom,* levied an extraordinary subsidy on his people*.

In the year 1798, before the public had got so much light as at present into the nature of the military force, which is necessary to us, the author commented on the extraordinary performance of Doctor *Stuart*, indirectly recommending that which, on his own reasoning, we ought of all things on earth to reject. He now thinks it unnecessary to repeat what he then said. If such, then, as we have seen them described by so many able men, be the nature and character of mercenary standing armies; and if the necessities of our situation, both in respect of danger from *France* and the *impossibility of upholding sufficient armies by taxes on the people*, call upon us to “probe to the bottom,” and to reform our military system, I will say, in the words of Mr. *Addington* (see p. 1.) but without a “*perhaps*,” “It is happy for the future interests of this empire that the occasion now offers, of which we should decisively avail ourselves, to show that any prospects of attack upon our *finances and independence*, such as the *French* government seems to entertain, must be vain and futile;” provided we follow the salutary counsel of Sir *William Jones*, and “*restore to full vigour and energy*” the military branch of our Constitution.

“ It must have been obvious to the reader that a revival of our ancient constitutional militia must supersede the present militia establishment, as well as a considerable part of the standing army; but this could be no cause of regret, because as the least of two evils is always to be preferred, so the most valuable of two good things is equally to be chosen. But in such a

* Hist. ch. v. l. 97.

change there would be the less to regret, when we consider how much it has been the object of modern policy to assimilate, as much as possible, our militia to the nature, and condition, and character of a standing army. What a true, natural, militia is, I trust, has been made appear; and we have only to ask if our militia, as now actually raised and *hired*, kept up as a standing force, and in pay during a war of many years, subjected to the military articles, and uniformly marched to a distance from its own county, and “their relations and acquaintance,” do most resemble such a constitutional force, or a standing army?

No officer of the present militia, or even of the standing army, will, I trust, take offence at any remarks I have made on either of those establishments. It is not with the gentlemen connected with those services, but with the establishments themselves, that I alone find fault. Neither am I insensible to the value of the real and important services *England* has received from both those establishments. They have been many: and while I contemplate the *necessary* ill consequences, if establishments formed on wrong principles should continue, and, indeed, *the certain ruin of liberty*, from the continuance of a standing army, not very greatly overbalanced by a genuine well-regulated proper militia such as the *county power*, I should not render justice to either of those establishments if I bore not my testimony to their past merits, and failed to remark how admirably they have paved the way to a restoration of the ancient system, by the facility we should experience in that restoration, from the diffusion they have given to military knowledge.

CHAPTER V.

REFLECTIONS IN FAVOUR OF STATE REFORMATIONS
WHEN THEY ARE BECOME NECESSARY.

IF the evils and calamities to be apprehended from half measures were to be inevitable results from *the fortune of war*, we must abide the issues and make the best of them: but, where they may be effectually provided against, and where so to provide is upon a minister as imperious an obligation as it is for the volunteer to do his duty in the ranks, we may hope that the obligation, being once distinctly pointed out, will not fail to produce its effect. This tract will be presented to ministers, with thanks for what they have already well done; and with lively hopes that the errors of their system will be speedily amended, and what remains to be done will be carried into effect without delay*.

It must already have been seen that DEFENCE ON RIGHT PRINCIPLES has in it as much of *civil* as of *military* prudence; and that, even in its military part, there is less of science than of nature. Its foundation is FREEDOM; its food, the delicious fruits of liberty; its life, the passionate attachment of the people to their form of government: it is the very soul of defence that a country be worth defending. Feeling these truths, the writer, in a letter to the minister, on the subject of our national situation, which he took the liberty of sending to him on the 29th of January 1803, con-

* The former edition of this tract was accordingly presented to six of the then cabinet ministers, together with a manuscript supplement containing some strictures on their own system of defence, which the author chose, in the first instance, at least, thus privately to put into their hands, rather than unnecessarily to appeal to the public against the measures of ministers. Those strictures will now be published in the second volume of the present edition.

fined not his observations to the *military* branch of the constitution, but paid equal attention to the *civil* also. Amongst other remarks, were these: "At the very awful conjuncture
 " in *England's* existence at which we are arrived, it is not,
 " Sir, in the human mind for a presiding minister to reflect
 " on the situation of the state, internal and external, without
 " the utmost anxiety, and emotions of a very untranquilizing nature. Internally, the state is diseased at the heart:
 " externally, its danger is unprecedented. Things cannot,
 " Sir, go on in the course that has brought us into this situation, without leading to some fatal catastrophe. It is
 " consoling, however, to know that for either evil that has
 " been alluded to a remedy, if not too long delayed, may be
 " found in the plain dictates of the CONSTITUTION. *A*
 " constitution, Sir, that can rescue us from the perils of
 " such a situation, ought to command our admiration, and
 " to insure our attachment. Call it, then, Sir, to your
 " aid," &c.

Does not the writer already see this constitution, like an up-starting giant, snapping asunder the bands of indifference and sloth, in which for centuries it has slumbered, and re-stamping on the nation that martial character which gave it of old its freedom and its fame! In this age of stupendous events, preparing for the human race some new destiny, he sees *England* on the eve of reassuming her proper attitude, and of recovering on the continent a beneficial influence*. In defending, by the arms of freemen, her own soil and her own honour, he sees her teaching the brave, but unfortunate nations around, the secret of defence and independence, and their statesmen the true balance of power. But, how slow soever they may be to profit by the great example, he trusts that every day's progress in political reformation will render the task at home more easy and more delightful.

* The hope of 1803.

We are now too much familiarized to the rise and fall of kingdoms, as well as to domestic events on a scale of uncommon magnitude, and have penetrated too much into the secret of revolutions and of conquests having their origin in that WANT of freedom, in that soul-sinking DESPOTISM, which makes governments not worth preserving, and countries not worth defending, to be any longer liable to strong delusions unfavourable to our own liberties, or to be seized with panics at mere opinions, instead of approving or disapproving of them, according to their merit; and a constitutional arming, seen at first sight to secure property and privilege, must, more than all, free us from those unworthy agitations of spirit, to which a nation, claiming freedom, but without arms in its possession, must, like a timid child, be ever subject. Confident and composed, a people born to, and enjoying freedom,

“ On rights and laws and lofty themes discourse,”

and, at all times are equally prepared, with steadiness and temper, to restore “ to full vigour and energy” their own decayed institutions, whether *military* or *civil*; and otherwise, in periods of awful danger, to act with immoveable fortitude that part on the theatre of human existence, to which, by the dispensations of Providence, they have been called. A people who, by only resorting to the energies of their own constitution, can stand the shock of *the Colossal despotism which bestrides so many prostrate nations*, and can grapple with the giant single-handed, are no longer to be duped by the stupid cant of *danger*, in attempting to check a *petty faction of corrupt men*; and I trust that such a people will never be diverted from seeking a constitutional reformation of abuses, which are as intolerable for the flagrant violation of public rights, as they are destructive of public morals, and incompatible with public honour.

To those who so often have wondered that the writer could have persevered, under all discouragements, in season

and out of season, in recommending a *civil* reform which they deemed unattainable, and who wondered yet more when, some years ago, he laboured to promote a *military* reform beyond all comparison, still less to be looked for, the present time is peculiarly instructive. In the critical moment of danger and of need, they see the last-mentioned reform brought, by a spontaneous act of the government, to the relief of the nation; and, although as yet much short of perfection, hailed with enthusiasm by the people, as the only means of their salvation. Effects, however, come not without their appropriate causes; and those who, in the contemplation of causes, have a foresight of effects, those who foresee public evils, and know their proper remedies, and who entertain rational notions of the nature of man, will ever feel a steady confidence in the progressive, the powerful, though possibly slow workings of truth on the human mind; and will feel persuaded that a day will come, when their counsels will not be despised, nor themselves be reviled. Let not, therefore, the friends of a reform in the representation of the people in parliament be discouraged. In due time, the necessity of resisting the *borough*-invaders of our liberties will be as manifest as is at present the necessity of arming against the *Gallic* invaders of our land; and its adoption will be as popular and enthusiastic. To the discerning, it is already seen, (and upon the principles we have discussed) that the ground-work of a system of defence cannot be perfect, *until the public interest in the CONSTITUTION is at the highest.*

It was when writing on the subject of putting arms into the hands of the citizens, under a new militia law of that period, that, in the year 1757, the Earl of *Liverpool*, in his *Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force in England*, begins with remarking “ that
 “ the constitution of every *free* government is subject from
 “ time to time to a sort of dangerous *crisis*, which demands

“ the attention of all who are concerned in its preservation.”

“ The fluctuation of property, the change of manners or disposition in the people, and *the shifting of power from one neighbouring state to another*, must variously affect it.

“ If the CONSTITUTION be only through age impaired, *it must be called back to its first principles.*

“ The history of this country abounds with more of these *critical periods* than any other; and it is owing to *the proper use* our ancestors made of them that our government has long been advancing, by various steps, to perfection. They withstood the repeated attempts of both papal innovation and regal oppression; and though their struggles frequently produced violent fevers in the state, yet the CONSTITUTION came forth in *more perfect health*, and some new security was obtained for our freedom; and whilst almost every other nation of *Europe*, who, like us, descended from one free and common stock, long ago became the subjects of arbitrary power, and resigned their liberty, this country has always proved a faithful guardian of that sacred deposit, and has alone improved the blessing.”

Are we not, indeed, at this moment, in a striking manner, in respect of *the military branch of our CONSTITUTION* calling it *back to its first principles*? And who, except *Bonaparte*, is afraid of the consequences? And who, in God's name, except *Bonaparte*, and a certain base-minded clan, the retail hawkers, pedlars, and auctioneers of our borough wares, and their owners, would be alarmed, if this calling *back to first principles* extended likewise to the *civil* branch of that Constitution? The *Corsican*, we may be assured, is the great and good ally of these traffickers, ready to aid them by his services, or his subsidies, or friendly counsels. We know his agreement with them in opinion. We remember his founding the late French Consular Constitution

on “*Liberty, Equality, and THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM;*” which “*REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM,*” modelled by his hand, with its due proportion of *patronage* and *influence*, is exactly what its creator intended; that is to say, in shadow and mockery, it is *civil representation*; in substance and calamity it is *military dominion*, with its never-failing concomitant, *taxation at the will of him who rules by the sword instead of the sceptre*; to the great benefit of *France*, and to the extraordinary satisfaction of the rest of *Europe*.

When the *Nabob of Arcot* had a point to carry in this country, he very sensibly sent his emissaries amongst those to whom I have alluded, and quietly bought of them his eight or nine seats. And when the horrid *African* man-trade was, if possible, to be upheld against the almost universal humanity and justice of this nation, manifested by petitions innumerable, the market of the speculators in the *English Borough* man-trade was remarkably brisk; their commodities had many bidders at good prices amongst the *commercial agents* of *Jamaica*, and were bought by wholesale; and the consequence was that the *gold* of *Jamaica* prevailed over the *justice and humanity* of *England*. Is *Bonaparte*, then, the only politician to overlook his own interest? Is he the only statesman who knows not *where* to place to most advantage *his* commercial agents; or the only potentate who has no *gold* at his command?

Hear me, ye defenders of the state! Hear me, ye advocates for UNANIMITY! If *freedom and a heartfelt attachment to our government* be the very basis, the life, the soul of *defence on right principles*, shut up the swindling shop, and arrest that canker-worm that has well nigh eaten to the very core of your liberties! Remove that wide-spreading grief and discontent that does, and necessarily must, reside in every reflecting bosom, at a *taxation discretionary in the minister of the day*, and at a *corrupt*

influence that pervades, poisons, and *debilitates* every department of the state, by substituting a corrupt parliamentary interest for public virtue and merit, as the recommendation to every employment ! Call back your Constitution to those *first principles* for which, and for which alone, it is the object of *England's* attachment, and the admiration of enlightened nations !—Unanimity raised on hollow foundations is the house of the foolish man ! which he built upon the sand : when the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, it fell, and great was the fall of it. A unanimity built on the rock of the Constitution is that alone which can defy the storm.

Mere universal travelling in the same track, either from coercion, or for quiet against absurd prejudice, is the unanimity of sheep before the driver. The unanimity of men is of the head, the heart, the lifted arm. It is the unanimity of reason and conviction, of passion and energy. It glows in the bosom, it sparkles in the eye, it flashes from a million of free swords, as they leap from the scabbard, in defence of liberty. Let such alone be the unanimity of ENGLAND !

I.

Dear land ! when ALFRED first thy sceptre sway'd,
Thine anguish he with parent eye survey'd,
Invaded, ravag'd by a ruthless foe :
Alike, maids, matrons, infants, rustics, feel
The murd'rous death-strokes of the Danish steel,
And flame-wrapp'd domes bespeak the gen'ral woe.

2.

High Heav'n inspires—the pious hero plans—
Embattled, straight, thy civic army stands,
A tithing-bas'd ubiquitary force !
Maids, matrons, infants, rustics, bleed no more ;
Thy plains their smiles resume ; thy frowning shore
The foe astounds ; he shuns the fatal course.

3.

Then, when ferocious Gauls besiege thy gate,
 And come, they boast, to seal thy downward fate,
 Shalt thou with God-taught ALFRED's lore dispense ?
 What sage has ris'n, of more exalted name ?
 What field-form'd warrior, of illustrious fame,
 Worthier to counsel in thy State's defence ?

4.

Glow in his patriot breast a purer fire ?
 Can he to more heroic deeds inspire
 Thy sons, than he who, from an *English* throne,
 The *Roman*, *Spartan*, and *Athenian* sage
 Eclips'd, as all, of each succeeding age ;
 And, godlike, first in civic wisdom shone ?

5.

More dear than life, then, prize his matchless code ;
 Nor time impairs it, nor foul rusts corrode—
 A beam from God,—pure gold without alloy * !
 Nor sloth, nor base ingratitude, be thine ;
 Each error rectify, oppose design,
 Laws to defeat, which nothing can destroy.

6.

Wouldst Thou, O, shame ! an ingrate vile appear ?
 Or folly's pupil, when the foe is near ?
 No : wise, as brave, the boastful Gaul defy !
 To drive him from thy gate, in foul disgrace,
 To vindicate thy fame, thy laws, thy race,
 FROM ALFRED'S BOW, O LET THINE ARROWS FLY !

In the present crisis of our affairs, it is to be hoped that none have influence in the counsels of our country, who “ have betaken themselves to state affairs with souls so un-
 “ principled in virtue and true generous breeding†,” as to feel insensible to a JONES's admonition ? Or to remain un-

* It is the well-known definition of the common law of England, that it is *the perfection of reason*.

† Milton.

taught by the wisdom,—untouched by the goodness—or unawed from despising or violating the Constitution, by the transcendant name of an **ALTERED**?

The recent patriot declaration of “**HIM IN WHOSE VEINS THE BLOOD OF ALFRED FLOWS,**” must be highly gratifying to every lover of his country. “*Embarked with my brave and loyal people in one COMMON CAUSE, it is my fixed determination, if the occasion should arise, to share their exertions and their dangers, in defence of our CONSTITUTION, our RELIGION, our LAWS, and INDEPENDENCE.*”

What sovereign, through the whole range of potentates, except a **KING OF ENGLAND**, can talk to his people of a **CONSTITUTION**, of **LAWS**, of **INDEPENDENCE**—in which he and they have a **COMMON INTEREST**, and can make a **COMMON CAUSE**? There is not one. On this advantage-ground an *English* king, over kings, consuls and emperors, stands gloriously pre-eminent; and an *English* people proudly distinguished.

Let us give credit to his Majesty’s advisers, for having adopted, as the vehicle of the royal sentiments, words which were not lightly chosen; words which conveyed, to those who employed them, the same “*distinct ideas**” of the things expressed as they convey to all others, who are acquainted with the objects mentioned, and that they who penned the speech, as constitutional statesman, conceived its extensive scope; as Englishmen felt its whole force; and, as responsible ministers, intended to give the nation a solemn and religious pledge that they should be found the same men in actions as in words.

Let us give them credit for having properly discriminated between “**OUR CONSTITUTION**” and its *violations*; as

* Jones’s Inquiry, 12.

well as between those eternal principles of right reason and justice, which, as being the foundations of our government and the safeguards of our freedom, are emphatically called "OUR LAWS," and mere *imperfect statutes*, which are too frequently disfigured with *unwise* or *arbitrary* enactments.

And when they apply to the PEOPLE, as well as to the KING, the word INDEPENDENCE, let us equally give them credit for meaning that that independence of BOTH, which they are now mutually to defend at the hazard of life, is to be a true and genuine independence of EACH, *agreeably to the* CONSTITUTION; that is, on one hand, an INDEPENDENCE, by means of which the KING ought to receive the revenue of his kingdom, and to exercise its executive authority, in conformity only with the wisdom of an INDEPENDENT parliament: and not shamefully to be controlled by, and *dependent* upon, *a few individuals*, who should claim to themselves an absolute power over the national purse; because, forsooth, they were the proprietors of *certain* stocks and stones, and other property in *certain* boroughs, or were the purchasers of borough venality; and, on the other hand, an INDEPENDENCE by which the PEOPLE ought likewise to have their RIGHTS, their LIBERTIES, and their PROPERTY, under the guardianship of such an INDEPENDENT parliament; and not at the disposal of such owners of stocks and stones, or of such traffickers in iniquity. Were such a faction ever to exist, and to acquire the power of holding in bonds both KING and PEOPLE, nothing would be wanting to dissolve the spell of such a ridiculous bondage, but a single review of the corps in Hyde-Park.

When KING and PEOPLE, at a period so awful that the passing day cannot close without the contemplation of some mighty danger to the state, are solemnly pledging themselves to each other to meet that danger with their united swords,

let us hope ministers have been actuated by those high thoughts which are the growth of great minds in perilous situations; and which, by a sense of the right principles of action, inspire fortitude; and, through a consciousness of integrity, confer serenity amidst the wildest ragings of the tempest.

Such statesmen will know the energies of an English Constitution, *military* and *civil*. To those energies they will give full scope. Have the energies been "*disgracefully neglected?*" Such statesmen will "*restore them to full vigour.*"—Have they been clogged and deprived of their spring, by falling among filth? Such statesmen will cleanse away the filth, and restore their elasticity. Such statesmen, when they name "*OUR CONSTITUTION,*" aware of the jugglings and impostures that have been carried on under cover of that abused word, will be eager to show, by their conduct, their fidelity to *POLITICAL LIBERTY*: when they speak of "*OUR LAWS,*" they will be equally desirous of manifesting, by actions, their attachment to *CIVIL FREEDOM*: when they talk of "*OUR INDEPENDENCE,*" they will not rest until they have proved their meaning to extend, not merely to an exemption from national vassalage to a foreign despot, but an exemption also from all domestic vassalage to any unconstitutional faction; and, in these days of unprincipled ambition, such statesmen will likewise have an honest pride, in contrasting the purity of their own conduct, with the treachery and hypocrisy of a *Bonaparte*, who, at the moment he was imitating *Cromwell* in annihilating a legislature, and subjugating his fellow citizens to military despotism, glossed over the foul act with the artful cant of founding a constitution on *LIBERTY, EQUALITY, and the REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.*

It has been already observed (p. 12.) that those who administer an English Constitution, have in their hands the fountains of *UNANIMITY* and *ENTHUSIASM*; and this is

the case, in a more eminent degree, when they have it in their power, by the restoration of rights the most sacred, and the revival of institutions the most essential to freedom, to property, to national security and honour, to recommend themselves to the approbation, and to seat themselves in the hearts of the people. And what time, of all others, is the most favourable for reformatations of awful magnitude and constitutional grandeur? Not, most assuredly, under the relaxation of peace and fancied security, when danger disappears, when the public mind seeks repose, when the bow of patriotism is unstrung, and when faction's hydra, with her thousand heads, has little to deter her from opening all her mouths in the cause of encroachment and abuse. No: the season of peril, and of deep anxiety—the season that rivets on the public interest national attention, and rouses in the public cause the national energy—the season which brings home to the understandings and the feelings of a people the weakness of those parts of the constitutional fortress which have fallen into decay—and the season when selfishness and faction dare not encounter the public eye—this is the season for such reformatations: And the statesman by whose wisdom and vigour they are effected, and who thereby conquers both the enemies of his country and her own corruptions, receives from his contemporaries and from posterity, not only of his own but of all nations, a crown of applause, before which the laurel of the proudest warrior appears but an unsightly weed.

I am not reporting to ministers any symptoms of remorse, or of returning virtue, in a faction which, in order to fire the public mind with the universal flame of patriotism, ought at this crisis to surrender the inordinate and mischievous power it possesses, in violation of common right, incompatible with the security of private property, undermining all wholesome discipline in every department of the

public service, and damping to a melancholy degree that ardour in our country's cause, which springs from a proud consciousness in the great mass of the people of possessing real freedom; for there are infatuations in all descriptions of vice, which, if the strong hand of reforming power do not interpose, carry on their votaries, with sealed eyes, even to a sure destruction. Neither am I telling ministers of existing petitions or specific demands at the present moment, for the measures to which I am directing their thoughts; for *hope long deferred maketh the heart sick*, until disgust, if not alienation, sits for a while brooding in silence and in apathy over the actions of the ruler, even in moments most propitious to political salvation. But if I am not telling ministers of active virtue and patriotic exertions of particular descriptions, I am nevertheless telling them—I hope unnecessarily—how they may save their country. If, unfortunately for us, they shall not see that, to that end, it is necessary *to call back to its first principles, both MILITARY and CIVIL, our impaired CONSTITUTION*, it can only be said that, by them, our country cannot be saved; and the greater the efforts that should be made, to carry her in any other way through the present struggle, would only accelerate her fall.

CHAPTER VI.

UNPREPAREDNESS THE CAUSE OF THE WAR. EFFECTS OF THE CALCULATING SYSTEM OF DEFENCE. SUPERIORITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. MILITARY COUNCIL. FORTIFICATIONS. A WORD TO THE VOLUNTEERS. MILITARY TRAINING. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DESPONDENCY. THE SINKING FUND. PLEASING PROSPECT. IMPROVIDENT EXPENSE. MERCENARIES. THE BALLOT. FREE MEN ARMED. MINISTERIAL PANIC. RIGHT PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOT REGARDED. MILITARY EDUCATION. UKASE AND CONSCRIPTION.

To what cause do you owe the present war?—Did *Bonaparte*, with only the wreck of a navy, hope to wrest from you *Malta*, by force of arms? Or *Gibraltar*?—Or your *Newfoundland* fishery? Or *Canada*? Or your *West India* islands? Or to expel you from your immense empire in the *East*? No: not one of these could be his object. But he saw your unpreparedness for war at *home*; he was probably as ignorant, as some people on this side of the water, of the *military branch of your Constitution*, and was in hopes he could be prepared for invasion before you could be prepared for resistance. He trusted to your having no material resource for military strength, but in the augmentation of your standing army, the expense of which is so ruinous to a country exhausted by debts and taxes; and to the interruption he could create to your commerce with the continent, as another stroke upon your finances. Had he seen the *military branch of your Constitution* “*restored to full vigour and energy*,” and that you could disconcert his projects *without expense*, you would have had NO WAR.

This position I lay down as that to which I doubt not

every one who has attentively perused these pages will subscribe.

We have, it is true, raised a great *volunteer* force; such as, in addition to regulars and militia, ministers *calculate* to be sufficient for our defence. But the *calculations* of *Bonaparte* afford to his mind so different a result that he continues his preparations for invasion, and we continue to *experience the expenses of war, and its other inconveniences*. So much, then, for the first fruits of *calculation*. If war in the bowels of our own country should be another of its fruits, we shall certainly have to gather that fruit amidst torrents of blood, and perhaps amongst the ruins of villages reduced to ashes, and of towns set in flames. But, in the necessary work and duty of national arming, with *calculation* we have nothing to do.

Had the system of universal arming been only an *occasional* provision of our Constitution, as an extraordinary security in time of war, then, indeed, there might have been a pretence for considering such arming as a subject of *calculation* according to the aspect of the war, and the estimate of danger—But in that case our Constitution would have been no better than that of *Belgium*. With the Constitution of *ENGLAND*, however, this is by no means the case; for at all times, whether of war or of peace, it equally prescribes a universal arms-bearing; which, indeed, is *necessarily a feature of every government that is not a despotism*. Who admits that any government can deny a man the use of one of his eyes? Or of one of his hands? Or the use of clothing, as a defence against the weather? Or of any other requisite towards his preservation? How, then, without despotism, can it deny a man the use of arms? But it has already been proved that to preserve society in peace and security is equally the business of all its members; so that what is the mere *right* of the *man* is the *duty* of the *citizen*.

Should government even go on, increasing the number of

he armed, until the enemy, despairing of success in his attacks upon our country, should consent to peace, yet, if the arming should stop short one jot of a complete revival of the *posse comitatus* in a state of PERMANENT arms-bearing, neither ministers nor parliament would be justified. This would still be CALCULATION, instead of the CONSTITUTION; as well as a ground for other *calculations*, by which we might in a short time, besides losing our freedom, be again reduced to a state of as complete unpreparedness for defence against invasion as we experienced at the breaking out of the present war; and be exposed to a fresh rupture, whenever it might please *France* to bring upon us the like calamity, with a view of ruining our finances, convulsing our empire, and striking at our existence.

Many persons, from not seeing in the cabinet a *Wolfe*, a *Peterborough*, or a *Marlborough*, have anxiously expressed a wish, that a *Military Council* had been formed, for directing the military energies of the country; particularly for preserving by our arms the existence of our state. If, indeed, we are to depend for our safety upon military *calculation*, we may stand in need of military genius the most transcendant; and even that may fail us: but if, as an *Ægis* of Defence, we shall not *reject* the Constitution, then, from the moment we shall have armed and organized our population, superior military genius, although still acceptable, will by no means be necessary. Resting this assertion on the case of invasion, which is put to the reader in p. 64, of this work, there I shall leave it without fear of contradiction.

We have also our advocates for *fortifications*.—Dock-yards, and other very valuable objects *immediately on the coast*, a remarkable pass, or point of natural strength, in the way to such valuable objects, or to the capital, which an enemy dare not leave in his rear, might become an object of fortification; *provided an enemy could otherwise approach the valuable object before a constitutional force could oppose and over-*

power him. Beyond this, fortifications, at the best, are useless and expensive toys, or strong holds dangerous to national freedom ; and, inasmuch as they are *contrivances to prevent fighting*, they are disgraceful and pernicious. When a large country is not fortified in the sword, and the bravery of its people, it cannot be defended.

One parting word to the Volunteers. In consequence of your corps having been made part of a system of defence upon *military calculation*, the toil of your training has been twenty times as great as, under a *constitutional system of defence*, it needed to have been. Under the former of those systems, an army is a piece of mechanism ; which, in order to do its work, must be long in the hands of the maker, and highly finished : because success depends upon military refinements under the direction of superior genius : whereas, under the latter system, when the success may be trusted to the physical strength of an immense superiority of numbers, and in which no generalship of the enemy can keep him out of the reach of the weapons of determined Englishmen, all that is *absolutely necessary* is learned very soon indeed.

Perhaps also it is part of the necessary *policy* of standing armies, to make men those machines we observe ; to metamorphose their heads with pomatum and powder ; to lay a stress upon a whole battalion's pulling the trigger in the same instant of time ; and to employ them in doing a thousand things upon a parade which are useless in the field ; and, while we shall contrive to arm on the *calculating* system, the whole of our military force will doubtless be trained after one fashion.

Under a constitutional system, we should have the good sense to introduce a new mode of training ; not but that particular corps, in each weapontake, such as the proposed cavaliers and gentlemen at arms, composed, as is probable, of men of leisure, might take a higher military polish

than the rest: and if all our youth were well instructed while at school, they would enter society ready made soldiers. Were I not studious of conciseness, the subject would lead me into some detail which, until we have got a real *posse comitatus*, may be premature. It would be the fault of the government if *such a militia* wanted a proper discipline; or such a degree of military skill as to cause invaders to fall before it, come they in what numbers they might. What want we more?

A few words, also, to those who view our pecuniary situation with eyes of despondency. As WAR has been the cause of all our debt, it is our true policy to avoid war; but still with national honour.—How to bring to a conclusion the present war, and to secure to ourselves an honourable and durable peace, I presume these pages have explained. It is by being absolutely invulnerable at home, even without a navy; by having that navy always at command for foreign services, and such a mass of men trained to arms as promptly to furnish armies for those services in any number. A great nation, if always thus prepared for war, will have durable peace.

According to our ministerial financiers, the sinking fund was to discharge the national debt in little more than forty years, although our *military* and *naval* establishments should have remained according to their ultimates. But, if we can reduce them to less than one half, as should seem to be the necessary effect of restoring THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY; and, if we can preserve peace for half forty years, which should seem to be another necessary effect of that restoration, then our debt would be extinguished in half the time calculated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Thus the reform we recommend, holds out to us a rational prospect of that which, while perpetually subject to new wars, must have been a mere chimera. How long was it, after Mr. Pitt

sung the praises of the sinking fund, before he involved the country in a new war? And how long was it again, after we heard the same song from Mr. *Addington*, that war again blew all his *pecuniary calculations* into the air? I wish his *military calculations* may fare better.—Neither of these statesmen could, or pretended to, hold out to you a rational ground of expectation, on which any man of experience or observation could depend for the continuance of peace, until the national debt should be discharged.

But let us indulge the pleasing hope, presented in the pages of the *Ægis*, that our country may see that happy day. We must then anticipate, as the writer on other occasions has observed, from the reduction of taxes, and the altered scale of our expenses, the triumph of our manufactures over competition in every foreign market; agriculture improved to gardening; commerce and navigation extending their sphere, and awakening to a friendly intercourse, and to civilization, the yet torpid nations; while the overflowings of wealth and of population would stimulate to new enterprise, and beget new colonies, planting the principles of true liberty, and the arts of beneficent government, in the most distant regions of the earth; making *England* the friend of man, and man over the face of the globe the friend of *England*.

In pp. 44 and 45, I have noticed the heavy expense of raising for the present war *one hundred thousand men*; stating that in the original *bounty money* alone, the cost was not less than *three millions and a half*, which is more than the whole annual revenue of the kingdom of *Denmark*; and I know it to be the opinion of an experienced and judicious person that, including the expense of carrying the laws for raising these men into execution, and all the consequent charges alluded to in p. 44, the whole real expense is probably more than *double* the original bounty; which makes it upwards of *seven millions*. This, however, enormous as is the sum, is not all; for, in order to induce the *Army of*

Reserve levies to volunteer for general service, they had, as I understand, an additional bounty of seven or eight pounds per man, adding to the former sum about *three hundred thousand pounds more*, and making a total of *seven millions three hundred thousand pounds*. Well may the appetite of the armies of *Bonparte* be whetted for the plunder of such a country!

If such be our expense in a mere *preparatory* item, towards having an army of MERCENARY TROOPS; and if, even at the present advanced prices of all military equipments, the sum just mentioned would have furnished handsome musquets, bayonets, belts, and pouches, that is, arms and accoutrements, sufficient to have lasted for three generations, for about *two millions and a quarter* of the *civil* state, who have no bounties for performing a common duty of society; or would have provided the like equipment for the *twelve hundred thousand men* (supposing them all infantry) proposed in these pages to have fire-arms; and have left a surplus of *three millions four hundred thousand pounds*, or above 2*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.* per man, towards other military expenses; what an additional argument is here for arming according to THE CONSTITUTION!

But why want we any arguments at all, where an indispensable and imperative duty is in question? I wish Mr. *Windham* in particular, comprehensively and dispassionately, to contemplate the subject *in all its parts, and in all its aspects*, and then to give us his honest opinion, supported by sound reasons, on the best mode of defending *that* country, to which belongs the *English Constitution*—whether by the swords of FREE men, or of *mercenaries*!—*Mercenaries indeed*! who, at such a juncture, sell their services to their country at such a rate!

When, instead of the *amor patria*, or antigallican ardour, avarice has thus deeply struck its deadly root into the heart of that class of whom your mercenary army is composed, what mind, the least endued with foresight, but may foretel

the fatal consequence of the *predominance* in a country of such soldiers!—Can any considerate statesman look back to the frightful events which, not many years ago, took place at *Spithead*, at *Plymouth*, and at the *Nore*; or can ponder on the *cause* that kept our armies out of camp in 1798, and not discern a portentous danger in principally, or even *materially*, confiding our defence to a description of persons who, as a prelude to entering into their country's service at double the pay she gave ten years ago, laid that country under a military contribution, greater than *Bonaparte* has yet collectively exacted from *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Holland*, and the *Hans Towns*? And if these enormous bounties are squandered for the most part in profligate gratifications, so much the worse; so much the readier, so much the greedier will be those, who have so spent what they have so extorted, for new extortions. Is not this the way to debauch your own defenders, to undermine every idea of a generous devotion to the public cause; and to ingraft into the bosoms of your army all the vices of mere soldiers of fortune, disposing them to be at the beck of the highest bidder?

Were ministers, instead of perfecting their own plan for arming the *civil* state, to pursue once more the insane policy which was a main cause of the fall of *Carthage*, that of trusting to mercenaries, I should then say, let the successful citizen tremble for his wealth, and the country gentleman for his acres; let the noble be prepared to part with his coronet and his estate; and his majesty with his crown: but his majesty's present government has made no small progress in a better system, and I trust will immediately amend its defects, and follow it up ere the great tempter arrive*.

But the enormous EXPENSE of raising the *Army of Reserve* was not the worst part of that measure, and, if we guard not against the consequences of unconstitutionally applying the BALLOT, we shall find a still more dreadful evil

* The author's disappointment has added a second volume to this work.

lurking behind. We are accustomed to contemplate the orders for sending the twentieth, the fifteenth, or the tenth man to the armies of *Russia by an imperial ukase*, or to the armies of *France by a conscription*, as evidence of complete despotism, with disgust and horror; but we do not seem to observe how fast the *English ballot* is degenerating into an engine of equal oppression; for indeed only a single shade more is now wanting to perfect the similitude between them. So fatal is *deviation from the constitution*! And such is the mischief of a tame acquiescence under the first introduction of an unsound principle!

The first departure from *the universality of arms-bearing* is of course the first step towards a *despotic monopoly* of arms; the monopoly for a while is allowed to retain a *popular form*; it is termed a *militia*, and, unless in the case of actual invasion, it is not to leave its own county; it is not to be under military law until called into the field; and it is likewise provided with some checks and guards in the qualifications of officers, &c. against becoming too subservient to the crown. Next comes, not only the power of generally removing it from its own county in time of war, but a *systematic rule of always marching it to a distance from thence*; its principal officers are gratified in the silly vanity of having army rank; and its vacancies in the inferior commissions are filled with officers from the half-pay of the army, &c. &c. In our time still bolder steps are taken. It is required to serve in *Scotland*: It is *permitted* to volunteer its service to *Ireland*: Its soldiers are *permitted* to enlist by wholesale into the *standing army*. In the former case, all the arts of terror and ill treatment are exercised upon the unwilling; and in the latter case, all the seductions of money and drink are employed to bribe its men from their original colours, to serve under standards more adapted to the purposes of absolute power. But, without affecting a correct historical detail, or dwelling on minute features of the sys-

tem, all tending to the same point, suffice it to observe, that the militia, *as it is still called*, has been gradually converted to the character of a mercenary standing army; and is in fact almost identically the same sort of army as was the *native Prussian* army of the politic and arbitrary *Frederick*, which army in time of peace that sagacious prince did not keep annually together much longer than the King of *Great Britain* keeps together his militia; for *Frederick's* garrisons, consisting of regiments composed of foreigners, were numerous enough to form a powerful army always ready in a moment for action.

Seeing the enormity of the bounties exacted by the hiring soldier, how strongly does experience confirm the truth of my observations five years ago, when in the *Appeal, Civil and Military, &c.* * I said, "It becomes every day, and every hour, more and more evident that the natural, the cheap, the only defence of nations, is in *an armed inhabitancy*. The stimulus to that defence is LIBERTY. With your navies, and your armies, and your *millions a year* for their support, *France* is already acquainted: but she only exerts with more alacrity her powers of hostility; and probably accounts the vastness of your expense to be more in *her* favour than your own. Change your system, and you will change hers. Reform your representation, strike off the bulk of your expense, while at the same time you arm more than *a million of men*, whose equipments for a generation to come will not cost four millions of money, and her threats of invasion will melt into invitations to peace.

Regardless of artificial ditch, or mound of inanimate earth, our sea-girt isle would thus become an inaccessible camp; her sole outwork, nature's restless wave; and her only interior fortification the living bulwark of her warlike sons. Her hamlets and villages would pour out their hundreds;

* See p. 97.

her towns and cities their thousands and tens of thousands; every rateable house within her wide domain a castle; and every inhabitant a possessor, and a free soldier*: Interested in the security of property and the preservation of peace, proud of the constitution of their ancestors, attached to the laws and customs of their country, and knowing and feeling that the same chain of loyalty bound the commons, the nobles of the land, and the king upon the throne, in one common interest and duty, *Englishmen* could not be subdued by the world in arms†.”

Notwithstanding the General Defence Act claims, on the part of his majesty, “the military services of all his liege subjects,” and provides for their being called into action, I have been informed that, during the very passage of the Act through the houses of parliament, some of the ministers were considerably affected by a panic, on contemplating the consequences of their own measure.

First Fear his hand, its skill to try,
Amid the chords bewilder'd laid,
And back recoil'd he knew not why,
E'en at the sound himself had made.

COLLINS.

They were told of danger from arming the people; and, from the very numerous offers of service they have since rejected, and the great degree in which they have suspended the statute, it should seem indeed as if there was some truth in the information. It is not surprising that statesmen, trained in “the policy of three last centuries,” should be staggered at the new idea of arming at once a million or two

* Soldier and Freeman, amongst the ancient Germans, were synonymous terms. See *Robertson's Charles VI.* p. 1.

† In this quotation there has been an alteration of only two words relative to *expense*; the ratio of which is even altered within the short time that has elapsed since the passage was first written.

of men ; especially according to the regular operation of the statute they had hastily framed : but, had they begun at the right end of their work, that is, by first arming the householders assessed to taxes, comprehending about eight hundred thousand persons,—*the possessors of all the property of the state*,—they would then have had a secure foundation ; and then to have called on an additional number equal to only half of the first named, for likewise carrying fire-arms ; taking care at the same time, to have revived all the admirable principles of the laws of *posse comitatus*, it is impossible that such an arming could have given alarm to any one having the slightest pretensions to a sound understanding, the slightest knowledge of our constitution, or the slightest regard to the liberties of our country ; and it cannot be too earnestly pressed upon ministers, if they would not see their country the SEAT OF WAR, and A STAKE PLAYED FOR BY CONTENDING GENERALS, not to lose a moment in so carrying into effect their own statute*.

To suppose the system of a general arming under the civil magistracy in the smallest degree dangerous to the ordinary peace of the country, were to suppose it a country without civilization or laws ; and that men would be more disposed, or more able, to commit violence, or felony, or open treason, when *suppression*, or *apprehension*, or *death*, would be infinitely more certain and speedy than at present ; for we all know, and it is to the scandal of our country, that under our late wretched system, the *civil power* scarcely ever pretended to the ability of quelling a riot, without military aid ; and we have seen too many instances, in which that aid has not arrived until the greatest mischiefs and abominations have been perpetrated : whereas, it is a self-evident proposition in police that, if every taxed householder were an armed citizen, every thing tending to a riot must be *crushed*

* Written in 1803.

in the bud, and all serious mischief must be *prevented*. As well might any one argue against the *general possession* of the powers of body or mind, for our self-defence and security, as against the common and general possession of arms. It is not the *common*, but the *exclusive* possession of arms:—it is not the *universality*, but the *monopoly*, which produces the mischief and the abomination;—and that worst of all mischiefs and abominations, A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. SUFFRAGE and ARMS being the rights of nature, well has it been observed that *representation* is the happiest discovery of political wisdom; and that, *to govern all by all*, is the great masterpiece of executive government. When Sir *William Temple* has remarked on the *English Constitution*, that, “it seems to be a strain of what *Heraclitus* said, was “the only skill or knowledge of any value in politics, “which was the secret of governing all by all;” he adds, “what prince soever can hit off this great secret *needs* “*know no other* for his own safety and happiness, or that “of the people he governs*.”

Let me take leave of the constellation of statesmen, historians, and philosophers, whose opinions I have quoted on the nature of armies, by observing that, as standing armies and despotic power are the causes which have kept the nations of Europe in perpetual war—for that is perpetual war which never ceases but as the work-worn peasant ceases to labour through exhaustion, and which again commences with new means, as the refreshed peasant returns at early morn to his accustomed toil—as standing armies and, despotic power are, I say, the causes of perpetual war, it ought to be the universal prayer that political freedom may be universally established, and such armies universally abolished.

It is not even merely from the number, at any time, of which a standing army consists, we are in danger; but like-

* I. 220.

wise from its being a *standing* and *permanent* force, upheld, in the bosom of our freedom, by a law which, to answer its purpose, must necessarily be despotic, and at variance with the mild and beneficent common law of the land. Such an institution, like a taint in the blood, must be the parent of many humours, unfriendly to the health and life of the body politic.

The army is a school, in which our youth take impressions and imbibe sentiments that accompany them through life. Whatever other reading may be neglected, the articles of war must be diligently studied. Whatever other duties may be forgotten, those of an officer must be attended to. In that profession it is every moment's conviction that an army is disgraced and ruined, if discipline be relaxed; and, with every good officer, it is not more a principle of duty to exact from his inferior a prompt obedience, than a point of honour to yield it to his superior.— Here then, if impressions thus made, and habits of mind thus formed, be not most powerfully counteracted by such reading and reflection as furnish a counterpoise of constitutional knowledge, and an ardent love of liberty, we see how gentlemen are unhappily betrayed into principles adverse to freedom; and how unintentionally and unknowingly they become insensibly moulded to the purposes of arbitrary statesmen.

Now, when we consider the fascinating allurements presented by a military life, not only to the empty and the idle part of our youth, but to those also who have in them the best characteristics of manhood, we must not be surprised to find in the army individuals drawn from every family of any rank or consideration in the kingdom, to be formed to the duties of life, and to all they owe their country, in this dangerous seminary. How widely then must the impressions of a military education be disseminated through the community; and through those classes in particular which have

the greatest influence on its destiny! And is it not, in a great degree, from this cause we now see in those classes far less of that high-minded independence, and that bold avowal of a love of liberty, which, while the other nations of *Europe* so long lay sunk in servitude, once gave the *English* gentlemen such a proud pre-eminence?

And, on the reasoning of the Earl of *Liverpool*, in 1757, on standing armies, I would once more warn government against the unconstitutional and fatal error, of not making the arms-bearing of the *civil* state permanent, instead of having continuance only “*during the present war.*” “If it were possible,” says he, “to suppose that an army, thus modelled and powerful, could not be induced to defeat, by one hasty blow, the public-spirited labours of so many centuries, and it would be even wise in a free people to rely on their virtue in this particular, may we not still have reason to apprehend that, by the influence and dependence of so large a body, an interest may be created dangerous and *repugnant to the spirit of our government*, which may direct the legislature in an improper manner, though it may not at once subvert it; which will operate insensibly to our destruction; and though less violent in its progress than the former evil, will be no less fatal to the constitution *?”—“Nothing, I imagine,” says another able writer, “could have rendered the keeping up a large army, in time of peace, in any degree palatable to the representatives of the people, but the consideration that the interest which the *officers* had in the community weighed more with them than their interest in that service.”—“But what security have we that our army shall always be thus officered? That even those at present in command shall continue in that command? And that within the short compass of a year, soldiers of fortune

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 67.

“ might not be advanced in their stead? We have no such
 “ security: many a man of birth, character, and fortune,
 “ has already felt the effects of caprice and resentment.
 “ Who shall say what further changes this rage of discipline
 “ may produce? *Is it not possible that these keepers of*
 “ *ours may come to resemble those of a SERAGLIO, and*
 “ *hate the very name of liberty, when totally deprived of*
 “ *their own ?*”

Should any disaster befall our country, in consequence of not having attended to the essentials, *civil* and *military*, of our CONSTITUTION, the author trusts that, in the judgment of that country and of posterity, he shall stand acquitted of having any share in the blame: had he done less than he has done he should not have stood acquitted in his own judgment.

One word more upon the alarming progress of a most dangerous innovation. It is to be lamented that it is not more the custom of historians than it is, closely and diligently to study the constitution of a free country, before they set about recording its transactions; for it is only in proportion as they possess an intimate acquaintance with the principle of its government, that their works can possess any intrinsic value, and serve either to guide the statesman, to direct the patriot, or to inform the general reader. I have been led into this reflection from contemplating the consequences that have gradually flowed from the error of neglecting the original, proper, and constitutional militia of *England*, or the power of the counties. By this fatal error, it came to pass, that, in the reign of *Charles* the Second, and again in the reign of *George* the Second, when it was seen that the land was naked of proper defence, and there was a growing standing army which gave uneasiness to the nation, the government, wanting wisdom, virtue, and vigour to restore the military branch of the constitution to its pristine vigour, and at the same time infected by a corrupt policy,

adopted the idea of enrolling and training only a small *proportion* of the men fit to bear arms, among whom it was a common and universal duty to defend their country and preserve its tranquillity.

Hence, this original error, with the *proportion* introduced the *ballot*. The unsound doctrines of a *proportion* and a *ballot*, naturally engendered another corruption, that of *substitutes*; expressly legalized for the first time by 13 Charles II. c. 3. In this process we of course find an association of the idea of a *ballot*, with those of *recruiting*, and of *bounties*, for procuring a MILITIA, the duties of which we ought never to forget are *personal* and *universal*.

It only wanted a system of government, in which the principles of despotism and national danger have kept pace with each other, to generate between those unconstitutional deviations from rectitude, and these corruptions of our military system, mischiefs threatening the complete subversion of our liberties. The *ballot* was seen to be a fit engine for the purpose. We therefore first see it extended from our *proportional* militia, to the raising of a Provisional Cavalry in the year 1796. We see it again an instrument in the fraudulent system in 179 , of measures, for first augmenting the militia to above 90,000 men, and then immediately reducing it again to about 30,000, under disreputable inventions for transferring the difference to the standing army*. Here we clearly discern the dishonest and despotic purposes of which the *ballot* was the main engine, and necessity, created by misgovernment, the pretext.

Ministers next, emboldened by success in this scandalous abuse of the *ballot*, as well as taught by the success of the wolf in the fable, thrust another paw within the fence of

* The subsequent augmentation of the militia to 41,000 again, in 1803, is another proof of the wretched uncertainty of our military counsels.

our constitution, when they prevailed upon parliament to sanction the project of what they called the army of reserve, of which I have already taken notice. And that this was intended as a prelude to a complete substitution of the *ballot*, for the *ukase*, or the *conscription*, we can have little doubt, when we see the doctrines with which the ministerial press at the same instant teemed, and how happily they seem calculated to relieve the ministerial complaint that “at the commencement of war, the state of our military preparations has never at all corresponded with the means of exertion which the country possessed.”—“I think that *an important change*, sooner or later, cannot be avoided.”—“The *whole system* ought, as soon as possible, to be *probed to the bottom*.”—“The services of this body, whom I shall characterize by the name of the *army of reserve*, are to be extended to *every part of the united kingdom*. I have stated the *principle* on which this extension is proposed; and when I add, that it is meant to extend their services to the islands of *Jersey* and *Guernsey*, I am confident that no gentleman can have any reasonable objection.”—“The mode in which the *BALLOT* is to be conducted is to be *similar* to the *BALLOT* for the *MILITIA* *.”

In a House in which for so many years every species of anti-constitutional doctrine had passed current, we must not be surprised at such language as this, nor at the measure to which it referred passing into law.

About the same time, or soon after, we meet with notice in our news-papers† of a pamphlet, said to be written, “by an Officer, who seems to be a man of intelligence and observation,” detailing a plan for a complete application

* Mr. Yorke’s speech. See *Morning Chronicle*, Tuesday, 21st June, 1803.

† *Morning Chronicle*.

of the BALLOT for filling the ranks of the standing army, and of course augmenting it to any extent. He is quoted as saying that the mode of recruiting is still “*defective*,” he “takes it for granted that BALLOT, upon a principle *similar to that now used for the MILITIA*, is the most effectual, and, in every point of view, the *best* means of RECRUITING THE REGULAR ARMY.”—And how admirably had we been prepared for this measure by the act of 43 Geo. III. c. 82, for raising the 50,000 men of the *Army of Reserve*,—an amphibious body half militia half regulars,—directed to be carried into execution by “his Majesty’s Lieutenants and Deputy Lieutenants, constituted and appointed by virtue, or acting in the execution of the several Acts of Parliament *relating to the MILITIA*,” as well as Justices of the Peace, Clerks of the General and Sub-division Meetings, and the whole of the militia machinery; not forgetting that “the wives and families of the corporals and private men—shall be entitled to such and the like relief, and under such and the like circumstances as the families of MILITIAMEN;”—and to complete all, it is “enacted, that all powers, provisions, rules, regulations, penalties, forfeitures, bounties, clauses, matters, and things contained in the aforesaid act of the 42d year of his majesty’s reign, or in any other act of parliament RELATIVE TO THE MILITIA, shall, so far as the same are applicable, and are not hereby altered, varied, or repealed, be applied and practised for the purpose of raising the men directed to be raised by this act, &c.”

After all this, I cannot pay any reader so ill a compliment as to imagine he does not see, that, if the present ministers and their system continue, it will not be long before the ENGLISH BALLOT will have precisely the same operation as the RUSSIAN UKASE, or the FRENCH CONSCRIPTION; or that he must not be convinced that other ministers and another system are necessary to avert from us so perfect a

despotism. Nor will it require much penetration to discover, that, in the present relative situation of this country and of *France*, constitutional ministers could not insure us against this being our early fate, by any other means than truly and effectually “restoring to full vigour and energy”

THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

ENGLAND'S ÆGIS:

OR,

THE MILITARY ENERGIES

OF

THE CONSTITUTION.

BY JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

It is not mere WAR in which we are engaged: it is a conflict with a rival, and a despotic state, for our POLITICAL EXISTENCE.

THE THIRD EDITION.

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1806.

DEDICATION

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM WINDHAM,

ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE.

Enfield, 24th February, 1806.

SIR,

RECALLED to the council of your Sovereign, a department in the state is now confided to you, in which you have a Herculean labour to perform.

Your country, Sir, left by other ministers in a condition of unpreparedness for defence against invasion, is at this moment exposed to much peril. It is yours, Sir, by recurring to other principles, to place her in a digni-

fied attitude of conscious strength and security.

Towards that end you may not, Sir, need the assistance of this work; but as it has been written with a hope of disseminating a knowledge of the right and infallible principles of security, I have much satisfaction in dedicating this volume of it to a minister, from whose manly mind the nation may justly expect that he will revive that grand military system, first organized by the heroic ALFRED, and afterwards cherished by our conquering EDWARDS and HENRIES, in which the martial spirit of an English people and the military energies of an English Constitution shall constitute an *Ægis* of Defence, on sight of which the spear of invasion shall assuredly fall from the hand of France's ambitious lord, whose hostile thoughts shall not till then be turned to peace and amity.

On the first introduction of a different military system by the Normans, this *Ægis* of England's Defence—THE POWER OF THE

COLLECTIVE COUNTIES,—seemed for a while to be lost; but being an essential part of the constitution, it soon again appeared, and the best of the Norman line, as well as some of the Tudors, watched over it with considerable care. And although under the Stuarts it was wholly neglected, yet it never ceased for one moment to have a real existence; while the unnatural system of the feudal polity, pregnant with turbulence and civil war, lived but for a period, and then perished for ever.

The thoughts of William the Third were so wholly occupied in Ireland and on the continent, with wars which were to be carried on by another species of force, that it may be questioned whether he ever knew of the existence of this POWER. Queen Anne was in a similar predicament; and none of the princes of the house of Hanover appear ever to have been informed by any act of their executive ministers, that this was a part of the English government.

But although the military branch of the constitution thus fell into a state of extreme neglect, and it became the settled policy of courtiers that it should, if possible, be sunk in eternal oblivion, yet such was ever felt to be the sacredness of its nature, that, amidst all the storms and shocks of the turbulent, and all the sappings and underminings of the corrupt times of our country, no hand was ever so daring as to strike directly at its being.

The most subtle, and the least scrupulous abettors of arbitrary power,—even a Dundas or a Pitt—who were never at any time so intent on our defence as on our subjugation, aimed at it only the treason of indirect words; but hoping indeed to confirm the general oblivion under which it lay covered by the rubbish of once-valuable statutes, become obsolete and useless through the mere mutation of time and of the modes of arming, they likewise added to the heap their own mischievous trash; which, whether we

view it with a military, or with a political eye, we perceive equally to disgrace the statute book. Nor can I speak more favourably of the military legislation of others of their school.

The labour, Sir, which you have to perform, I have called Herculean; but Hercules did more by his wisdom than by his strength. It was by turning the course of a river that one of his arduous labours was achieved. Bring you then back, Sir, the river of the constitution into the channel of defence, and your achievement will at once be accomplished, with salvation to your country, and glory to yourself.

Of military experiments and innovations, of perilous novelties and empirical fancies, I believe, Sir, you are of opinion we have already had too many; and I trust that no argument, however plausible, no influence, however weighty, shall prevail with you to follow such examples, or to wander on this occasion one step out of the constitution;

but that valuing the esteem of those who respect the fundamental laws of their country, desirous to live in the good opinion of the truly-learned of posterity, but, above all, determined to insure the approbation of your own mind, you will secure to yourself the proud consciousness of restoring entire that English barrier against invasion which no foreign force can break down; and thence, in return for the menace of him who talks of numbering England amongst his conquests, that you will not, as you well might, hurl back a contemptuous defiance; but smilingly offer practical counsel, of potency to check ambition and disarm hostility.

And if, Sir, in the moments of consternation for having been stripped of allies by defeat and misfortune,—if, in the very moments when we are expecting their conquerors on our own unprepared shores, such vast things by such simple means can be effected, and by those very means our military expenses, in these distressful times, can also be

lessened by millions, with what devotion must an English people cleave to a constitution possessing such energies for their benefit ! And what must be their sense of obligation, to an administration by whom, after a tedious age of misgovernment and calamity, that constitution shall be restored to full vigour and energy !

I have the honour, Sir, to subscribe myself, with much respect,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

ENGLAND'S ÆGIS;

OR

THE MILITARY ENERGIES

OF THE

ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

CHAPTER I.

Campaign of the Autumn of 1805. Instructive to England. True Principles of German Defence. Mr. Pitt's Ministry and Merits. House of Commons. The Author's Conduct. Court Faction insensible of Danger. The People ought to assemble and speak their Opinion. Late System of Terror. Constitutional System of Defence. Ministerial System. Volunteer Services. Ministerial Discretion. Mr. Dundas (now Lord Melville). Dukes of Bedford and Northumberland. The Stuarts expelled for suspending Laws. Inference.

ON the twenty-first day of June 1805, Mr. Pitt obtains a vote of FIVE MILLIONS, for raising up a continental coalition to curb the ambition of France. In August the Austrians advance towards the French frontier, the Russians following. Thereupon Napoleon puts his troops in motion. In the middle of November he enters Vienna, the capital of Austria, in triumph, having on his march thither defeated

great armies, capturing a large proportion, and driving the rest before him. And on the second of December, in a decisive action, he defeats at *Austerlitz* two mighty monarchs his enemies, in consequence of which he greatly aggrandizes himself, and creates around him new kings, as satellites to the orb of his own greatness.

Such are the effects of Mr. *Pitt's* crude projects for "THE DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE!" And such the resistance made by two coalesced sovereigns commanding a very large proportion of Europe, furnishing TWELVE MILLIONS OF FIGHTING MEN! Here surely is instruction to those who are debating "what may be the best means of defence*." And Christians who are acquainted with the history of that commonwealth of which God himself is represented in Scripture as having been the legislator, well know how even that small state was provided for defence. "*There were in Israel eight hundred thousand valiant men who drew the sword; and the men of Judah were five hundred thousand†.*" But Englishmen need not go for instruction out of their own constitution and common law; nor consult on this occasion any other than their own god-like *Alfred*, who, faithful to the liberties of his country, to the laws of Nature, and of Nature's God, organized his whole people for defensive war, on that inimitable system which has been detailed in the first volume of this work, the revival of which system, *as the military branch of our constitution*, would give us, as I have shown, *one million two hundred thousand* valiant men to draw the sword; exclusive of a large remainder of our population, who, armed with pikes or spears, might eventually be of great use in repelling invasion.

Do we want to know the value of this system, and its infinite superiority over a system of defence by a *standing*

* Duke of Richmond's Thoughts on the National Defence, 1801.

† Samuel.

army? Apply it to the case at this moment before our eyes. It is a case *doubly* in point; inasmuch as *Austria* has not been able to defend herself with the *standing mercenary armies* of two potent empires; but has fallen in the struggle almost as soon as the contest began. Driven in a few weeks from the *Dan* to the *Beersheba* of his dominions, we have seen the fugitive sovereign become a wretched victim to the detested counsels of despotism; and the civil government of his states administered by magistrates of the conqueror's appointment! Could such events have happened, had that Emperor given to his people freedom and arms? With a population affording many millions of fighting men, could the *regular* armies of *France*, though every man had been a *Bonaparte*, have penetrated half way to *Vienna*? No: had they in that case been rash enough for the attempt, instead of defeating, they must have been defeated; instead of capturing, they must have been captured; instead of subduing, they must have been subdued. I therefore again say—"It is NOT by the alliance of *potentate* with *potentate*, it is NOT by combining together discordant hosts of arbitrary governments, great and small, that our neighbours of *Germany* can obtain either safety or independence."

Let her princes make *allies* of their PEOPLE; let there be to her earthly thrones no other defence than the *free* man's sword; nor to the heavenly throne be raised, in adoration, any other than a *free* man's voice; and then, but not till then, shall *Germany* be capable of assured defence*. And to the continental governments, I repeat, stay at home until you have given political liberty to all your states, and put arms into the hands of all your people.

'What!' say those who granted the FIVE MILLIONS, and those who approved of the grant, 'Do you wish to see the torrent of *French* invasion poured into your country?'

* England's *Ægis*, Vol. I. xii.

My answer is, ‘ Read and judge, and let those who have not
 ‘ done their duty towards the defence of *England*, suffer
 ‘ the punishment due to their crimes !’ Had her civil and
 military energies been properly exerted, ministers need not
 have given FIVE MILLIONS of her money to spread the
 flames and the miseries of war over the continent, by way of
 diversion to our enemy’s force ; but we might have laughed
 in security at the idle threat of invasion.

Less than half FIVE MILLIONS of money *spent at home*
 to have invigorated our own industry, and applied in making
 allies of our own people, and arming and training them for
 defence of their fields and fire sides, would have put us in a
 grand and proud attitude of perfect safety ; and would have
 left our friends on the continent (sufficiently interested one
 should think in their own defence, and the balance of power)
 leisure for consulting on the best means and the best oppor-
 tunities of providing for those objects ; and, in my mind,
 such an *example* on our part, had they had virtue enough to
 follow it, would have been of more value to them than
 twenty times FIVE MILLIONS of our money, could it even
 have answered the purposes for which it was given. Given
 as the minister has given our money ; he has only purchased
 with it additional dishonour and calamity.

Well ! I for one am ready to kiss the rod of our chastise-
 ment ; I will not murmur at the expenditure of this money,
 unwise and dishonest as, under all circumstances, I esteem
 such an expenditure to have been, while I see neglected and
 betrayed the true principles of our defence, provided the
 prostration of the continent of *Europe* at the feet of
France, to which the evil counsels of the ministers of this
 country have so largely contributed, and provided the
 preparations for our destruction, with increased means in the
 hands, and increased enmity in the heart of *Napoleon*, shall
 but bring us at length to our senses ; and determine us,
 before casting the last die in our present desperate game, on

taking the necessary measures for complete security, and for the right application of our native energies for defence; which measures I hold to be “TO CHANGE THE MINISTRY, TO REFORM THE PARLIAMENT, AND TO RESTORE TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY THE MILITARY BRANCH OF OUR CONSTITUTION*.”

Other men may have their nostrums, or may look to other means of withstanding the high-wrought and vindictive energies of *France*, but these alone are, to my apprehension, the means appointed by nature for averting the peril of our situation, and in these alone can I confide.

Is our country, in her present conflict for her political existence, at a period when “*England expects every man to do his duty*,” safe in the hands of the present ministers? Considering the whole of the ministry as identified with, and completely subservient to, Mr. Pitt, I answer, NO. In justification of this answer I might repeat a great multitude of arguments I have formerly urged, particularly in the *Appeal, civil and military, on the Subject of the English Constitution*, and in ‘*The State of the Nation*,’ to show that, powerful as he is in the talent of talking, he is without the smallest pretence to the solid wisdom of a statesman, or the constitutional integrity of a minister. Here however I will quote but one of those arguments, as applying to his wisdom; and one other as applying to his integrity. The first occurred in a comparison between “the capacities and talents of the two men who “respectively preside over those countries, (*France* and “*England*) and direct their energies;” where I observed that “one, grasps the widest combinations of state policy, “directing with success all means to an individual end; the “other, has attempted such combinations and miserably “failed.” How dreadfully in the space of a few months has this observation been verified †! The second is this;

* *State of the Nation*, 170.

+ *Ib.* 130.

“ If after Mr. *Pitt*’s black share in the transactions reported
 “ by the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry, and *the part he*
 “ *has acted* in the proceedings we have spoken of *, the
 “ Nation can tamely bear the continuance of his ministry,
 “ it is a nation that ought to forget it ever produced *Russells*,
 “ and *Sidneys*, and *Hampdens* ; and to blush at the very
 “ mention of freedom or public spirit † !” Were there no
 other earthly reason than the last alluded to, the ministry
 ought to be changed.

So much for the ministry : now for the parliament ; meaning here the House of Commons. Now, unless *parliament*, while the national expenditure is sixty millions a year, and when the fate of every family in the kingdom hangs by the thread of *national defence* against the attack of a *Napoleon*, be an useless institution, common sense will say, and common honesty will assent to the proposition, that “ *every man*” who contributes to those sixty millions, and whose happiness or misery depends on the wisdom and virtue of that parliament, ought to be in a situation “ *to do his duty*,” in electing the members of it ; while common prudence will proclaim that, unless we shall be content to see in a short time one of the *Bonaparte* family on the throne of *England*, and our country, like the several kingdoms of *Italy*, *Bavaria*, *Wirtemberg*, &c. an appendage of the *Great Nation*, we ought to lose no time in reforming, which in the military phrase signifies disbanding, that worst of all our volunteer corps, the *Borough Faction*. Who can hesitate that looks back to all the voting of that corps ? To the voting of Lord *North*’s *American* war ? Mr. *Pitt*’s war of 1793 ? And Mr *Addington*’s war of 1803 ? Who can hesitate that sees the nation voted into between six and seven hun-

* Those for screening Lord *Melville*.

† State of the Nation, 105.

dred millions of debt, every new loan all the while regularly accompanied with a panegyric on our increasing prosperity? But, above all, who can hesitate that has witnessed the famous voting of the last session, in the case of Lord *Melville*? It was an æra perfectly singular in the annals of parliament, for by the successive votes of April 8, June 25, and July , we know the *unanimous* opinion of the House of Commons to have been that his lordship was guilty; whereas, notwithstanding this perfect *unanimity* of the House, in which the Speaker himself had joined, we recollect that 229 members on the 25th of June voted *against* a prosecution; and that 216 voted on the 8th of April *against* even a censure!!!

But what has this voting about Lord *Melville* to do with national defence? I hear some one ask.—It *has* to do with national defence; because national defence is a public interest, requiring public virtue, and honest voting. It will soon be seen how criminal Lord *Melville* and Mr. *Pitt*, and other ministers, have uniformly been in rejecting all the true principles and modes of defence, and in leaving the country dangerously exposed to invasion; and if it be the duty of parliament to control ministers and keep them to their duty, we shall see that the criminality has not been confined to ministers, but that the *Borough Faction* is deep in the guilt. Besides; he who at this awful crisis in the fate of nations can dream of our country's benefiting by an able administration, however selected, without an honest parliament really chosen by the people, may indeed be a very fit companion for the court tribe who have caused the fall of *Austria*, but will never contribute to the saving of *England*.

But let us come to the point in hand. How, I pray, has parliament acquitted itself respecting *the military branch of the CONSTITUTION*, and laws for defending the coun-

try?—read the Earl of *Liverpool**—read Sir *William Jones* †—read the Duke of *Richmond* ‡—read what I also, a humble advocate for the constitution, have written on the subject §; and do not forget to read the Acts of Parliament severally brought forward by Lord *Shelburne*, towards the close of the *American* war, by Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) in Mr. *Pitt's* war, and those of Mr. *Forke* and of Mr. *Pitt* himself in Mr. *Addington's* war, in which we have no prospect left but that of grappling with him on our soil, unless by something better still to be done we make it impracticable to him to plant on it a *French* standard; in not one of which statutes is the constitution duly respected; in not one of which has the defence of the country been duly provided for; but in every one of which you will find clear evidence of what Lord *Liverpool* shows has been the general system of all the *European* courts for “these three last centuries ||,” as well as of what he emphatically calls “a detestable policy ¶.”

But what are we to expect of parliament, when in order to obtain that concurrence between parliament and a minister which is necessary to the public business, and towards which it used to be thought necessary for the minister to act under the controul of public wisdom and public power, collected in parliament, when the court and borough factions have brought into fashion the monstrous doctrines, that par-

* Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, published in 1757—re-published 1794.

† Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence, 1780.

‡ Thoughts on the National Defence, 1804.

§ Appeal, civil and military, on the Constitution, 1799. *England's Ægis*, 1803. It came out the 7th of December, 1803, although the bookseller put the date in the following year.

|| Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, 65.

¶ lb. 8.

liament must conform to the minister, and yet that parliament is to be omnipotent over every right of the people? To these factions, and to their minister, who perfectly understand each other, these doctrines are very convenient: to the nation, they are every thing that is pernicious and destructive; and in no one particular more than in what respects the defence of our country; as I have in my first volume already poved, and in the present shall make still more manifest and unquestionable. It is on these grounds I maintain a reform of parliament to be necessary to *national defence*. To every other public interest—and we have more to do than merely defend ourselves—that necessity has long been known and felt by all but the corrupt and the ignorant.

Prior to Sir *William Jones's* luminous exhibition of what in respect of defence against invasion is, and must continue to be, the *common law of the land*, because founded on reason and necessity, and how in ancient times the statute law was made *to correspond* with the common law, prior, I say, to this work of Sir *William Jones*, parliaments of modern times might have had some small apology for not passing statutes for defence on right principles; but since the publication of the work of that great and good man now alluded to, parliaments have had no excuse whatever. No private man is allowed to plead ignorance of any law, or clause of a law, although the statute law alone fills sixteen bulky, close-printed volumes, and the common law is scattered over at least sixty volumes more, whether he have offended in any thing important or trivial, in that of which he could be supposed to have a knowledge or not. Are the members of parliament then, men whose immediate duty is that of legislation, to plead ignorance of those great prominent laws which are *essential to the very existence of the state*? Certainly not. Least of all can the present parliament plead such ignorance on the matter of defence, because

their attention had been particularly called to the subject by the extreme danger into which the minister had brought the country, as well as by the reiterated declarations of that danger by the minister himself, by the immense sums they had voted for a navy to watch the invaders, by the immense expense they had likewise put the nation to for an Army of Reserve, an Additional Force, &c. and by the extravagant prices for militia substitutes thereby occasioned. Nor is this all, for when the Bill for amending the Act for Defence and Security of the Realm came before them in 1803, in the preamble of which they were reminded of his Majesty's power "of requiring the military service of all his liege subjects in case of an invasion," they were so pointedly called on to examine what was the spirit and sense of the constitution and common law, that I must needs think them inexcusable in passing statutes as contrary to that spirit and to that sense, as darkness to light, and in consequence of which the general plan for the defence of the country is to this moment a national reproach, and if not amended will doubtless prove the national ruin.

Do I hear the voice of court censure for speaking this language? Am I sneeringly asked, why, when those statutes were pending, I did not tender my sage counsels? I have an answer. At the very breaking out of the war, my book, "*An Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Subject of the English Constitution*," was borrowed of me by the Secretary of a Cabinet Minister; and as I could not know the extent of his motive, I earnestly requested him to put it into the hands of his principal. By the doctrines of that book I abide, and my present opinions are regulated. Am I asked, why I do not now privately communicate my sentiments to the minister instead of publicly arraigning him, and thus exposing to the enemy the nakedness of the land?—Why privately? He might have read the *Appeal*, published seven years ago; and published under such remarkable circumstances as leave me no doubt of its having been read by some

of the vigilant persons he employed and so well paid for their sedition-hunting services. He might have read the *Ægis*, containing the same military doctrines somewhat condensed, which was published two years ago, copies of which I sent to six members of the then cabinet ; some of them now sitting in the cabinet of Mr. *Pitt* himself. But, alas ! to speak the language of the *constitution* to such a minister, were to speak to the deaf adder ! What ! offer private counsel for preserving the constitution, the laws, and liberties of *England*, to a minister I have for many years been publicly arraigning as their most deadly enemy ? Ask me not then why I do not privately offer my thoughts to such a minister ? Ask Lord *Liverpool*, why, notwithstanding his remonstrances forty-nine years ago, against the traiterous system of “ these three last centuries,” and exposing a “ *de-testable policy*,” the same system and the same policy have ever since been steadily adhered to in the cabinet, notwithstanding his lordship’s own presence in it for the greater part of that time ? Ask the Duke of *Richmond* why he exposes the nakedness of the land ? He had better means than myself of privately communicating with ministers, and yet his reasonings are all arguments to prove that defence is still grievously wanted. But it will shortly be seen, that when I could entertain the most distant hope of attention, I did make *private* communications to ministers on the subject of national defence.

To return, however, from this digression to the necessity of reforming parliament before a right system of defence can be hoped for ; I ask on what ground we are to expect that parliament on this particular subject will control the minister ? Has there ever been, before the unfortunate Reports of the Naval Commissioners, even any apparent difference of opinion between them except respecting the two slave trades, that of the *West Indies* and that of *England* ? And what is our hope that Mr. *Pitt* will rebel against the

system and the policy of the court faction, conscious as he is that he holds his place by the tenure of his obedience? Or what is our ground of expectation, that the *court faction* can be made to see their own in the public danger? Could the noblesse of *France* be made to see their own danger till actually ingulphed in the volcano of Revolution? Could all the counsels of the wise, or the warnings of prophets, avert from the court of *Jerusalem* conquest and captivity? Could the forewarnings even of a *Jesus* prevail to save the city from final destruction? And although *Belshazzar* admitted as true the interpretation of *Daniel*, and honoured him for it, yet the admonition came too late, for in the same night *Belshazzar* was slain and another took the kingdom. I cite these as familiar instances to show the stupifying effect of *court corruption* upon the human mind.

When General *Mack* had advanced with a gallant army towards *Ulm*, and *Russian* armies were on their march to support him; and while the august sovereign of *Austria*, *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, *Moravia*, *Venice*, and the *Tyrol*, was relieving the toils of government by his innocent amusements, amongst which travellers speak of acting plays, manufacturing squibs, crackers, and other fireworks, and sometimes making elegant pastry, or artificial flowers, or some such thing, his courtiers I doubt not were throwing about the squibs of their wit on sending his *Russian* bears to teach *Frenchmen* to dance, and cracking their jokes on *the upstart*, and the humiliations to which he was soon to submit. And if our own court faction by their influence in parliament and over the minister, and with the ignorance of, and insensibility to, every public interest, which is the characteristic of the tribe, shall paralyze the military energies of the *English Constitution*, they may none of them be awakened out of their dream until the same person who performed that office to the courtiers of *Vienna*, may be upon *English* ground and in full march for *London*.

Every corrupt court faction is alike ; seeing, they see not ; hearing, they hear not ; neither do they understand. Our own court faction, sometimes called *the faction behind the throne*, is very well known to be political *Jews and Greeks*, to whom the constitution is a stumbling block, and the venerable common law of the land foolishness. Seeing then how the court faction, the borough faction, and the minister are linked together, I do not see what benefit we are to have from a change of ministers without a reform of parliament ; unless a change of ministers and a reform of parliament means the same thing ; which we know is not the case, for since we have been reasoning and petitioning for a reform of parliament, we have had many changes of ministers, but without reform being either the same thing or a consequence of it. We have within that period had the ministries of Lord *Rockingham*, Lord *Shelburne*, the *Coalition*, Mr. *Pitt*, Mr. *Addington*, and now of Mr. *Pitt* again. Perhaps the public now look towards Mr. *Fox* and his friends. But if, in consequence of an *Austerlitz* panic having seized upon the court and borough factions, those statesmen should be called to the helm, can the factions ever cordially co-operate with men they had proscribed and persecuted, traduced, and vilified for twenty years ? Can they with such men join in binding up those wounds of the constitution which have been so many times inflicted by their own hands, against all the remonstrances of these very persons ? Can they support them in vindicating the justice of the country, by bringing to punishment any great criminal in whose crimes they have participated, and whose violations of the law and constitution have been all along sanctioned by themselves ?

Or, to stick to the point now immediately before us, that of national defence and security ;—would those factions permit a virtuous ministry practically to prove that which Sir *William Jones* so clearly demonstrated,—“ That the com-

“ mon, and statute, laws of the realm in force at this day
 “ give the *civil* state in every county a power, which, *if it*
 “ *were perfectly understood and continually prepared,*
 “ would effectually quell any riot or insurrection, without
 “ assistance from the *military*, and even without the mo-
 “ dern riot-act; by showing the nature and extent of the
 “ *Posse Comitatum*, and proving that it is required by law
 “ to be equal in its exertion to a *well-disciplined army* * †”
 And “ That the power so raised may and must be armed
 “ with such weapons, and act in such orders as shall enable
 “ them totally to suppress the riot or insurrection, or to re-
 “ pel the invaders †.”

Would those factions permit such ministers even to intro-
 duce the extended militia proposed by the Duke of *Rich-*
mond of about 470,000, while even in time of war not more
 than 30,000 regulars would be required at home? Much
 less would they allow the law and constitution to operate ac-
 cording to the doctrine of Sir *William Jones*, furnishing for
 defence full 1,200,000 men completely armed, although thus
 to restore the common law “ to full vigour and energy †”
 would not only obtain you immediate peace, but preserve it
 when obtained?

If therefore my countrymen, the good-natured people of
England, are NOT yet prepared to rank themselves with the
 human cattle of *Bohemia*, who, if their lord have lost his
 estate at the gaming-table, are sold with the land; or if the
 said people of *England* be NOT disposed to leave their all
 and the fate of their posterity to the care of a court and bo-
 rough faction and such a minister as Mr. *Pitt*, to be pro-
 tected as courtiers have protected the people of *Austria*,
 they will probably think it is time to interfere a little them-

* Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence, 34.

† *Ib.* 19.

‡ *Ib.* 10.

selves, for their own preservation, ere the *French* armies, greatly augmented for their late campaign, and greatly elated by the success of it, shall pour the torrent of invasion into this land.

I thus repeat the opinion lately given in "*The State of the Nation*," on the urgent necessity of the *people* assembling in their counties and towns to take care of themselves and their posterity. It is to be sure the opinion of a private man, but it is the opinion of one who has thought much on these subjects. He has not been unobservant of the torpor under which his country has long laboured; nor is he ignorant of the benumbing effects of upheaping tax upon tax, prosecution upon prosecution; while some parliamentary patriots are driven into secession, and still more are fascinated into silence. He never liked secession. He never could submit to be silenced. In one respect he has found the friends of public liberty more like other men than he could wish to see them. They get wearied by repeated defeats, and disheartened by long disappointment; they thus fall into habits of indolence, or grow splenetic, or desponding; in this temper they omit to do the public good of which they are capable; they get possessed with dreams of difficulties and dangers, which in their more ardent days would have vanished at their presence; they infect one another with irresolution; they neglect opportunities of disseminating salutary truth and manly sentiments; and, while sacrificing precious moments, in which by the generous energies of public spirit they might rally their careless countrymen around the neglected standard of the constitution, they attempt to justify their own inaction by blaming the inactivity of others, who more properly wait for their authoritative example and patriotic invitation. These are not the words of spleen; but I feel, and I expostulate.

Those, to whom the preservation of the state has been intrusted, have not done their duty: They have even been

grossly unfaithful to their trust. I know the responsibility attaching to what I say. I may speak in personal danger; but the dangers which threaten my country demands the truth. On the same subject in the year 1799, as already intimated, I delivered the truths on which the safety of *England* depends, in the "*Appeal*," already referred to, but so dangerous was uttering constitutional truth then thought, that not a bookseller dared to publish the work. Except by hiring a shop and a servant solely to sell that book I had no means of circulating it, unless privately, which, for its appearance of a clandestine transaction, I disdained. For the mines of *Potosi*, I would not now but have so treated with contempt the then *Robespierian* system of terror—fit engine of government for such a minister as Mr. *Pitt*!—to make known to my countrymen the true military system of *England's defence*. That model of the system, hateful and full of reproach as it must have been to despotism and its scribes, and opposite as it was to all the habits and prejudices of our professional soldiers, has now stood seven years immovable as a rock*.

As the system is no invention of mine, I may speak of it as I think. I shall therefore say, that in my fixed opinion nothing else can bid a sure defiance to *French* invasion, and teach the trembling nations on the continent how to set impassable bounds to the ambition of *Napoleon*. Such I hold to be that system which no bookseller, with the dread of Mr. *Pitt* before his eyes, dared in 1799 to publish!!! Between this system and that which was introduced in 1803

* The work was dedicated to the officers of the British army; and in the preface the author says, "They being the best judges in the science of war, he throws out to them an amicable challenge, liberally and candidly to discuss that military system of which he treats; and he means it as a *friendly provocation* to them, to say all that can be said to its prejudice, and in defence of the system under which they now act."

by Mr. *Forke*, and has been adopted and persevered in to this moment by Mr. *Pitt*, let us draw a short comparison. The first preliminary observation to be made is, that these ministers, copying the *Israelites* who rejected the government of God, set about the defence of *England* by first rejecting the constitution: the military energies of which, compared with those of their own system—if system it can be called—are as iron to clay, or as adamant to the fragile handiwork of the potter. Troubled with the dangers into which their wretched counsels had brought their country, the framers of the system of 1803, having heard of the military strength of the constitution, turned that way their eyes, but with no friendly thoughts. Something was to be done, and as it should seem they studied the military system of the constitution only to learn how at every step they might elude it, evade it, or pervert it; while yet they might make much show with little effect; and obtain the reputation of strength, with real weakness; for ignorant indeed must they have been, to have taken that for military strength, which any smatterer in the science could have told them was imbecility. And what can equal the impolicy of thus attempting to impose upon the sagacity of a *Napoleon*; or by such shallow manœuvres to deter him from his project of invasion! Such statesmen are the very children who thrust their heads into a bush, and then cry aloud, ‘ You can’t see me!’

Where the system of the constitution is beautifully simple, their project is complex and confused; where that makes the duty of the armed individual easy, convenient, delightful; this, makes it harassing, ruinous, and disgusting; where the constitutional system inspires the invincible enthusiasm of freedom, their substitute, by its dragooning degradations, is inconsistent with every idea of *English* liberty, repulsive to every *English* feeling. That which for a thousand years

has been known for law, they style "prerogative;" and that which has the eternal basis of common law, common sense, and common right, they represent as altogether dependent upon royal, that is, ministerial *discretion*; and by their exercise of that discretion, they even neglected to arm or exercise a tenth part of the men they enrolled; as if to arm and to exercise, when the legions of a *Napoleon* are expected among us, were to be left to the last moment of "actual invasion, or on the appearance of the enemy in force upon the coast!" How is such conduct to be characterised?

At such a period of national danger, a danger which they created and were themselves the loudest to proclaim, purposely to refuse to restore from a state of neglect the venerable *military branch of the constitution*, or, in other words, that martial system that belongs to, that is coeval with, and the only security for, its civil existence, these innovators—*who forsooth hate alterations, and cannot endure reforms!*—these innovators, I say, thrust upon us a crude medley of imbecility, confusion, and ministerial *discretion*;—a diseased, rickety, and ephemeral brat begotten by that *Discretion* upon the strumpet *Flattery*. For constitutional order, discipline, and firm union, these military legislators give us, in a perilous novelty, a military rope of sand with *incurable irregularity and insubordination*. They "allowed themselves," says the Duke of *Richmond*, "to be seduced by a proposition to introduce the substitute of uncertain, and never-to-be-made-orderly corps of volunteers for a *regular organization of the whole force of the nation by law, and under military discipline* *."

On a former occasion I have said, "It is a distinguish-

* *Thoughts on the National Defence*, 50.

ing feature of Mr. *Dundas's* Act, that it calls *only* for the *voluntary* services of the people; and every individual is to have an option. This, at first sight, may appear conciliating; but it is calculated to make wrong impressions, and to perpetuate the present great IGNORANCE of the *English* Constitution; which is, unquestionably, one of the greatest of ALL OUR NATIONAL MISFORTUNES. That constitution—a constitution of liberty and beneficence—knowing it to be *equally the duty of every man* to defend the laws and liberties of his country, and the peace, property, and happiness of the community of which he is a member,—confidently, justly, and honourably PRESUMES *every* man a volunteer in such a cause; and the law consequently should dictate only a proper *organization* of the collective force, the *means* of rendering it effective, and the *regulations* under which it shall be exerted*,” &c.

But this plausible invitation to *voluntary* service was the hypocritical mask and artifice for covering “the detestable policy” of the *faction behind the throne*, to which the *Pitts* and *Dundasses*, their colleagues and creatures, have been uniformly subservient. These men,—so steady to the interests of their crew, so faithless to those of their country!—so knowing in the crooked ways of intrigue, so averse from the straight paths of the constitution!—could not fail to discern the immediate advantages their faction were to derive from this device of *voluntary* service of men to be raised “for defence of their counties, town, or coasts, or for the general defence of the kingdom, during the present war†;” because it furnished them with the pretence of introducing into their system for defence of the realm “*the fiend discretion*‡,” dependent upon which these politicians, these place-

* Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Constitution, 140.

† 1794.

‡ Sir W. Jones. See his Ode—“What constitutes a State?”

holders, these men of office, these any thing but statesmen, did not scruple to place the security of the state ;—that state which the free principles of the constitution, and the grand system of the mighty *Alfred*, confides to the keeping of every member of the community able to bear arms in its defence.

And what was the use these men who ruled by discord and division immediately made of this engine of *discretion*, but to arm *their own partizans exclusively* ! At a meeting at *Boston*, where their insidious plan, then in circulation, was proposed, pointing out its unconstitutional nature and tendency, I moved to reject it, and to invite all taxed householders to purchase arms and ammunition, and to appoint a committee of magistrates and other gentlemen, to examine the common law of the land, for instruction how such force was to be organized and regulated. Finding no one to second me, I purchased a chest of arms and ammunition for myself and family.

Their act of that day (1794, c. 31) begins thus “ Whereas the *utmost exertions* are now requisite for increasing the military force of this kingdom ;” but except their exertions to increase the mercenary part of that military force, I repeat that, in contempt of the constitution and common law of the land, they took good care, by the exercise of the *discretion* they had secured to themselves, to arm none but their own partizans exclusively ; and during the whole remainder of that war, much as our dangers increased, they still clung to this *discretionary power*, as may be seen again by their statute of 1798 (c. 27.) and, we remember how they used it. How at that time I thought of their proceedings may be seen by the following quotations from my “ *Appeal*,” written in 1798, and published 1799.—“ I come to speak of the *discretionary power* claimed by Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) for himself, as War Secretary, and for every Lord Lieutenant of a county under him, in re-

spect of those among the people of *England* who shall, or who shall not, be permitted to *bear arms*. Of such a *discretionary power* in a lord lieutenant, or a Mr. *Dundas*, or in even the king himself, the constitution knows no more than it does of an *Aga*, a *Bashaw*, or a *Grand Seigneur*.”—“ When Mr. *Dundas* talks of ‘ the common law of the land,’ and ‘ the spirit of the constitution,’ it were to be wished he would not misrepresent them. The words imputed to him, as given in the *Morning Chronicle* of May 9th, 1798, are these: ‘ It would not, he believed, be asserted, that any subject of the realm ought to take up and bear arms without the assent and authority of the *executive* government of the country?’—“ It is high time that *Englishmen* thought seriously on these important questions, so flippantly decided by Mr. *Dundas*, in the teeth of the *English* constitution, of reason, and of nature. And such are the men who hold the reins of *English* government, when the state, from its internal corruptions and external danger, is shaken to its centre !*”

In afterwards commenting on Mr. *Dundas*’s circular letters of the 9th and 15th of May, 1798, (his act having passed the 5th of April preceding) saying to the Lords Lieutenants “ that his Majesty’s ministers have it in contemplation to propose some measures to parliament, with “ a view to check such dangerous proceedings,” as *Englishmen* “ exercising themselves in the use of arms, without any commissions or authority from his Majesty, or “ any person competent to give such commissions or authority,” Good God! exclaimed I, to what a condition are we brought, when a secretary of state shall dare to proclaim to the whole kingdom such an intention ! When an alleged *suspicion*, that is perfectly ridiculous, and a *charge*

* Appeal, Civil and Military, on English Constitution, 189. 191.

of certain men's doing that which, in fact, it is not only the right, but *the duty of every man to do*, and which, at this perilous season, is a proof of his loyalty and of the interest he takes in his country's welfare, is to be the monstrous ground of an act, to seal at one stroke the slavery of the nation? for what were a statute to forbid the use of arms to any but persons licensed by the crown, but a charter of slavery as complete and as perfect as was ever conceived in the brain of a tyrant! There is nothing in *English* history with which it may be mentioned, but the ignominious CURFEW; at the horrible tolling of which, a wretched, dejected people, instead of tasting abroad the freshness of the evening breeze, or the converse of friends and freemen, still more refreshing, were doomed to hide themselves within their melancholy dwellings, without fire, without light, but not without heart-rending reflections as to the unspeakable miseries of despotism.

Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*), who on the 9th of May, signed the avowal of the intention of which I have spoken, IS STILL A MINISTER OF THE KING OF ENGLAND!!!

What! is it sheer ignorance of our constitution,—an utter unacquaintance with our books and legal reading, that betrays this minister into such proposals? or is it a contempt for the principles of our government, a design to subvert it, and a spirit of audacious experiment on the patience of the *English* people? Patient, indeed, must that people be, when a man who has holden such language, still holds his place as a minister of their country, while they hold their tongues as if nothing were amiss!

No reflecting *Englishman* who has read with attention these pages, will, I apprehend, be surprised, that there should be men who 'have it in contemplation' to plunge their last dagger into the vitals of their country, and to tear

up by the roots at one effort the whole constitution and common law of the land *.”

That Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) could not be ignorant of the existence of the *English posse comitatus* is plain, because in his introductory speech to his bill of 1798, he tells the House, that the respective powers of the lieutenants and of the sheriffs over that *posse comitatus* had been taken into consideration, and the bill was intended to remove doubts which had arisen on the subject. Now, with this evidence before us to show that this system of *voluntary service*, and of its appendage *discretion*, was not introduced through ignorance; and with the evidence likewise of our law-books (including Sir *William Jones's* learned and luminous tract on the subject †, published eighteen years before) for proving what is imperatively enjoined by the constitution and common law of the land, on the point of arming for defence; and for showing that both this *voluntary service* ‡ and this *discretion* are perfect novelties, and the most mischievous innovations, the former of them destructive of all discipline and defensive energy, as the latter is destructive of the constitution itself; I must needs think that it must be apparent to every sound understanding, that in this conduct of Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) and of Mr. *Pitt* his colleague in all

* 195. Written in June, 1798.

† Inquiry into the Legal Mode of suppressing Riots, with a constitutional Plan of future Defence, 1780.

‡ Do not let this *voluntary service*, by the statutes of Mr. *Dundas* and Mr. *Pitt*, be confounded with the *voluntary associations* of Sir *W. Jones*, the objects of which were for the associates “to provide themselves with arms, and pay for learning the use of them”—“for the sole purpose of joining the power, when legally summoned”—“as part of the *civil* state;” as the duty of every man until his repeated complaint and exhortation “that our laws have been disgracefully neglected, and ought to be restored to full vigour and energy,” should be attended to. 1b. 34.

this nefarious business, there is a ground of impeachment as far transcending that "violation of law" we have heard so much of, as the value of our constitutional liberties transcends the value of any sum of money we can count, or as the wickedness of the rankest treason transcends that of petty larceny.

With what insolence, in the days of their despotic sway—such is the short-sightedness of the wicked!—was this *discretion* exercised! How contemptuously was Mr. *Tierney*, and "a vast proportion of his constituents," treated in the rejection of "their services for the defence of their country" by a Lord of the Bedchamber*! For to such humble placemen, to render it the more galling, was this tremendous *discretion* delegated. But when a *Scotch* lawyer, by subserviency to the system of the *faction behind the throne*, had worked his way to power, and become the most confidential associate in office with such a minister as Mr. *Pitt*, no bounds could limit his arrogance, but the first nobility of *England* were to be grossly insulted by the exercise of this *discretion*. Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) dared to reject the services of the Dukes of *Bedford* and *Northumberland* at the head of their tenantry; this rejection to the former accompanied with an insolent letter†. This maintainer of the impudent doctrine that no *Englishmen* can "train and exercise themselves in the use of arms" without commission or authority from his Majesty, or any "person competent to give such commission or authority‡," dared, I say, even in the cases of two of the first nobility of the kingdom for rank and character, to reject their offers of service, dared thus to frustrate efforts towards defence of the realm against foreign invasion, even when the parties

* Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Constitution, 186.

† *Ib.* 196.

‡ *Ib.* 195.

offered, in consideration of the public danger, to act under this very discretionary power!

Here, then, was not an unintentional, a pardonable overlooking of the constitution and common law of the land, respecting the *posse comitatus*; for of that I have shown Mr. Dundas was not ignorant: here was not a mere neglect of ministerial duty, by which, if those noblemen and their tenantry had been backward in defending their country, or had been deficient in “training and exercising themselves in the use of arms,” as that constitution and common law required them to do, it was incumbent on the king’s minister to have reminded them of this duty; and if, through change of arms and usages, that minister found the regulating statutes for carrying into effect the perpetually-existing constitutional and common-law principle of arms-bearing for defence of the realm, had become obsolete, it was further incumbent on him to have brought a bill or bills into parliament, as Sir William Jones had several years before shown to be necessary, “to restore to full vigour and energy*” that constitutional and common-law principle, so as to have given it complete operative effect; and then, if necessary, to have enforced obedience to such law on all persons alike, for Sir William Jones expressly says, “The Power of the County includes “the whole *civil* state, from the duke to the peasant; while “the *military* state†, *as such*, forms no part of that power, “being under a different command, and subject to a different “law ‡.”

Now if a minister, one who had been a practising lawyer, and who has particularly adverted to the common law of the case, instead of keeping in the straight path of so plain a duty, imposes upon an innocent, confiding, all-believing parliament, and obtains from it by misrepresentation a statute not only in-

* Inquiry into Legal Mode, &c. 10.

† Ib. 14,

‡ Meaning the Standing Army.

consistent with the Constitution and the Common Law of the Land, but stabbing them to the vitals, he may not possibly commit that technical species of crime for which a special pleader would hang him at a sessions in the *Old Bailey*; but I am greatly deficient in judgment if such an attempt to betray, to subvert, and to destroy the state, be not that highest species of treason which is elsewhere cognizable at a proper season. And when in the course of these pages shall be seen the peril in which Mr. *Pitt*, and Mr. *Dundas*, and the rest of their school, have, by such conduct, to this day left the kingdom, while it was at any hour, since they involved it in these wars of unexampled danger, in their power to have placed it in perfect safety, impregnable by half a dozen *Napoleons* with half a dozen invading armies, the reader may, in this one feature of the character of these men, discover a clew by which to estimate the degree in which they have proved a scourge to their country. A whole race of our hereditary princes were expelled from the throne for endeavouring “to subvert and extirpate the laws and liberties of this kingdom,” and particularly “by assuming and exercising a power of *dispensing* with and *suspending* of laws, and the *execution* of laws, without consent of parliament*,” and I trust that neither Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*) nor Mr. *Pitt*, nor any of the school, even with the consent of a deceived, an innocent, a confiding, and all-believing parliament, will ever be permitted to subvert and extirpate those “laws and liberties,” by fraudfully “dispensing with and suspending” *the military half of the Constitution*, and the whole immutable common law of the land respecting the County Power, in favour of any species of domestic despotism; or by putting the lives and estates of *Englishmen* out of the protection of those “laws and liberties,” by which alone they can be securely defended against

* See the Bill of Rights.

the attacks of such a conqueror as him by whom they are now threatened.

In ancient times, there was no want of discipline ; especially in the marches between *England* and *Scotland*, where the inveterate habit of reciprocal depredation required that the discipline should be prompt and severe, for it was necessary to the dwellers there always to be on the alert. We accordingly find it an article in the *Border Laws* “ That every
 “ man do rise and follow the fray, upon blowing of horn,
 “ shout, or outcry ; upon pain of death*.” In all other parts of the kingdom it was the law, and is so to this moment, that “ upon cry made for weapons to keep the peace
 “ all subjects who are not continually prest, or ready, for
 “ the orders of the Sheriff on an alarm in the country,
 “ are exposed to the royal displeasure, and to a severe
 “ penalty †.” and a regular organization of the County Power for making it “ equal in its exertions to a well-disci-
 “ plined army ‡.” for repelling invasion implies of course that this discipline shall be provided for by law.

Preparatory to the discipline for real service, we must have the discipline for training and exercise ; and the training which the arms used in former days required was by law enforced under constant penalties for neglect ; that training began in youth, and upon these obvious principles, 1st, that that which was a *national duty*, was to be made a *national practice* ; 2dly, to prevent the duty becoming either difficult or irksome in manhood, this practice ought to be rooted in early *habit*, while we are boys, and so become a second nature, easy and familiar to the end of our lives ; and 3dly, that for the *perfection* of bodily exercises, as in swimming, skating, dancing, and the like, youth is the season for laying the foundations. The training of the English

* Hist. and Antiq. of Westm. and Cumberland, lxxxiii.

† Jones’s Inquiry, 27. 29.

‡ Ib. 34.

youth to archery therefore began, as we see by the 33 Henry VIII. c. 9. at *seven years of age*, and hence that excellence which gave renown to the *English* bowmen all over *Europe*, as dreadful in the battle.

It is on these principles that in my "*Appeal, civil and military, on the Subject of the Constitution*," (116) I observed that "a new generation must necessarily spring up, before the system could arrive at that high finish and perfection of which it is capable; as an essential feature of it must be, to have the use of arms well taught in all schools and seminaries of learning whatever, where our youth after twelve years of age should be brought up; under such sanctions as should absolutely insure the attainment of sufficient skill; than which nothing could be more easy."

Any one who wishes to see the extreme facility, alacrity, and precision, with which very young boys learn all the elementary exercises and tactics of war, and the delight they take in them, may be highly gratified by visiting the Military Asylum at *Chelsea*. These things need not abridge the hours of study one moment. They should merely occupy a part of the time allotted for exercise; and in that view are as good as whipping a top, and better than marbles; the body early receives a noble air, and the mind imbibes manly sentiments. To what perfection must a militia, so trained from infancy, soon attain all the movements of field duty! and with what a sovereign contempt must an *English* nation so prepared think of *French* invasion!

And so far would be this part of education from having any ill effect upon the national manners, character, and habits in advanced life, that we might expect the contrary in an eminent degree. Young men above the labouring class, whether of spirit qualifying them for war, or of vanity for strutting in regimentals, are now allured from peaceful occupations when arms-bearing is a monopoly attended with flattering distinctions in dress, or lifts a youth up from the

counter to the rank of a gentleman. In the lower classes again, when the monopoly of arms creates a demand for a large standing army, recruiting serjeants, with their decoymen decorated with ribbons, and all the temptations of drink and money, draw into the military profession great numbers not fit for military duties. In both cases habits, morals, and characters are very frequently ruined. In such a state of society the military part of the community have too much licentiousness, and the civil part are apt to have too little of a true manly fortitude and spirit; as a scientific boxer is apt to be overbearing and insolent, while he who can neither give nor parry a blow degenerates into timidity.

A universal acquaintance with the use of arms, by removing the consciousness of great superiority or great inferiority, must, on the contrary, promote a general manliness equally removed from pusillanimity or arrogance; and safe from the temptations of idleness, vanity, or vice, for entering into the regular army; which, in such a state of things, would be comparatively small, and would always find an overflowing of recruits from the conscious energies of young men who, in a military schooling from their very infancy, felt the life of a soldier, with all its labours and its dangers, that for which they were formed; so that, instead of the arts of seduction now in use for filling the ranks, and receiving all as fish that come to the net, our regular regiments would have the picking and culling among the most high-spirited young men of the country.

The truth is, that, in the same proportion as we are commercial and manufacturing, we require the manly habit of arms-bearing, as a counteraction of the tendencies of traffic to render us avaricious, low-minded, mean, servile, and pusillanimous; and consequently an easy conquest to hardy and warlike invaders.

Those commercial *Belgæ* and *Batavians* whom we have seen over-run and subdued by *France* without even a strug-

gle, once stood as a rampart against the mightiest monarchies. It was the excess of trade that in particular has been the ruin of *Holland*; which even more than a hundred and thirty years ago began sensibly to decline, as observed by Sir *William Temple* when our ambassador to the States. His words are full of instruction to *Englishmen*. First, says he, “I take their vast trade, which was an occasion of their
 “ greatness, to have been one likewise of their fall, by
 “ having wholly diverted the genius of their native subjects,
 “ and inhabitants, from arms, to traffic and the arts of
 “ peace; leaving the whole fortune of their later wars to
 “ foreign and mercenary troops; which much abased the
 “ courage of their nation, and made the burghers of so
 “ little moment towards the defence of their towns; whereas
 “ in the famous sieges of *Haerlem*, *Alcmer*, and *Leyden*,
 “ they had made such brave and fierce defences, as broke
 “ the heart of the *Spanish* armics, and the fortune of their
 “ affairs *.”

To the same effect I might quote some pages of intrinsic wisdom from Lord *Liverpool*’s “Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force;” but I will content myself with a few short extracts. “When
 “ *Spain*,” says he, “produced the best soldiers in *Europe*,
 “ and her aim was universal empire, her commerce was
 “ also extensive; the same spirit made her both brave and
 “ industrious, gave courage to her armies, and life to her
 “ manufactures,” &c.—“but when the glory of her arms
 “ was extinguished, her commerce also decayed, and she
 “ became at once both lazy and unwarlike.”——“No
 “ country ever made in a few years so great a progress in
 “ trade as the *United Provinces*; their shipping was at one
 “ time computed to be more than what belonged to all the

“ rest of *Europe* put together ; and yet their wealth and
 “ commerce increased in this prodigious manner, while they
 “ were engaged in a war of fifty years continuance in the
 “ heart of their own country ; while most of their trading
 “ towns were fortresses, garrisoned by burghers, and while
 “ the natives of this republic, from 18 years of age to 60,
 “ were obliged, by the union of *Utrecht*, to be *armed and*
 “ *trained* ; but *since this first established militia has been*
 “ *neglected* ;” [as the *English* county power has been]
 “ since they trusted their defence to foreign mercenaries ;
 “ and since of late they have hardly been defended at all,
 “ their commerce has been gradually on the decline.”

“ Whoever also has but cursorily perused the history of
 “ our own country must have observed, that those reigns,
 “ in which the martial spirit of our people has most ap-
 “ peared, have been no less distinguished by the advances
 “ that were then made in commerce ; I shall instance only
 “ in the reign of *Edward the Third*, when *Scotland*,
 “ *France*, and *Spain*, felt the successful efforts of our arms ;
 “ when THE NATIONAL MILITIA” [the *posse comitatus*
 proposed in these volumes to be revived] “ was in vogue,
 “ often trained, and frequently called into service ; when
 “ the legislature thought it an object worthy their attention,
 “ and passed several laws in its favour,—and what part of
 “ our annals can produce more good statutes in support of
 “ *trade* ? Or did *commerce* at any time take larger strides
 “ towards perfection ?”

“ Commerce loves security, not such as can arise from
 “ the protection of another, but such as places the power in
 “ her own hands ; and on which she can fully depend.—
 “ No one will labour to “ have,” if he is not certain he
 “ shall be able to “ hold.” A precarious possession would
 “ be but a bad encouragement to dangerous voyages and
 “ painful occupations ; and no merchant will with zeal and
 “ pleasure apply himself to trade, unless he has a good

“ opinion of the wisdom and conduct of the state, that is to
 “ secure his acquisitions ; that *it is established on founda-*
 “ *tions which cannot easily be shaken*, nor consequently in
 “ danger of any sudden revolution ; and as he requires good
 “ laws to protect him from *domestic oppressions*,” [written
 forty-nine years ago] “ so must he no less have *a well-con-*
 “ *stituted internal force to secure him from foreign inva-*
 “ *sions.*”—“ If we leave our country defenceless, the more
 “ rich it grows, it becomes the more desirable morsel, and
 “ tempts, as it were, its enemies to destroy it ; HUSBAND-
 “ MEN AND ARTIFICERS MUST TURN SOLDIERS, WHEN
 “ THE CONTEST IS WHO SHALL HAVE THE LAND
 “ AND MERCHANDIZE *.”

* See p. 41—47.

CHAPTER II.

Defenceless State of the Coast of Lincolnshire. General Defects of the System. The Author's Speech on the 22d of October, 1803. Singular Confirmation of his Sentiments in a Letter from America in 1804. Chancellor Morton. Lord Lyttelton. Sir W. Temple. Hanoverian and Belgic Proclamation. Hungarian Levee en Masse. Expostulation. Supplement to the First Volume now first published. Reflections. Ministerial Discretion. Their System a probable Cause of Invasion. Wisdom of Alfred. Contrast in the Ministerial System. Lord Liverpool.

RESIDING, in October 1803, near the sea-port town of *Boston* in the county of *Lincoln*, the merchants of which at that time were become somewhat uneasy on account of depredations then making on the coast by a privateer or two of the enemy, I took occasion, after consulting a chart and taking a ride along the shore, to propose a select meeting of gentlemen, to take into consideration the defenceless state of the coast. At that meeting I addressed to the gentlemen assembled my sentiments; intended to apprize them of dangers to which they were exposed, and to which they seemed completely insensible; dangers infinitely beyond the loss they might sustain from a few lurking privateers; and to be myself secure against any misapprehension of what I should say, I spoke from a written paper; which paper, at the same time that the resolutions agreed upon by the meeting were transmitted to government, I enclosed in a letter to the proper minister; and I now mean to lay it before the public, in order that, on a full consideration of what is of-

ferred in both volumes of the "*Ægis*," they may judge whether, when "*England expects every man to do his duty*," I have been negligent of mine, or ministers have done theirs.

I am perfectly prepared for what may be said on this occasion by persons interested in imposing upon the public, by keeping them in the dark ; and in screening from public censure the errors of statesmen, in order to secure to themselves the hire for which they let out their pens. Such persons will probably pretend to be shocked, that a man professing to wish well to his country, should run any risk of giving *information to the enemy* ; meaning by such hypocrisy, to deter men from giving *information to the public*, of a nature to enable that public truly to estimate the services, the characters, and the views of the paymasters of such writers. Upon the information I have to give, the public, in respect of the conduct of ministers from that day to this, will form its opinion, whether they have or have not studiously neglected, and as studiously evaded, the restoration of the decayed *military branch of the constitution* ; and purposely preferred a worse to a better system of national defence. If that opinion should be in the affirmative, the motives to such preference will not be difficult to assign.

Now the paper to which I have already alluded contains no *information* to the enemy ; for that only can be *information* which he does *not* already know ; whereas, as will hereafter appear, all that I wish the *English* public to know, the enemy already knows too well. Mine is mere *reasoning* upon that knowledge of which the enemy is in complete possession ; and on which moreover he is prepared to act. That reasoning at the time just alluded to had in it something of novelty to those whom it was first addressed, and gave a full conviction of danger to minds which till then had been wrapped in a fatal security : a like fatal security I see in a great part of the nation, which it is the object

of this book if possible to remove. If the general reasoning of the present work, shall but make as much impression on the nation, as my arguments on that particular occasion did on those to whom they were addressed, I shall have cause for being content.

My general position is,—That the court system of our national defence, is, in a *military* view, disgraceful, contemptible, and big with danger of actual conquest by *France*; and, in a *political* view, insidious to the constitution, and hostile to the liberties of our country; so that, unless we demand and obtain a better system, should we, by *favour of the elements*, escape being made the slaves of *Frenchmen*, we must become slaves under an *English* despotism.

That the enemy knows our weakness perfectly well, I maintain to be *proved*, by his continued *preparation to invade us*; for two years have now elapsed since I observed—“that, so long as the enemy shall continue his invasive preparations, so long there will be unquestionable *evidence* that our system of defence is materially short of constitutional perfection.” At the same time it was also observed, “that the instant we shall be placed in a *constitutional* attitude of defence, in the same instant *Bonaparte* must abandon every thought of invasion.”

It is they, then, 'tis the ministry of the country *, who, in obstinately refusing to restore that system which can alone protect us, who both cause and proclaim our weakness, and who give that *information* to the enemy, which induces him to attempt our destruction; and are those then who see, and offer proof of the fatal mischief, and who call on the nation to open their eyes to their danger, to be charged with indis-

* This work was ready for the press before the ministry was changed, and there was no time, in the author's opinion, for alterations; nor did he think it proper to make any.

cretion, or ill designs? Between the Author of *England's Ægis* and ministers, let the country judge!

Without further preface then I now lay before the reader “A Speech addressed to the Chairman of a Select Meeting of Gentlemen*, held at the Cross Chamber, at *Boston*, on Saturday, the 22d of October 1803; for taking into consideration the defenceless state of the Port, the practicability of a descent by the enemy, and the consequences to be apprehended should such a descent be made.”

SIR,

Although originally bred in the naval service of my country, since I settled near *Boston* I have thought little of naval matters; but the circumstances in which we are now placed, have awakened me to more attention. Having in thirteen years of active service in the early part of my life acquired some little experience, I have oft listened with emotion to the confident opinions of mere landsmen, decisively pronounced on naval affairs. Thus I hear of the impracticability of an enemy getting to sea, while we have cruisers to block up their ports; I hear of the impracticability of landing on the open coast of this county beyond *Wainfleet*; and I hear of the impracticability of an enemy entering our Bay.

Sir, there is no impracticability in any of these things. Who stopped *Humbert* and his nine hundred men from sailing for *Ireland*? Who stopped *Hoche* with a much larger force? Who stopped the vast armament of *Bonaparte*, with which he conquered *Egypt*; the reconquering of which

* Between thirty and forty, consisting of Magistrates, Country Gentlemen, Merchants, Officers of Volunteers, and Masters of Ships. And two Captains of the Royal Navy, commanding the Fencibles, had the goodness to attend.

cost us so many millions? Let us hear no more then of the *certainty* of blocking up an enemy's port*.—Respecting the *Texel* I shall have something to say, by and by.

Now, Sir, as to landing between *Wainfleet* and *Grimsby*; the fact is, that, with full half the winds of heaven even in blowing weather, for a large army and its cannon it is one of the best landing places on the whole coast of *Great Britain*, as, from the mode of supplying the inhabitants with their coals must be perfectly well known. If I forget not, it was on that coast the country was once invaded by a horde of ravaging *Danes*, whose ferocious warfare bore a strong similitude to that of the modern *French*.

But now, Sir, we are told of another impracticability; that of dragging cannon in winter through the marsh *roads*: but as invaders† would not fear an action of trespass before the Quarter Sessions, perhaps they might fill in a few ditches, and march over the farmer's pastures, which happen to be remarkably firm land.

Touching the fanciful impracticability of entering our Bay, I see Gentlemen present who can satisfy you of the grossness of the error. Although a scaman, I never in my life was in the Bay in either ship or boat; but nevertheless, after considering *Mitchel's* Chart, and asking very few questions, I make no scruple to say, that, with that chart in my hand, were I your enemy, I would, on the forfeiture of my

* Within the last twelve months we have had again repeated proofs of the fallibility of naval blockades. At the present moment of writing, there are at sea two squadrons of the enemy, one of which escaped long since from Rochfort, and the other lately (as supposed) from Brest. December 27, 1805.

† Although a *Warwickshire* gentleman, or a *Manchester* manufacturer, may be ignorant of the difficulties or the facilities of a march over these parts, we must be credulous indeed to suppose, that in the office of the *French* Minister of War these things are not as well known, as a mail coachman knows his road by night or by day.

head for miscarriage, undertake to bring into *Boston Deep*s, either a single ship or a fleet of any magnitude ; with or without a fair wind ; and with or without the buoys. If the vessels were *Dutch*, not drawing more than five, six, or at most seven feet, (and such are the vessels that would bring hither an army) they might with a leading wind enter between the *Nock* and the main.

I do not mean to say, that this is a coast free from danger ; but danger, Sir, is the familiar companion of sailors and soldiers. It once fell to my own lot, for five successive years, to navigate a coast equally dangerous, amidst an infinity of sunken rocks, without either chart, soundings, pilot, or sailing marks, but such as I noted myself ; nor aught else to trust to, but my own eyes and my own vigilance. I see nothing, therefore, in this coast, with the benefit of charts, pilots, and all other helps to navigation, to deter an enemy from making free with it. Unless you make your pikes and bayonets, your musquets and your cannon more dangerous than your Deep>s, I would have you be prepared for all the ravages and brutalities of *French* invaders.

Now, Sir, let us advert to our daily informations concerning the preparations of the enemy. We hear of Lord *Keith* and our other commanders looking into the enemy's ports, and *thence* forming opinions of their ability for attacking us ; and sometimes we hear of the report of an *American* ship-master, who has left one of their ports. For my own part, Sir, I think very little of this counting of gun-boats, or of these reports of ship-masters ; for none of these persons can look further into a mill-stone than you or I. It is our business, Sir, not merely to look into ports, but also into possibilities. We must look at the enemy's means, not merely with the eye of the body, but likewise of the mind. Seeing that he is prosecuting the war for no other object, but *the invasion of this country* ; and that the whole

powers of the fruitful and daring mind of *Bonaparte*, are exerted on this object; that he bears to this country the most rancorous and deadly hatred; and is sanguine in his expectations of effecting its complete destruction; we are to consider what he *can* do; and then to infer, it is the thing he *will* do.

Had we nothing, Sir, to fear, but the gun-boats that have been so often counted, I might perhaps indulge in a vein of ridicule similar to that which filled all our newspapers while the First Consul was preparing his *Army of Reserve*, which neither the *English Minister*, nor the *Austrian General* could believe to exist in any formidable shape, until, like a dragon, it descended from the clouds that envelop the snowy summit of Mount *St. Bernard*, and struck a blow that astonished *Europe*. I wish we may not see another army issue from places we little dream of, and strike a blow at the heart of *England* that may hazard her existence.

The country, Sir, from *Dunkirk* all the way through *Flanders*, and to the very northern extremity of *Holland*, is full of large canals, which are the commercial highways of that populous and busy part of the world; by which canals there is a free communication with all the islands of *Zealand*, as well as with the two *Schelds*, the *Maes*, the *Rhine*, the *Ems*, the *Dollart*, and the *Zuyder See*. In a country so much dependent upon canal navigation, the vessels thus employed are innumerable; and of all burdens, from fifty, to one, two, three, and even four hundred tons. Can *Bonaparte* then, want the means of transporting to this country even a hundred thousand men, and in vessels which, if he meant to adapt them to the navigation of *Boston Deeps*, could not be better constructed?

I told you, Sir, that I had something more to say about the *Texel*. That channel we know is the only one into the *Zuyder See* practicable for ships of war, and therefore we watch it continually; but, Sir, when we compare the mis-

chief that can be done us by the remnant of the *Dutch* navy, with what we might experience from a fleet of transports laden with a large army, I think very little of blocking up the *Texel*, while there are plenty of outlets by which an army can get to sea. From the *Helder* point to the *Ims* there are eight or ten of these outlets, the furthest of which to the N. E. is full twenty-five leagues from the *Helder*: Then again between the southernmost point of the main land of *Holland* and *Fort St. Paul* in *Flanders*, there are six other capacious outlets, some of which are so wide, as to have two or three navigable channels between the sands; the southernmost of these channels is twenty leagues from the *Heyde*, and that again is twenty-one from the *Helder*; so that, independent of what may get to sea from *Dunkirk* and *Ostend*, here is a line of coast, of sixty-six leagues in extent, and having fifteen or sixteen outlets to sea, from which the enemy may sail.

An affected bustle may be made at the *Texel*, as we see made at *Calais*, *Boulogne*, &c. for attracting our attention, and fixing the situation of cruisers, while at points very distant, and perhaps many at the same time, the transports may rendezvous and push out to sea; and where there are buoyed channels, they may even sail out in the darkest night, by the simple expedient of anchoring small vessels in the situations of the buoys, to carry lanterns, giving light towards the port, but none towards the sea.

Having thus shown, that few things in war are more easy than to invade you from the ports of *Flanders* and *Holland*, let us next consider the various sorts of invasion which, according to circumstances, may be expected; and here, Sir, it is necessary to advert to the particular character of the war.

Contemplating the present war as a contest, in which we are to fight for preserving the very foundations and sources of our national consequence, and indeed for our existence

as a free state, I am strongly persuaded that we must lay our account, in case the enemy should any where enter our country in force, with seeing all those foundations and sources of our prosperity, as far as it may be in the power of the invaders, *absolutely destroyed*.

Taking this view of the subject, and being decidedly of opinion, that our *North Sea* squadron cannot insure us against very serious invasion, in my humble judgment, both the government, and the people themselves, without any calculation of chances on winds and weather, which of all things under heaven are the most uncertain, ought to provide for the *defence* of the country, to the full extent of their means; and that no objects, the destruction of which may be the wish of the enemy, nor any portion of the coast, on which for such purposes they can land, ought to be in any degree unguarded.

We ought, I say, to provide for the *defence* of our country, that is for effectually *preventing* its becoming the seat of war and desolation; between which state of security, and the finally wresting it again, in a desert state, from the ferocious spoiler, who may have once been partly in possession, after a bloody and doubtful struggle, there is a difference of incalculable magnitude. I particularly make this observation, in order that, as we proceed, you may observe from what we ourselves see, and know, touching the defenceless state of the *Lincolnshire* coast, that we are at present acting upon a system radically wrong; inasmuch as it lays the country completely open to the palpable hazard of becoming the seat of war, and to all the dreadful calamities and horrors of such a situation. How those who are answerable for conducting the defence of the country can reconcile to themselves such a system, I know not, but I would not have the consciousness of having adopted such a system, for all that this world can confer upon me *. But,

* The reader will observe, that these remarks apply to the state of

as far as we are compelled to act upon the present system, let us, in God's name, bad as it is, act upon it with vigour and energy, improving upon it ourselves if we can, wherever we find ourselves at liberty so to do, by doing more and better than the system requires.

As the subject we have under consideration is, I may venture to pronounce, far more weighty and important, than any you were ever before called upon to discuss, I trust it will not be expected of me, to dispatch what I have to lay before you in three words, nor without viewing our danger in different aspects; for in truth I am no composer of epigrams; neither do I believe, that the saving of towns, counties, or kingdoms from calamity, will in general be so well promoted by bolting out a few short naked propositions, as when the necessary propositions are somewhat clothed with the arguments of grave deliberation.

With your permission, then, in contemplating the probability of an invasion on the coast of *Lincolnshire*, I shall consider the town of *Boston** as a primary object of such invasion; and shall likewise consider such an invasion under four different points of view, accordingly as we may imagine the enemy to act in this quarter upon a plan more or less extended.

First, I shall suppose an attempt at coming upon the town by surprise with a handful of men, perhaps a thou-

the county more than two years ago, during which it is to be presumed, that vigilant and energetic ministers have effected a total change. On the present state of the coast I say nothing. But thinking it a safe rule of judgment to believe that *Bonaparte* has good intelligence, our *Warwickshire* gentlemen and *Manchester* manufacturers, may, as I should conceive, form very rational conclusions of invasions being practicable or impracticable, by observing whether the plan of invasion be abandoned or not by the enemy.

* I presume I am not giving *information* to the enemy by a publication which announces that two years ago there were such towns as *Boston* and *Lynn*.

sand; secondly, making a joint attack, with *four or five thousand*, upon *Boston* and *Lynn*, and some other neighbouring places; thirdly, seizing upon *Boston*, as a military post, with a considerable army, destined to effect much more extensive mischief than could be executed even in the county of *Lincoln*; and fourthly, seizing and making a military depot of *Boston*, when invading the country with an army of great strength that should be intended to act its part in the work of subjugation.

First, then, the enemy, stung in particular with resentment for our recent bombardments, and firings of the towns of *Calais*, *Boulogne*, *Granville*, &c. and keeping also in mind our destroying the grand sluice at *Ostend*, could he by a *coup de main* take at one place, and by one stroke, a double revenge, by giving to the flames the shipping and town of *Boston*, and at the same time demolishing all the sea sluices, would he not, think you, make it a matter of the highest exultation?

In the present wretched state of our defences, would such an enterprise require more than *one thousand men**? When we had an army of twenty thousand men in *Ireland*, *Humbert* landed there with only *nine hundred* men; and after losing eight days, waiting for the *Irish* to join him, he still marched more than half way to *Dublin*, and was, as I think, a full fortnight or more in the country before he was brought to a surrender. And be it remembered that *Humbert's* army was conveyed to *Ireland* in *three ships only*.

Considering, therefore, that almost all the effective force of the kingdom is drawn round the *metropolis*, *Portsmouth*, and *Plymouth*, and how much afraid the govern-

* "No, by G—, nor *three hundred*," was the exclamation of an officer present, whose opinion the company knew to be entitled to respect.

ment would be of weakening those points of defence, we must conceive that, besides the mischief already spoken of, the enemy would have ample time, before he could be overpowered, to cut the sea banks in this neighbourhood, and drown a great proportion of the country ; for you know that the sea at high tide is of a higher level than the surface of a great part of the soil.

Were we to experience these calamities, we could have no consolation ; for they could be imputed to nothing but the most disgraceful negligence. Contemplate, Sir, as seen in your mind's eye, all the levels of the country so lately waving with their golden harvests, once more a salt sea ; your magnificent church a frightful ruin ; your town and its wealth a heap of ashes ; and the inexpressible misery of its late inhabitants, now squandered God knows where, many of them in beggary and ruin ; and all this effected by a *thousand men* ; and I am sure you will think it high time that the town, the neighbourhood, and the government aroused from their lethargy ; and instantly took the necessary measures for averting such an evil !

Secondly, I will suppose the enemy to arrive in our bay with an army of *four or five thousand men* and some artillery. Dividing his force pretty equally, he makes his descents as near as possible to the towns of *Boston* and *Lynn* ; having previously landed strong foraging parties at a greater distance ; keeps a small force in each, and pushes forward by forced marches to *Yaxley*, leaving troops in possession, as he advances, of *Spalding*, *Deeping*, *Wisbech*, and *Peterborough* *. I know not the force kept for guarding *Yaxley* ; nor have sufficient information for judging what might be all the effect of such a movement on the part of an enemy. If our troops at that place should

* The enemy, I presume, know there were such places two years ago.

find it necessary to evacuate their post, and march their prisoners further into the interior, the enemy would of course burn the barracks, when it is probable they would return; but whether they would leave all the towns I have mentioned in flames, or not, I leave to be judged of, according to your ideas of their object in making such a descent. You are to consider that in all descents, where they could not entertain any great expectation of a return, but must lay their account with a final surrender as prisoners of war, their *Corsican* master would take care to have ample payment, in *mischief to England*, for the number of men he was to sacrifice; and, whether they should be merely captured, or else slain, would make no other difference in his mind, than that he would expose them to that fate, by which he could secure to himself *the greatest mischief to this country*. On such an invasion, therefore, as I am now considering, we must not be surprised if *Spalding, Deeping, Wisbech, and Peterborough*, as places of trade, with all the works of navigation, and drainage, and embankment in their immediate vicinity, should be totally destroyed; and that *Boston and Lynn* should lastly share the same fate.

If such an attack should only be one of many similar movements at the same period, and the government should be put under serious alarm at the same time for the capital, no aid either naval or military might be sent into these parts in time; and the enemy in that case might re-embark, and direct his course for some other of our defenceless ports and places to the northward*, to extend his ravages; enjoying, as he went, the thought of having levelled to the dust so many proud *English* towns, and of having defeated the labours of many ages, by giving back to the devouring jaws of the sea, a country won from it by human industry;

* Defenceless *two* years ago.

and destroying all the principal works of drainage and navigation extending over six or seven hundred square miles of fertile land.

As a motive with me, for endeavouring to avert such calamities, it suffices, that I see a *practicability* of their being brought upon us : I enter not into any pernicious calculations about winds and weather, nor flatter myself that, because difficulty and danger must attend the enterprise, therefore it will not be attempted. Has *Bonaparte* usurped the throne of *France*, and brought the continent of *Europe* to his foot, without encountering difficulty and danger ? And what are the difficulties, what are the dangers, that will deter him, from attempting to gratify the favourite wish of his soul, that of annihilating the power of *England* !

But, let me come to my third supposition ; in which *Boston* might not be doomed to immediate destruction ; but might be destined to become, for a longer or a shorter period, according to the success of the war, a military station to a *French* army. On this occasion again, I shall suppose a combined attack on both *Boston* and *Lynn*, as well as on *Faxley*, but with a greater force than under the former supposition. I shall likewise suppose all the towns before-named, except *Spalding*, to experience the same fate as before imagined ; but that the troops which perform these services, immediately fall back upon *Boston* ; where they find their countrymen fortifying the town ; having, however, pushed forwards considerable corps to *Donnington*, *Tattersall*, and other points, leaving a corps also at *Spalding*, as an outpost *.

* The reader must know that I cannot instruct *French generals* how to take their positions, or to subdue a country. But for rousing the good people of *England* from their fatal lethargy, it seems necessary to present pictures of warfare which would be likely to take place after effecting a landing on their shores. General abstract reasonings on military science, can have little effect in comparison of coming home to plain men's apprehensions and feelings.

On the supposition I am now taking, I am supposing the *Army of Boston*, (as perhaps the *Corsican* would call it) intended to make a serious impression on the kingdom, at the same time that it made a powerful diversion in favour of the *French Army of London*, favoured by a similar diversion by another invasion made in the *west*. In this case again, the importance of saving the capital and our great naval arsenals might expose the midland and northern counties to a severe conflict with the veteran troops of the enemy; in which there might be little hope of subduing this *northern* enemy before decisive victories had been obtained over those of the *west* and the *south*. Meanwhile I will suppose a short time spent by a part of the *French* army in strengthening *Boston* as a post; from which it might (in this low country) be difficult to dislodge it during the winter months.

By casting an eye on the map of *Boston*, and of the lands a mile round, or less, we see at once the facility of encircling it with lines of some strength. Except for a short distance on each side of the *Witham* at the Grand Sluice, the town is already completely encompassed with drains of some magnitude. A cut from the *Witham* Bank to the *Maud Foster* on the north side; and another cut from the *Witham* Bank again, to the extremity of the *North Forty Foot Drain* on the south side, will enclose the whole town; taking in also considerable pastures for sheep, to be fed out of the granaries of the merchants. Along the inside of the encircling drains, a substantial parapet might soon be thrown up; with *redouts*, or perhaps, more properly speaking, with simple *ravelins*, at convenient distances on the outsides of the drains, and then cutting ditches around those exterior works, to communicate with the drain at each extremity of the said ditches, and laying foot bridges into the said *ravelins*.

At the four bridges by which you now approach the town from the *east*, the *west*, the *south*, and the *north*, strong

tête de ponts, encompassed likewise with ditches, might also be soon constructed; the ditches of these particular works being made passable by draw-bridges for carriages, at *Maud Foster Gout*, and at the points of contact with the *Witham* and the *South Forty Foot Banks*, suitable works being farther constructed; and the whole palisadoed, the post would be fortified, and made of some strength, for it is now supposed the enemy brings with him a powerful artillery. By the time the place may be thus (if not prevented) in possession of an enemy, it is presumed the bed of the haven between the *Black Sluice* and *Maud Foster Gout*, will no longer be, as it is in some parts at present, passable on dry sand, but that there will at low tide be water enough to answer as a ditch. Engineers who have armies and the population of a country to execute their plans would not be long in constructing such works as have been mentioned. Their next attention might be directed to the construction of redoubts, in a chain around these lines for adding to the strength of the place*.

Such works being in a short time considerably advanced, we may suppose a moderate garrison to be left in the town, and the rest of the army to march for *Newark* and thence to *Nottingham*. If they should prosecute the war under strict orders to make desolation of every thing appertaining to manufactures, trade, and navigation, here they would again begin these mischiefs; burning all mills, manufactories, and their produce; breaking up all navigation locks and other works; and destroying all the implements of manufacture they could lay their hands on; and, but too probably, burning the towns themselves; thus crushing at once the eggs of our opulence and destroying the nests.

Knowing that the ruin of trade is the making of armies,

* To call such reasoning as this, suggested by a mere sight of the map, *informing* the enemy, would be truly ridiculous.

they would now play off their eloquent proclamations against the *English* government, and deal out the most liberal promises to all such artizans as should join the *French* standard. They would be assured of admission to a complete fraternity with the native *French*, and in the event of a conquest, of a full share of the confiscated estates of the nobility and gentry of *England*. Nor would they fail to circulate similar promises to the *English* army; and, if the hope of boundless plunder could seduce them from their duty, it would be held out to them in terms the most flattering*.

I shall not by any means take for granted, any thing to the disadvantage, either of our manufacturing artizans, or of our soldiery; but the former, by the ruin of trade, would be reduced to beggary, and the latter have been trained in a school not very favourable to morality. I would wish to keep all such persons out of temptation; particularly the soldiers of a standing army; for when we consider the materials of which mercenary armies are composed, no sober-minded man at all acquainted with the history and character of such armies, but must shudder at the thought of his country depending upon the virtue of such a class of men, when it might be in their power to turn the balance, either for preservation or ruin, for liberty or slavery; and when their virtue must stand in direct opposition to their immediate interest.

Recollecting what must be fresh in every man's mind, of the symptoms which occasioned the *douceur* of double pay, we could not be surprised if the dazzling hope of golden re-

* Ought he who uses such reasoning as the foregoing, in order to bring about a constitutional state of things, which must totally remove all possibility of such dangers; or those ministers who, by shutting their ears, and persisting in an unconstitutional system, expose their country to every possible calamity war can bring upon it; the persons who are to be blamed?

wards, and of becoming, jointly with other soldiers of fortune, the lords of all the lands and wealth of *England*, should suddenly fill the minds of hirelings serving for a few pence a day, with a criminal ambition too strong to be resisted.

Pains, it is true, on the part of government, have not been spared, to fortify the virtue of such persons against the seductions of *French* eloquence: but these very pains are a proof, that my anxiety on the point in question is not in the opinion of that government unfounded; but who can prove to us, that the reasonings and the eloquence which on this occasion have been exerted, and which have been circulated beyond all example, have produced the desired effect?

But let us return to the imagined progress of the invading army which we left at *Nottingham*. From thence it may be supposed to steer its course for *Sheffield*, and thence into the heart of the manufacturing part of *Yorkshire*. Exaggerated accounts of its strength and its deeds would fly before it; and if it were known that other armies had at the same time landed in the south and the west, the *French* in the north would not fail to fill the country with reports of their success, and with assurances that the fate of *England* was on the point of being decided, by a final conquest.

It is not to be supposed that an enemy could have advanced so far into the country without meeting some opposition, and being engaged in some partial actions; but, under the circumstances of our military preparations, it is not to be imagined, that, as yet, it would have been thought prudent to have hazarded any decisive battle between such veteran troops, and our inexperienced volunteers and raw levies. This military superiority, and the advancing progress of the enemy, added to all other causes, might have great effects on the minds of the ignorant and unreflecting; and if they saw such towns as *Wakefield*, *Leeds*, and *Hali-*

fax in flames, and the enemy still pushing on and threatening the whole country with destruction, how far a ruined populace, driven to despair of ever seeing their country in a state for affording them the bread of sober industry might be induced to join the invaders, as supposing them the stronger party, and the destined masters of *England*, no man can divine.

I draw these pictures of events within the compass of possibility, to show the dreadful effects which *may* result from the accessibility of our coast, and the comparatively unarmed state of our population. To prevent the possibility of such events, must be equally the duty of the governed, and of those who govern; and I feel it to be a duty we owe our country, respectfully, but freely, to deliver our sentiments on the subject, to those who have it in their power to improve our situation. But, Sir, I must plainly tell you, that, although our own prudence, with some small aid from government, may guard the town of *Boston*, from being surprised, pillaged, and set on fire by the *coup de main* of a small body of troops; yet that you can have no security whatever given you against the attacks of any considerable army, unless the government shall depart from its calculating system of defence, and shall, before it be too late, arm and organize a much larger proportion of the population of the kingdom, besides furnishing you on this coast with a considerable naval force.

I have yet, Sir, one other supposition to state to you; which differs from the last only in extent; and although some may imagine that I have already supposed much more than can really happen, I think it right to apprize you of something beyond that, which, for aught that any one can prove to the contrary, may possibly take place.

Under my last supposition, I supposed only such an army to invade us, as might be able to leave a corps in possession of *Boston*, as a military post, fortified by tolerable lines;

but, for aught that I can see against the supposition, we may be visited by a *French* army capable of leaving here a much larger force than I before thought of; and which, after constructing such lines as before spoken of, might, within them again, throw up a regular fortification of great strength, with a view of holding the place during the war; unless they preferred razing it to the ground, and taking the field with the undiminished force of their whole army, which might be capable, under able generals, of disputing the victory with any force that could be sent against it; and of acting an important part in the attempt towards a reduction of the kingdom.

It is only, Sir, by our becoming an armed nation, in the true sense of the word, that we can be free from such a danger; and if, Sir, the gentlemen present would wish to prevent the dreadful calamity of our country being under such circumstances the seat of war, and *Boston* either a *French* fortress or a heap of ashes, they will be ready to join in proper recommendations to government, of the only system that can afford security.

Of the four several suppositions respecting an invasion in this quarter which I have taken, probability seems much more in favour of the last than of any one of the others; because it most accords with the object and the genius of *Bonaparte*; and if he were to pray to Heaven for a commodious shore to land upon with a hundred thousand men, I think he would scarcely solicit one more commodious than that which lies along your deeps from *Wainfleet* to *Frieston*.

When I see at his command a population of forty millions of people, out of whom he can form armies at his pleasure,—when I see his means of collecting upon his canals transports in any number,—when I see his fifteen or sixteen outlets to sea, from any of which he can sail in the darkest nights,—when I see such a harbour as *Boston*

Deeps directly opposite his ports open to receive him,—when I see a shore just such as he could wish to land on,—and nothing to oppose him but a few companies of infantry without firelocks, and a troop or two of horse without sabres*, and this when *England*, with a short interval only, has been at war with *France* TEN YEARS AND A HALF,—I almost fancy I see the indignant genius of my country dooming it to expiate, by its blood and a long course of calamity, the folly and the criminality of not respecting a constitution, a vital part of which is a military system of national defence, the most perfect and infallible that human genius ever devised.

Obsolete as, in the shallow opinions of some, the institution to which I allude is become, that it was not “restored to full vigour and energy,” was, more than twenty years ago, the pathetic lamentation of one, who, by his genius, his learning, his wisdom, and his virtue, shed a lustre on the age in which he lived, and on the nation that gave him birth: I mean the late Sir *William Jones*.

If I shall be told that, in the General Defence Act, we have in effect the *posse comitatus*, I shall reply, that it is a miserable shadow of a managed original; but yet, were it but carried into full and energetic execution, we might for the present be safe; wherefore, when I have heard the sentiments of other gentlemen, I intend to propose something on the subject.

Whether in the foregoing Speech I magnified the danger to be apprehended, or have now given any *information* to the enemy not before in his possession, may be seen by a publication purporting to be dated *America*, May 1804, and to come from the pen of *Thomas Paine*; which, from the

* Such, in October 1803, was the state of preparation.

internal evidence of it I take to be his *. He tells us that “ the union of *Belgium* to *France* makes a new order of things;”—that “ the plan of a descent upon *England* by “ gun-boats, began after the first peace with *Austria*, and “ the acquisition of *Belgium* by *France*. Before that acquisition *France* had no territory on the north sea, and it “ is there the descent will be carried on.”

“ The *English* coast on the north sea, including the “ counties of *Essex*, *Suffolk*, *Norfolk*, and *Lincolnshire* †, “ is as level as a bowling-green, and approachable in every “ part for more than two hundred miles. The shore is a “ clean firm sand, where a flat-bottomed boat may row dry “ aground. The country people use it as a race-ground “ and for other sports when the tide is out. *It is the weak “ and defenceless part of England*, and it is impossible to “ make it otherwise.”—‘ This, Thomas, is not true; but I believe that you as little desire to see it properly defended, or the people to be truly informed, as their own minister himself.’

He goes on to say, “ The *Belgic* coast, and that of *Hol-* “ *land*, which joins it, is directly opposite this defenceless “ part, and open a new passage for invasion. *The Dutch “ fishermen know this coast better than the English them-* “ *selves*, except those who live upon it ‡; and *the Dutch “ smugglers know every creek and corner in it.*

* This work, part of which is sufficiently insidious, I understand to be suppressed, in consequence of an Information filed by the Attorney General; who is also said to have suspended the proceedings he had commenced against the publisher. It was sent to me several months ago, with what intention I know not.

† Paine was born in *Norfolk*, and was afterwards an Exciseman at *Alford*, in *Lincolnshire*, near the coast.

‡ The author, while resident near that coast found it, prior to October 1803, the prevalent opinion among the gentlemen even of the immediate

“ The original plan, formed in the time of the Directory,
 “ (BUT NOW MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE) was to build
 “ *one thousand* boats, each sixty feet long, to draw about
 “ two feet water, to carry a twenty-four or thirty-six
 “ pounder in the head, and a field-piece in the stern, to be
 “ run out as soon as they touched the ground. Each boat
 “ was to carry a hundred men, making in the whole *one*
 “ *hundred thousand*, and to row with 20 or 25 oars on a
 “ side. *Bonaparte* was appointed to the command, and by
 “ an agreement between him and me, *I was to accompany*
 “ *him.*”

“ As the expedition could choose its time of setting off,
 “ either after a storm, when the English fleet would be
 “ blown off, or in a calm, or in a fog; and as thirty-six
 “ hours *rowing* * would be able to carry it over, the proba-
 “ bility is, it would arrive, and when arrived, no ship of the
 “ line, or large frigate, could approach it, on account of the
 “ shoalness of the coast †: and besides this, the boats would
 “ form a floating battery, close in with the shore, of *a thou-*
 “ *sand pieces of heavy artillery*, and the attempts against
 “ the gun-boats at *Boulogne* shows the insufficiency of ships
 “ in such situations. About two hundred and fifty gun-
 “ boats were built, when the expedition was abandoned for

neighbourhood, that, such were the *dangers* of the coast, the enemy would not think of it for the purposes of *invasion*.

* About thirty-six hours *sailing*; but to row all the way would require much more. Although such gun-boats may be built in *Holland* and *Flanders*, I suspect that they would be added to these in narrower parts of the channel, and large transports issue from the ports of those countries.

† This circumstance indeed favours the supposition of an attempt by boats, which if they could once pass our cruisers on their coast under these circumstances, or by favour of a dark night, might very well get over with their oars; but if when out they should be favoured by an air too light for our cruisers to pursue with effect, the enemy might derive some assistance from their sails.

“ that of *Egypt*, to which the preparations had served as a
 “ feint.”

“ The preparations for the invasion have already demon-
 “ strated to *France* what *England* ought never have suf-
 “ fered her to know, which is, that she can hold the *Eng-*
 “ *lish* government in terror, and the whole country in
 “ alarm, whenever she pleases, and as long as she pleases,
 “ and that without employing a single ship of the line, and
 “ more effectually than if she had a hundred sail. The
 “ boasted navy of *England* is out-done by gun-boats ! It is
 “ a revolution in naval tactics ; but we live in an age of re-
 “ volutions.” What a satire is here on *the faction behind*
the throne, and their ministers, for not restoring *the mili-*
tary branch of the constitution ; and putting an end to
 this expensive terror !

These quotations will show that my reasonings in Octo-
 ber 1803, in consequence of the whole of the Low Countries
 having become *French*, were not without such foundations
 as ought to impress upon the mind of every *Englishman*,
 how essential it is to our existence as a state, that our
 powers of defence shall be commensurate to our danger ; to
 which end nothing is wanting, no contrivance of genius, no
 invention, nothing which plain sense cannot point out, and
 common honesty execute ; nothing indeed but the perform-
 ance of an obvious duty on the part of parliament and mi-
 nisters, the wilful neglect of which, as it may involve the
 overthrow of the constitution and the utter ruin of our coun-
 try, I need not characterize. The danger to be apprehend-
 ed by this country from the hostility of *Belgium* in potent
 hands, was, so early as the reign of Henry VII. foreseen by
 the Lord Chancellor *Morton*, who deprecates “ the increase-
 “ ment of the greatness of *France*, by the addition of such
 “ a country, *which stretches its boughs into our seas.*” He
 is quoted by the great Lord *Bacon* ; and about forty years ago
 Lord *Lyttelton*, after commenting on the passage, adds,

“ The present state of the *Dutch* and the *Austrian Nether-*
 “ *lands* is not such as will absolutely remove that fear from
 “ any thinking man*.”

And Sir *William Temple* draws for this nation the most melancholy presages, should those countries, with which he was so well acquainted, ever fall under the dominion of *France*. In a letter to his brother, Sir *John Temple*, dated *Brussels*, October 10, N. S. 1667, he says, “ If the *French*
 “ shall carry *Flanders*, as they very well may in another
 “ campaign, by the weakness and disorders in the govern-
 “ ment here, the *Dutch* are sensible that they must fall to
 “ be a maritime province to *France*, upon the best terms
 “ they can; and what a condition *England* will be left in
 “ by such an accession of maritime forces, as well as pro-
 “ vinces, to such a power as *France* is already, is but too
 “ easy, and too melancholy a reflection†.” And most assuredly this event, which has in our day taken place, while a man born for empire and for revolutions has also risen to the *French* throne, will put the seal of extinction on the existence of our state, unless the government of *England* shall wholly abandon, as speedily as possible, those dangerous principles of national defence which belong only to despotic states, and by which, as we now with deep anxiety witness, not even such states can be saved in the day of trial. Do we not remember the *Hanoverian* proclamation on the eve of the *French* irruption, for the population to rise in arms? And what did it avail? Do we not remember the proclamation of the Emperor of *Germany* to his *Belgic* subjects, on the eve of a similar irruption from *France*? But what effect did it produce? Have we not again recently heard of attempts at a *levee en masse* in *Hungary*? But

* Life of Hen. II. v. 3, p. 11, published in 1767.

† Ib. II. 43.

with what better success? Had any of these nations possessed real political liberty, must not the *French* have exterminated, to have conquered, them? But, alas! the subjects of an arbitrary monarch *have not a country*, in the political, the majestic sense of that word; and no such monarch, until inspired with the god-like idea of imparting to his people political liberty, can give them a regular, organized, *prepared* system equivalent to the *County Power* of *England*, (existing to this day as an essential part of the constitution and common law of the land, although traiterously neglected by those whose duty it has been to keep it in constant vigour and exercise) by which, in time of need, he can depend on having at his call a *levee en masse*. Little does it import an *Hungarian* or a *Bohemian* peasant of what sovereign, or of what subordinate lord, he is the slave. In the day of extremity, it is not the bodies of reluctant slaves, but the minds, the hearts, the souls of freemen that form the impregnable rampart of a throne. Nor is this all. In arbitrary and in free states respectively, the whole system of defence is essentially different; the organization, and machinery, is correspondent to the principle of the government. One is radically weak: the other inherently strong. Had *Austria*, *Moravia*, *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, and the *Venetian* states, been free nations under one sovereign, with a population furnishing many MILLIONS of valiant men to draw the sword, under such an *organization* as the *English* militia under ALFRED, explained in my first volume, those countries would have been at this moment in peace and security? *Napoleon*, who by mere dint of superior science, talent, and experience, has prevailed against mere mercenary armies, where there has been no material disparity of numbers on either side, would not have been quite so rash, as to have led his *army of mercenary soldiers* into the interior of a country, where in ten days time they must inevitably have laid down their arms to their encircling enemy, or have been

given to slaughter. It is of a piece with the stupid policy of despotism to imagine, that a *levee en masse*, or an armed, orderly, and effective rising of the population of a country for defence against armies of veterans, led on by able generals, *can* take place in an enslaved country at the word of command in a moment of danger. It can only be the effect of *system* interwoven into the general law of the nation, of *established freedom*, of *constant arms-bearing*, and *habitual training*. And the framers of our *Acts for General Defence* must permit me to tell them, that a temporary *paper system*, without all the rest, will in the hour of “ actual invasion, or on the appearance of the enemy in force upon the coast*,” be as little availing as a *Hanoverian*, *Belgic*, or *Hungarian* proclamation.

When I call on our government to abandon erroneous principles of defence, it is with my eye full upon their *Acts for General Defence* †. I would to God I could forget them ! For my country’s sake, for my country’s honour, I wish them obliterated from the statute book, to make way for a law more congenial with the constitution ; that is, a statute simply declaratory of that system of defence which has in fact been law for more than a thousand years, and for giving that system life and effect. While *Napoleon* is occupied in new-modelling continental despotisms, stripping emperors, and creating kings, happy would it be for *England* would she employ the leisure afforded her, in fortifying her own freedom, by restoring *the military branch of her own constitution* ‡.

On the subject of these statutes for General Defence, I

* 43 Geo. III. c. 96; § 44.

† 43 Geo. III. c. 55. 96. 120.

‡ Great events succeed so rapidly, that unless we had learned to print as fast as we write, we cannot keep pace with them. By the time this volume can be published, *Napoleon* may be executing new designs.

have already made known to the public some of my thoughts both in my first volume, (p. 6 and 93) and in the present ; and enough to show their unconstitutional nature, and ill tendency : to ministers I submitted in manuscript further objections ; and although I could not but judge of their motives by their actions, yet, hoping the general reasoning of my book, grounded on the clearest principles of the constitution, might prevail with them to act as became statesmen in a free country, I thought it right, until their conduct should prove the contrary, to attribute the defects I saw in their statutes to a want of leisure ; and even to a prudent care not to reform our military system with *too hasty a hand** : but two full years of silence, and of neglect to propose any amendment of their plan, having convinced me that my original opinion was but too well founded, I now think it my duty, not only to make public what in December 1803 I sent them privately in manuscript, but to offer further remarks. The manuscript was as follows :

“ Private Supplement to the *Ægis*, submitted to the consideration of his Majesty’s Ministers, by the author †.”

The writer’s publication sufficiently explaining what he conceives to be the true system of defence for *England*, as actually *prescribed by her constitution*, and as *essential to her freedom*, he has, on the present occasion, only to offer such thoughts on the system now acting upon, as, from respect to his majesty’s ministers, and other considerations of propriety, he chose not to communicate through the medium of the press ‡.

* First Vol. Pref. xviii.

† Sent, together with a printed copy of the *Ægis*, to six cabinet ministers, one each.

‡ A silence of full two years cannot have betrayed any rude impatience on the part of the author ; nor any particular eagerness to find fault ; especially when it is considered that the substance of the system given in *England’s Ægis* was published near seven years ago.

Meaning neither to flatter nor to offend, but simply to express his thoughts on a subject too momentous for either hollow compliment or frivolous criticism, he hopes what he has to say will meet with a candid hearing; and, if it shall appear that a plan adopted while those who framed it were burdened with the toil and care of government, at a crisis of unparalleled difficulty, shall have material imperfections, he trusts that its authors will be ready to amend it, on those imperfections being pointed out.

These observations being supplementary to what he has said in his book, he thinks it may contribute to perspicuity if he keep in his eye the same arrangement of his matter, as he did in the *Ægis*, while commenting upon the Acts of Parliament for arming the English Population.

First, then, the writer imagines, that, in the circumstance of the present system of defence having been made *temporary* only, he sees the effect of a mere temporary caution; not intended to be persevered in. It might, by ministers, have been thought that to have enforced all at once a general and permanent arms-bearing, together with the discipline properly attending it, how constitutional soever such a measure might be, would have savoured of a severity that might not have been acceptable to a people, whose habits had not been in unison with such a regimen; and on this account perhaps it was judged best, not to give permanency to the system, until experience had shown how easy must be the duty of each individual citizen when the great mass should be armed; especially in time of peace; as well as to defer it until means had been taken to impress upon the

Seeing no more prospect under this second administration of Mr. Pitt than before of a system of defence such as can be relied on, and seeing at the same time (notwithstanding our late victories on the ocean) our danger from invasion every year increasing more and more, were he longer to suppress what, he thinks, would be to desert what he esteems his duty, and to betray a criminal indifference to the fate of his country,

public mind, the many benefits resulting from a constitutional arming.

He hopes that such was at the time the reasoning of his majesty's ministers; and he believes that all difficulties, in the way of completely restoring the military branch of the constitution, are already removed.

Contemplating the peculiar domestic situation of our country, while the human mind throughout *Europe* is in a state of commotion; contemplating also that country, as borne down with the weight of its debt and taxes, and as assailed by the gigantic military despotism of *France*, the writer feels that no ordinary vigour is required in our statesmen; but, still more, that all the energies of our constitution ought to be reinvigorated, cherished, and wrought up to their highest capabilities. He cannot imagine that ministers, at such a crisis, can hope to conduct the government with success, without rising above the crooked wisdom of ordinary courtiers; or without totally discarding, as the bane of their country, the deadly *policy* of "*the three last centuries**, " by which the military branch of our constitution has been gradually, but uniformly undermined, with a view of establishing in its place, the system of governing by a standing army.

Should the present very limited arms-bearing of the civil state melt away again at the first return of peace, as it inevitably must if not perpetuated by a legislative act, what would in that case be our situation?—Identified, as in effect what we now call a militia is, with the regular army, should we not be in the condition described by *Aristotle*, who says that "those who command the arms in a country are mas-

* See a Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force in England, by Lord *Hawkesbury*, now Earl of *Liverpool*, first published in 1757; and republished, but *not* by his Lordship, in 1794. Page 65.

“ters of the state, and can make what revolutions they please?” And should we not have practical evidence of the truth of Mr. *Arthur Young*’s observation, that “where government only is armed, there despotism is established.”

To imagine that, to place *England* at the termination of the war in the same state of subjugation to the sword of despotic power, which in *France* we contemplate with so much disgust and horror, was, by the framers of the Acts for General Defence, premeditated and intended, would be ungenerously to impute to them an impiety towards their country, which words are too weak to express. No: the writer trusts they are free from the Corsican taint; that the political conduct of a *Bonaparte* towards his country, will not be chosen for their model; and, consequently, that they will take the proper steps for averting from *England*, that consummation of national evil, a military government.

Secondly; in addition to what is said in the *Ægis*, on the subject of *Volunteer Services*, the writer cannot but think that substituting this novelty in place of the constitutional practice of former times, is undignified, and savours too much of the tricking character of modern recruiting. In the original, from which this feature was copied, it is easy to detect an insidious design, under this affectation of popularity*. But when this invitation of volunteer services is accompanied with a threat of compulsion, surely the majesty of the constitution, which knows no such policy, and needs no such arts, is not duly respected!

Thirdly; the idea of utility, in the introduction of a condition, that Volunteers should be liable to march to any part of the kingdom, could only arise out of the radical imperfections of the system; as it is presumed must appear from

* The original here referred to was the system of the Volunteer Yeomanry of Mr. *Pitt* and Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Mcville*).

a perusal of the *Ægis*. The introduction of such a condition is a broad acknowledgement, that, under the adopted system of defence, our country is still exposed to the dreadful calamity, of being made the seat of a bloody and doubtful war. THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION MAKES SUCH AN EVENT IMPOSSIBLE.—The Writer, therefore, beseeches those whom he has now the honour to address, duly to reflect on an alternative, on which may hang not only the comforts, the property and lives of thousands, and tens of thousands, but the very destiny of the state.

In arming according to the constitution, no such condition is necessary. Every man would see that, unless a miracle took place, he never could be called upon for more than to march to the nearest coast to defend his own immediate fire-side, to which, if he survived, he must speedily return. The present condition, from its own nature must be, and the Writer knows it is, contemplated with great dissatisfaction, by persons of the greatest loyalty and patriotism. The extreme personal inconvenience with which the condition is big, and the distress, and even ruin, it might produce to very many virtuous volunteers, are so obvious they need not to be described.

Fourthly; the Writer confesses that he cannot even name one necessary consequence of the present system of arming —that of volunteers being, in a very large proportion, at the expiration of the war, again *disarmed*, without the deepest emotion. He blushes for those Englishmen who can endure the thought.

As soon as the hateful tyranny of the curfew had abated, and while yet the *Norman* notions of government ran high, every Englishman as observed in the *Ægis* was *armed*; every Englishman's arms were *his own*, whether he were, or were not, a feudal tenant; his arms were kept in his *own house*; “two times a year,” to the *property* and the *posses-*

sion he was sworn; nay, when all other goods and moveables were seizable for a debt, his military "horse and harness" were sacred even from the touch of the Sheriff*.

Under the *Tudors*, again, the lowest servant, if he received wages, was to find arms, or his master was to provide them, and to abate his wages for the payment.—Is it then, under a prince of the house of *Brunswick*, and when the nation is struggling for its political existence, that an *English People*, for the first time since the curfew, are to be armed with the same jealousy as if they were *Jamaica Negroes* †? If his majesty's ministers have in their veins one drop of *English* blood, they will be impatient to wipe from the once-manly face of *England* so foul a stain! Meaning to save the state by the native courage of its people, it will be their study not to debase, but to exalt the public mind, and to cause the nation to glory in its freedom, while it draws the sword in its defence. Claiming to be conversant with the science of just dominion, to be familiar with the generous maxims of the *English* Constitution, to feel (if it may be so expressed) the magnanimity and the intrinsic wisdom, of a government of *all by all*; which at once secures authority to the Prince and freedom to the People; they will not degrade themselves to a level with the agents of despotic power, who know not how to reconcile the rights and interests of the throne and the cottage, nor how to support the authority of the sovereign, without reducing the subject to a slave.

The Writer, equally aware of the fears, of the ignorance, of the prejudice, and of the settled hostility to freedom, that he had to guard against, was careful to render, if possible, what he had to say in the *Ægis*, on the subject of arming, perfectly unexceptionable; and he trusts it will bear examination, as a feature in a system of defence which must afford equal security to all interests in the state.

* 13 Ed. I. St. 1. c. 39.

† See the remarks at the end of this supplement.

Under the *Fifth* head, the writer having nothing new to add, he proceeds to the

Sixth. On the liability of persons in the *civil* state to be impressed, and draughted into the ranks of the mercenary troops, it is almost as difficult to speak without warmth, as on a preceeding article.

Accustomed to contemplate the character of a mercenary standing army, as drawn by the pens of historians, statesmen, and philosophers; and alive to the jealousy with which such a military force has ever been viewed by the most enlightened men of our country, the Writer's feelings, he confesses, received no common shock, on reading the speech of Mr. *Sheridan*, delivered on the fourth of August 1803, wherein, speaking of those who might not be volunteers to serve under the act of 43 Geo. III. c. 96, and in terms equally applicable to *unaccepted volunteers*, he told us, "There was no noble-
" *man or gentleman*, he was certain, who would like to be
" compelled to march to *Cornwal* or to *Scotland*, to asso-
" ciate with the common soldiers in the day-time, and to
" sleep in the same tent with five of them in the night; yet
" *that must be the case*, if they were compelled to go ac-
" cording to the act. No gentleman could take upon him
" to say that that would not be the case within a month;" and when the writer found this to be a true interpretation of the statute, he was perfectly stunned with astonishment.

When through the rapid approach of a mighty danger, or the resistless power of necessity, men are hurried into action before they have had time to form "distinct ideas" on all that is to be done, considerable errors may be no cause of either surprise, or of censure; but when a conclusion is really monstrous, it is much that its deformity, independent of any reasoning, does not beget a conviction of unsoundness in the premises. Monstrous and shocking things, it is true, may be justified by necessity; as a part of a crew being thrown overboard, to preserve the lives of the remainder;

or some being killed and eaten, that all may not perish ; but we could not approve of that conduct, in victualling the ship, or in appointing her destination, which had *produced* the cruel necessity.

If any reader of the *Ægis* shall not be convinced, that, to “ restore to full vigour and energy” THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, must effectually prevent the necessity of any such alternative to “ *a nobleman or gentleman,*” as that we are speaking of, those pages have been written to little purpose. Sir *William Jones*, who is careful to recommend it to us to form a “ distinct idea” of the *posse comitatus*, observes, that “ it includes the whole “ *civil* state, from the duke to the peasant ; while the *military* state, as such, forms no part of that power, being “ under a different command and subject to a different law.” He has also proved that the *posse* “ *is required by law* to be equal in its exertion to a well disciplined army ;” and we know that, for ages and centuries prior to the existence in this country of a standing army, or of despotic articles of war framed independent of parliament, the constitution saw no necessity for putting Englishmen out of the pale of the *common law of the land*, as a prelude to their fighting for their *laws and liberties* ; and the writer trusts he has given ample proof, that there is no more need to subject either nobleman, gentleman, or peasant, to a military conscription as a private soldier into the ranks of a mercenary army on a march “ *to Cornwall or to Scotland,*” than there can be to force them into those ranks, on an expedition *to China, or to Terra del Feugo.*

Seventhly. Discretionary and suspending powers are so essential to military operations, and in many cases also to a beneficial civil administration, that, unless we are upon our guard, and careful to discriminate, we shall be liable to introduce those powers where they ought to have no place.

Accordingly, as any point of our coast should be invaded by an army of one thousand, of ten thousand, or of one hundred thousand men, it is evident there ought to exist a *discretion* of calling into the field to oppose the enemy a suitable proportion, and no more, of the *posse comitatus*: but no man can admit that, whether there shall, or shall not, exist a *posse comitatus* itself—a thing vital to the *English* constitution and to *English* freedom and essential to the safety of our country—ought to be left to the *discretion* of the crown. So far, then, as the statute in question is a revival of the *posse comitatus*, the crown ought to have, no power of suspending it. Such a power in the act is either its own strong condemnation, as a hasty and crude measure, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution; or it is an unconstitutional feature, introduced in consequence of a contracted and mistaken view of the subject. Such an application of the principle of arming, as ought to satisfy rank and property of their security, is consistent with wisdom; and this has been attempted in the *Ægis*; but we must not subvert the constitution in compliment to the silly fears of nobles, who are too idle to study it; or to the ignorant apprehensions of men who care for nothing but their wealth. The Writer trusts he has so treated this point, as must preclude the possibility of supporting a sound objection to a permanent arming of our population.

Considering the disgraceful negligence which has been shown THE MILITARY BRANCH OF OUR CONSTITUTION, it is no wonder that it is become a *terra incognita*, towards which the timid children of wealth and rank are afraid to navigate; but it is by the absence of “distinct ideas” on its nature and character,—it is by forgetting that the perfection of defensive strength lies in the perfection of political liberty,—it is by not recollecting that our free *Saxon* militia wholly rests on *civil* foundations, and that arms-bearing is the *civil duty* of every citizen,—and it is from not having contemplated our system of *posse comitatus* as holding

over every other defensive military system of human invention a glorious pre-eminence,—it is from such errors, that, when men even intend right, they act wrong; and that while they are animating us to fight for our “property, our rights and independence,” they themselves (unwittingly we trust) pursue a course which leads to the squandering of our money, wounding our constitution, and undermining our freedom.

Of *discretionary* powers, and the power of *suspending* laws, the most wise and the most virtuous have ever been the most jealous. On this point might be quoted, amongst many others, the late Sir *W. Jones*, the late Lord *Camden*, Lord *Coke*, &c. &c. and the exercises of *discretion* in a minister not many years ago, towards noblemen of the highest rank and character, on offering military services; and of a Lord of the Bedchamber, towards a gentleman now of his majesty’s privy council, were not calculated to recommend the unnecessary existence of such a power in any man’s hands.

Eighthly. Notwithstanding all the authorities in support of the *driving* system, it appears to the writer so inapplicable to *England*, so UNMILITARY, and fraught with evils of such magnitude, that he earnestly recommends a mature reconsideration of it, by men who are both soldiers and constitutional statesmen.

Ninthly, and lastly. On the adopted system of defence, as we see it carrying into execution, are we, or can we be, secure against our country becoming *the seat of war*? To the writer, the reverse is most apparent; and if the latent, suspended, powers of the system shall not be called forth until the danger be imminent, or the enemy be in the country, consequences the most fatal, in his judgment, may ensue.

While on those parts of the home coast, which may be considered as the immediate outposts to *London*, we are extensively fortifying, and occupying every inch of ground, as though that city were already besieged; the coasts of whole

counties more distant, and indeed a very large proportion of the shores of our island, are, and must necessarily be, completely open to the entrance of invaders in any number.

Although the *French* armies on the adverse shores be ever so formidable, yet, if there be no means of transporting hither any but an insignificant force, why such anxiety of preparation along the coasts of *Essex*, *Kent*, and *Sussex*? And why employ on the *North Sea* station alone, a fleet of four-score vessels, great and small, to watch the enemy's motions*? But if he have both a large army and means of transport, can you make him relinquish the war, by merely keeping *London* out of his hands? Were it a small matter that he should pour into *Lincolnshire*, or any more distant county, an army with which he could maintain the war upon your own soil?

Ministers, no doubt, have consulted military men: But, if we are to judge from the measures actually adopted, they have not, as it should seem, put to them, in the first instance, the right question. The first question is not—‘*With what force will you answer for the safety of the country?*’ but—‘*How shall we effectually prevent the country becoming the seat of war?*’ Between the two different results of these two questions, in true constitutional policy, **THE DISTANCE IS IMMEASURABLY GREAT.**

To the question which ought to have the precedency, the answer of a military man, if he know any thing of the constitution, will be, ‘*Restore the posse comitatus*, for ‘**THE PEOPLE IN ARMS** is the only possible fortification of ‘a great country against successful invasion.’—But if the other question be put to him, and if he be not versed in the military energies of the constitution, his answer will probably be merely *professional*. When a statesman applies to a professional soldier, for his opinion on the force necessary to the safety of the country, in what sense is he likely to

* Written in 1803.

understand the latter words of the question? Will he not take those words to mean, the ultimate safety from *conquest*, as a *final result* of the military operations on both sides which enter into his contemplation? He *calculates* the enemy's aggregate force; he *calculates* the separate armies that the enemy may possibly get into the country at different points; he *calculates* the strength that must at all times, and at all events, be kept in and near the capital, *Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. &c.* He then *calculates* the distances to be marched, and the time required for concentrating an army, or armies, to meet the invaders; and, considering the rapid foe with whom he has to deal, he probably *calculates* various successes of the enemy before he can be materially checked; and then, contemplating all that is in the power of masterly generalship to effect, how long the war may be spun out, and bestowing a thought or two on that great disconcerter of plans, *the chance of war*, he delivers his opinion on the force necessary to *the safety of the country*.

A professional soldier may not think it is *his* business to take into the account, the counties that may be desolated, the villages and towns that may be sacked and given to the flames, the thousands that may be slaughtered, nor the unspeakable miseries of an *English country overrun by a French soldiery, sent hither for the very purpose of destroying all the sources of our opulence and power*. These calculations he may leave to the statesman; while he himself, in his own imagination, *begins to desolate*, in order to distress the enemy; who, in return, puts to the sword man, woman, and child, *in terrorem*, in order to secure his subsistence.

The *driving system*, which is equally disgraceful, and UNMILITARY in a free country, is already proclaimed (by act of parliament) 'To be a feature of our system of general defence;' and if carried into execution, as enacted by statute, may first carry desolation into the heart of the kingdom, and then extend it in every direction. By this pro-

vision, as well as from the suspension of arming that has already taken place, before we are prepared to stop a single battalion that should land in *Lincolnshire*, or other counties, from penetrating to the very centre of the kingdom, we have full evidence that it is intended we shall defend our country upon the *Fabian* system.—HANNIBAL MAINTAINED THE WAR IN ITALY FOR FIFTEEN YEARS: and when a *Massena*, a *Berthier*, or a *Bonaparte*, may have got footing in *England* with a considerable army, perhaps we shall not easily find an *English* general that can *calculate* him out again; nor a statesman who, in the whirlwind that may arise, can insure the state for six months.

THE CONSTITUTION, when all is at stake,—when every thing that constitutes the greatness and happiness of a nation is at hazard, does not *calculate*: But, calling forth the whole physical strength of the country, kept always in a state of complete preparation for orderly action, it crushes invasion in the bud, if an enemy should be so mad as to make the attempt, and effectually protects the people from the unspeakable calamities and horrors of having their country THE SEAT OF WAR. If the military *calculator*, when he shall have expelled the invaders, is finally to restore in *safety* to his sovereign,—not the *England* we now see and enjoy, but a frightful, depopulated desert, with a remnant of population sunk to the extreme of human misery, what must be the reflections of those statesman (if they survive) who consented to dispense with the *constitutional*, and to adopt the *Fabian*, system of defence!

Here the writer desires to set before the eyes of his majesty's ministers a picture of their own drawing, in a little pamphlet entitled, "*Important Considerations for the People of this Kingdom*,"—and which in great numbers they have "sent to the officiating minister of every parish in *England*." It is therein set forth, that

"There is no country, into which the *French* have been able to enter, where their footsteps have not been marked

with blood ; where they have spared either high or low, rich or poor, sex or age ; where terror has not been their forerunner, and where desolation and misery have not marched in their rear. In *Italy*, the churches were given up to indiscriminate plunder and defilement ; for the laws were substituted *French* mandates, and military execution ; property was devoured by enormous contributions ; nor did they spare public funds or charities, or schools, or hospitals for the benefit of the poor, the aged and the helpless ; towns and villages were given up to fire and sword, and the inhabitants were exposed to pillage and murder, by the rapacious and inhuman soldiers, who were ordered to shoot every one who resisted."

" In *Egypt*, almost all the inhabitants of the populous city of *Alexandria* were massacred ; men and women, old and young, and even babes at the breast."

" At *Jaffa*, *Bonaparte* also massacred three thousand eight hundred prisoners in cold blood, and even poisoned five hundred and eighty of his own sick and wounded soldiers."

" In *Holland*, the palaces were seized on, the cottages soon followed ; the merchant, the manufacturer, the farmer, the tradesman, were sunk in one common ruin."

" In *Switzerland*, when she had complied with every thing that *France* demanded, and had nothing more to yield, an armistice was broke, and the country was invaded by an army it had not means to resist ; hundreds and thousands perished by the sabres of the *French* ; and while the earth was strewed with their dead bodies, and while the flames ascended from the once-happy dwellings of this valiant and innocent people, the hard-earned and long-preserved liberties of *Switzerland* expired."

" In *Germany*, no sooner had the *French* become masters of the country, than they spread themselves over it like beasts of prey, devouring and destroying every thing before them. They spared neither cities nor towns ; nei-

ther villages, nor hamlets, nor solitary houses. They plundered all, high or low, they rifled the pockets and chests of the inhabitants, cut open their beds, and searched graves and coffins for secreted coin; and they even wrung from the people a discovery of their pittance of ready money, by *torture*. Grey hairs and lisping infancy, the sick, the dying, women in child-bed, were alike exposed to inhuman treatment. Teams, and flocks, and cattle were driven off or destroyed; stacks were burnt; furniture and utensils of all kinds demolished.

“Towards women, of all ages and all conditions, they were guilty of brutality never before heard of; neither extreme youth nor extreme age; neither weakness nor deformity, nor disease; neither the pangs of labour, nor the agonies of death, could restrain them; shrieks, tears, supplications were of no avail; and where fathers, husbands, or brothers interfered, murder seldom failed to close the horrible scene.”

“WE are one of those nations, we are the people whom they are preparing to invade: Awful, indeed, is the warning, and, *if we despise it*, tremendous will be the judgment.—The robberies, the barbarities, the brutalities, they have committed in other countries, though, at the thought of them, the heart sinks, and the blood runs cold, will be MERE TRIFLES TO WHAT THEY WILL COMMIT HERE. They have long entertained against us a hatred engendered by the mixture of envy and fear; and they are now about to make a great and desperate effort to gratify this furious, this unquenchable, this deadly hatred. What, then, can we expect at their hands?—What, but torments even surpassing those which they have inflicted on other nations.”

Can *English* ministers tell the people all this, and yet leave the greater part of their country wholly open to invasion? Can they tell them all this, and yet, by suspending their own act of parliament for general defence,

invite the war into the bowels of the kingdom? Can they tell them all this, and yet deny them the only security in nature, against experiencing such miseries and such horrors, by neglecting “to restore to full vigour and energy”

THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION?

To these expostulations with *English* ministers in favour of the *English* constitution, and to my former remarks, I have now a few more observations to add.—It is manifest that what Lord *Liverpool* calls the, “detestable policy” of the reigns of *Charles* the Second and *James* the Second “to disarm the people*,” which he likewise shows to have been the prevailing policy of the “three last centuries†,” is at the bottom of this arming for general defence; since, like all the volunteer and yeomanry institutions, which took place towards the end of the *American* war, and have from the pressure of necessity been again resorted to at any time since, these statutes have continuance only “during the present war;” at the expiration of which it is of course intended that the country shall return into the keeping of the standing army, and a mangled body of forces, partaking now much more of the character of mercenaries than of a militia; notwithstanding it must long have been evident to the dullest understanding, that, so long as *France* shall be in possession of all those counties “which stretch their boughs into our seas,” to deprive ourselves even for a single moment, whether in war or in peace, of the means of an armed, orderly, and effective rising of our population for defence, would be THE HEIGHT OF MADNESS: and when I

* Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, 1794, p. 8. First published in 1757.

† Ib. 65. “Arbitrary princes have for these three last centuries neglected their militias, and for their own views rendered them purposely useless and undisciplined.”

see ministers, in all this extremity of our danger, pertinaciously clinging to a system which leaves us no alternative but a conquest by *France*, or a military despotism in such hands as theirs; and the press teeming with attempts to the same end; I cannot but denounce such conduct as the HEIGHT OF TREASON: for as Lord *Liverpool* well observes, in his excellent treatise, already quoted, “certain it is, that any number of troops [meaning mercenaries] which will be sufficient to repel the strength of *France*, will have the power, if they should have the inclination, to enslave us.” I must however go one step further than his lordship, by observing, that the *existence* of such a number of mercenary troops in *England* would be evidence of her having been *already enslaved*.

Ministers tell us, ‘it is also expedient to enable his majesty more effectually and speedily to exercise his ancient and undoubted prerogative of requiring the military service of *all* his liege subjects in case of an invasion of the realm by a foreign enemy.’ Then, combining together the doctrine of prerogative here laid down, the discretion claimed for the king, that is, the ministers, and the practice of ministers since this discretion was given, we shall see what havoc is made of the constitution, and may be made of his majesty’s ‘liege subjects,’ under their system, ‘*All men*,’ from 17 to 55, are to be ‘enrolled,’ if not otherwise serving or incapable; ministers at their discretion may order them to be armed, or trained to arms, or *neither*; but ‘in case of invasion or the appearance of an enemy in force’—‘all the men enrolled’—take notice,—‘all the men enrolled,’ whether they have been *trained*, or *not*, or whether they have been even *armed*, or *not*, may instantly be placed in such of the ‘existing regiments’ as are serving in *Great Britain*; or may be formed into ‘new regiments’—as ministers ‘shall judge necessary’—and ‘be led into any part of *Great Britain* for the repelling and prevention

‘ of any such invasion ;’—that is to say, should we be shortly invaded by those veteran troops whom the well-armed and well-disciplined regular armies of *Austria* and *Russia* have not been able to resist, those men who by the constitution and common law of the land, independent of the new system, it has been *the duty of ministers to see at all times armed and trained to arms, but which duty they have not performed*, may, at the discretion of *such* ministers, be led—even forced if a wise minister pleases into ‘ *new regiments*,’—and in perfect ignorance of the use of arms, to oppose *such* invaders ; and should those men when exposed to so unequal a combat quit their ranks, they may suffer death by ‘ the articles of war !!!’ And when the awful tide of war, after overwhelming in its eastern course a mighty empire, shall return westward, rolling towards our shores, and bringing with it ‘ actual invasion,’ or presenting ‘ the appearance of the enemy in force upon the coast,’ what can such statesmen do, but fill the ranks with the ‘ enrolled,’ trained or untrained ; effecting the *deliverance* of *England* as they have already effected “ the *deliverance* of *Europe* ?”

Again ; although it suited my last argument to quote the ministerial system no further than the operative words corresponding with the title, yet the objects for which those operative words say the ‘ enrolled’ men may, at the *discretion* of ministers, ‘ be led to any part of *Great Britain*,’ are more extensive than I have yet shown ; for those objects are declared to be ‘ for the repelling and prevention of ‘ any such *invasion*, or for the suppression of any *rebellion* ‘ or *insurrection* within *Great Britain* arising or existing ‘ at the time of any such *invasion*.’

Could the wisdom of *Alfred*, and his fidelity and piety towards the liberties of his country, have made any impression on the minds of those who framed this system, they

must have seen in his system of defence, the utter *impossibility* either of successful *invasion*, *rebellion*, or *insurrection*; whereas *their own* system, as proved by the internal evidence of its provisions, and by the external evidence of its never having caused *Napoleon* for one moment to relax in his preparations, is likely to be the very *cause* of invasion; and I have moreover pointed out, how it is likely from its wretched insufficiency even to *generate* the other evils here spoken of. In this apprehension I find myself confirmed by the opinion of the Duke of *Richmond*, who says, “unless the most vigorous means are *before-hand* taken for this purpose, the confusion and mischief that will arise, will of itself, and without the interference of the enemy, be sufficient to ruin the country. For we may be sure that, besides too many ill-disposed persons who will be glad to avail themselves of the first opportunity of adding to the distresses of government, there are thousands in all parts of the country, who, for the sake of mere plunder, will commit all sorts of depredations, if there be not left a very strong force to resist them*.” And have we not other dangers of a frightful magnitude allied to these, which were touched upon in my speech of the 22d of October, 1803?

Lord *Liverpool*, in his Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, p. 81 †, observes that “when this island was frequently plundered, and almost conquered by the *Danes*, the perfidious invaders of ancient times, the cause of it was, that a proper attention had not been paid to the discipline of the *Saxon Militia*; and it is recorded among the wise institutions of the virtuous *Alfred*, that by new regulations he brought back

* Thoughts on National Defence, 77.

† Ed. 1794.

“ this once martial body to its first state of perfection, and
 “ thereby relieved his kingdom from the fury of *Danish*
 “ incursions.”

In this statement his lordship is not quite correct, nor does entire justice to him of whom he speaks. It was principally, because the power of armed society among the free *Saxons* never had been reduced to such a *system* for its exercise, as to become one of the most excellent parts in the frame of *civil* government, and a perfect safeguard against invasion, but for want of regularity of discipline, fell lamentably short of the effects it was capable of producing, that it stood in need of improvement. This imperfection having been discovered by the discerning mind of *Alfred*, it was not his object to *restore* it to what it had at any time been, but to *improve* it, by adding to its natural force, the great advantage of a systematic discipline; and this he did “ by a beautiful, refined, yet simple mechanism*.” His regulations, which were wholly *new*, applied, and were limited, to the population of each county; from which circumstance it was that, in the *Norman* times, the militia organized on *Alfred's* plan obtained the name of *posse comitatus*, or *county power*. “ Thus,” says *Rapin*, “ the householders being *responsible* for their “ families, the tithing for the householders, the hundred for “ the tithings, and the county for the hundreds, every one “ was watchful over his neighbour's actions†.” Hence this system had among our *Saxon* ancestors the title of *Frank-pledge*.

- It is this true species of *English* militia, (which did not receive such an organization till all the *Saxon* kingdoms were swallowed up in the sole kingdom of *England*,) that forms the key-stone of the community, or the connecting link between the *civil* and *military* parts of the constitution.

* Appeal, iv.

+ I. 95.

Under its other title of *posse comitatus*, this very militia has ever since existed, and does so at this moment, and, to use the words of Sir *William Jones*, “ includes the whole *civil* state, “ from the duke to the peasant *.” The members of it, in their *civil* capacity, are *pledges* for the order and tranquillity of the realm, equally ready with their “ weapons to keep the peace †,” at all times and in all places to watch the motions of strangers, to apprehend offenders, or to keep quiet the turbulent; as, in their *military* capacity, they are equally, at the instant call of the crown, to put down insurrection, to crush rebellion, or to repel invasion. This, I say, is the constitution and common law of the land. We know that the members of the *posse* are punishable for neglect of duty, and that in our own time they have been repeatedly punished, when, having failed to prevent the mischief done by rioters (as at *London* in 1780, and at *Birmingham* in 1794, &c.) they have been made to pay the damage. Nor can it be doubted that ministers are constitutionally punishable, for resorting to other, and inefficient, and most pernicious means of keeping the peace and resisting invasion, while they purposely leave the *posse comitatus* in a state of incapacity for answering the ends of its institution. By a complete restoration of the *county power* “ to full vigour and energy ‡,” as urgently recommended by Sir *William Jones* above five and twenty years ago, ministers would have *prevented* any idea of either insurrection, rebellion, or invasion, as things utterly impossible of execution; which had been somewhat wiser than introducing a system with inadequate provisions for defence, thereby inviting and probably *causing* invasion when not prepared to resist it; an event which the language

* Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, &c. 14.

† Ib. 27. 2 Rd. III. c. 3.

‡ Ib. 36.

of their system pretty broadly intimates is *likely to produce* insurrection or rebellion.

The real effect which immediately ensued upon carrying into execution the military improvement of *Alfred*, although no more than what was natural, struck contemporary writers with astonishment, and by posterity has even been doubted, as savouring of something miraculous. The same miracle it is in the power of a wise minister and an honest parliament to work again whenever they please. Could *Alfred* have bequeathed to his successors so much only of his own wisdom, as merely not to have neglected his regulations for the militia, no *Dane* had ever again set hostile foot on *English* land, nor had a *Norman* government even poisoned with its pollutions the free constitution and common law of *England*.

By certain phrases in the introduction to the ministerial system, I think we see cause to believe, that the framers of it hoped to convey an idea, that they had duly attended to, and followed as their guide, the ancient constitutional system of defence; but the constitutional eye that shall compare their system with that, will instantly discover them to be of complexions as different as *Othello's* from *Desdemona's*. Not being acquainted with the rules for a *levée en masse* in *Hanover* or in *Hungary*, I cannot guess whether those rules (if any such exist) have been taken as their model; but having paid some attention to the true constitutional system of our own island, I can safely aver that they have not copied from *that*.

The ministerial system does not propose even to nip in the bud the mischief and miseries of invasion, by repelling it at the point of descent, or at half a dozen such points at once, as the revived *county power* would insure to us. Ministers cannot *intend* it should have that effect. On the contrary their system, for want of physical strength to resist, proposes to desolate our own coast and country wherever

an enemy approaches; and they make provision for our being marched to *Cornwal* or to *Scotland* to meet a landed enemy. But if one still more powerful meanwhile lands in *Sussex*, we may be counter-ordered thither, or to *Norfolk*, or any other part where the danger may be greatest; and, as if foreseeing the probability of insurrection, in consequence of the distractions arising from a system so insufficient and so goading, they find themselves called upon to prepare us for a march moreover to some unhappy scene of public confusion, even while the *French* armies may be on their march for *London*!

And why a system so empty of real security, and so big with mischief? Why, but to evade the prayer of Sir *William Jones*, that we may have “restored to full vigour and energy” the *posse comitatus*, which, being a part of the constitution, is *permanent*? In the eyes of such statesmen a *posse comitatus* must be ever hateful, because it supersedes the necessity of a standing army for *the police of England*; and because a free nation so long as it kept arms in its own hands never yet was enslaved. Of such ministers it ever must be the policy, be the danger into which they have brought their country ever so extreme, to arm the people only partially at their own *discretion*, and on a *temporary* plan, as they arm *Jamaica Negroes*.

But not to anticipate what I have further to say in its proper place on this ministerial system, let me repeat that about two months after transmitting my remarks from *Boston* to a secretary of state, I published the first volume of this work, copies of which the bookseller had orders to deliver, one to each of six cabinet ministers, to whom at the same time I sent, as already mentioned, additional observations in manuscript.

Considering that the Earl of *Liverpool*, and his son Lord *Hawkesbury*, have no small influence in the cabinet of our sovereign, we ought to feel no small surprise that they at

least should continue to partake of counsels so much at variance with the better knowledge and declared opinions of that noble earl, who, in 1757, told us “the militia act, which passed the 13th of *Charles II.* was in itself a vague and ill-concerted scheme; and the *detestable policy* of that and a subsequent reign, was to *disarm* the people *.

After having reasoned unanswerably against the admission of a standing army of such magnitude as to preponderate against a militia, he says, “Here indeed it may justly be replied, that these dangers are very far remote, and that we are not only secure at present from any apprehensions of this kind, but that we also possess a stock of *freedom* in reversion; since there is an heir to the crown [his present majesty] whom nature has adorned with virtues, peculiarly calculated to make the people of this country hereafter happy, and who will prolong for many years the *free spirit* of his grandfather’s government †.”

Now as the same noble author says of a “*British king*, it is his peculiar happiness, that, to do *good*, his power is *without bounds*;—to do *wrong* he has constitutionally *no power* ‡,” to whom, but to his lordship, who is probably the oldest confidential counsellor about the throne, can we apply to be informed by whose influence his majesty’s *boundless power of doing good*, from which we might reasonably have expected so much benefit, has been throughout the whole of his unfortunate reign so constantly counteracted, that either in respect of freedom or of prosperity, it has been a striking contrast to the reign of his grandfather?—By what pernicious counsels in particular it has been owing, that within the last fifteen years only, the national debt has been nearly *trebled*; the paupers of the kingdom have been

* Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, 8.

† Ib. 68.

‡ Ib. 39.

increased in number by near a *million*; that our country is left without an ally; that *France*, which in 1792 was a suitor in extreme humility for the King of *England's* mediation to preserve her new form of a mixed government, by averting the war with which she was then threatened, has, *by the rejection of that suit*, been raised to be the tyrant of the continent, and to a strength that, unless we resort to the genuine energies of our constitution for security, must ere long put an end to the existence of our state?

These counsels have, we know, been imputed to a *faction behind the throne*. It were to be wished the Earl of *Liverpool*, who, in the short "Discourse" I have quoted, has discovered no ordinary share of constitutional knowledge, judgment, and penetration, would unmask for us this faction, and mark the men who ought to be driven from the abused ear of their sovereign; and particularly those who at this awful crisis counteract the proper constitutional mode of defence, on which alone we can rely for our safety.—"One " could have wished," says his lordship, "that those persons, to whom we were indebted for so many wise regulations in the year 1688, had planned some new militia law, more capable of execution [than that of 13th " *Charles II.*] and more agreeable to *the temper of our constitution*."—And what so proper for wise and virtuous men to have done, as to have "restored to full vigour " and energy" THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF? "Liberty would then have rested "secure, whilst her own votaries held the sword, which "gave her protection*."

Who, I would ask, advised the clause in the act of 22 (III. c. 79, for encouraging volunteer services for de-

* Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, 9.

fence of our towns and coasts, “or for the general defence of the kingdom,” which permitted the existence of such “corps or companies” only “during the [then] present war?” By whose advice have all the yeomanry and volunteer corps, during the *Pitt* and *Melville*, the *Addington* and *Hawkesbury* administrations, had, like the NEGRO corps in *Jamaica*, in like manner only a *temporary* existence “during the present war,” when all those ministers, when all the law advisers of the crown, when every lawyer in the kingdom, and every *Englishman* who is decently acquainted with the laws of his country, perfectly well knew that every individual member of our “civil state, from the duke to the peasant,” was already a member of the *posse comitatus*, and, *as such*, was at all times, whether of war or of peace, bound to be armed, trained to the use of his arms, and ever ready at the call of the magistrate to keep the peace, to quell riot, to put down insurrection, to crush rebellion, or to repel invasion? By whose counsels is it that at this moment we are deprived of the benefit of *the military branch of our constitution*; so that, should the state survive “the present war”—which in the present condition of things is extremely questionable—it shall instantly return again into the custody of a standing army, which, although sufficient to establish domestic despotism, cannot defend us from foreign invasion?

The county power of old times, which I call *the military branch of the constitution*, Lord *Liverpool* calls the *Saxon militia*, and the national militia, and in the 15th, 22d, 31st, and the 43d pages of his book is eloquent in its praise; and he tells us that this “national militia met with encouragement “or not, as the reigning monarch was well or ill-intentioned “towards his people: the first and third *Edwards*, (princes “whose memories will ever be revered, the one as the *Jus-* “*tinian* of this country, the other as its most accomplished

“ warrior) always favoured and encouraged it; while *Edward* the Second and *Richard* the Second (those rivals in
“ brutal lusts, folly, and oppression,) usurped upon the
“ rights of this body, and *rendered ineffectual those good*
“ *statutes, which were passed for its preservation.*”

CHAPTER III.

A Navy and a Militia compared and distinguished. Limitations of the Power of a Navy. Alfred did not expose any Part of his Coast. French triennial Festival, copied from the Trident published in England in 1802. Abuses of the System of a Naval Defence unnecessary. Effects of a Storm. Effects of an Invasion upon 'Change Alley. Consequences of an Invasion. Expostulation.

HERE let me mark a trait in the character of him who brought this "national militia" to perfection, the immortal *Alfred*, a trait of wisdom worthy the serious attention of the statesmen and soldiers of this day; I mean the discrimination made by that great man between the different natures, and different powers, and different purposes, of a militia and a navy. Of all our princes *Alfred* had the most powerful motives for partiality to a navy. It was by a navy, a navy consisting of galleys of his own invention, that he first turned the tide of fortune in his own favour, in his bloody and till then disastrous wars with the *Danes*. It was, in short, to his navy he was indebted for the means of preserving his throne; and by the same navy it was that he wrested from his piratical invaders the dominion of the surrounding seas. No wonder therefore that he cultivated this navy, and that it should remain very powerful during the remainder of his reign. Besides this, his taste and genius led him to cherish a marine, and to patronize navigation. Add to this again, that it was the fashion of the age among the northern nations to seek profit and aggrandizement in expeditions by sea. None of these motives, however, could move or influence the steady, the enlightened, the magnifi-

cent mind of this great prince, who in an age of Cimmeric darkness was not only the promoter of voyages of commerce, but the patron and historian also of voyages of discovery. Neither his own taste, nor vanity, nor prejudice, nor fashion, nor avarice, nor ambition, had power to blind him. He maintained a navy more to *watch*, to harass, and to disconcert invaders than to *conquer* them. He wisely considered that these *wooden walls*, although moveable castles of great utility, and although they had given him the sovereignty of the sea, were yet peculiarly the sport of the elements, and their best concerted operations might be defeated by storms and tempests, by adverse winds, by rocks and shoals, and even by darkness, by fogs, or by calms. Although he had made his navy numerous and triumphant, he abated not one jot in so organizing his militia, as to render every particle of its physical force available for repelling invasion, although it should assail him in twenty points at the same instant.

This true statesman and warrior did not make that which lay locked up in the bosom of his enemies the subject of his CALCULATION; he did not arm by any imaginary rule of proportion, respecting the strength by which he might be attacked; but knowing national defence to be the common duty of all, he took care that ALL should be armed and ready. Knowing that to bear arms was both the right and the duty of every free man, while he held sacred his right, he compelled him to the performance of his duty.—It was not upon presumptuous conjecture in the dark, but upon sight of his enemy, that he appointed the *proportion* of his forces for the fight. He did not draw his force to particular points and landing-places nearest his capital, and say to his enemies ‘*Here* you shall make your descent, and *here* we will fight;’ he did not leave the more distant counties, and those especially opposite the best ports of his enemy, for collecting transports and

embarking armies, and counties of which the shores were by nature particularly inviting to the invader, wholly destitute of defensive force; he did not thus solicit his enemy to enter and penetrate to the heart of his kingdom, that he might afterwards show his skill in tactics, and manœuvres, and stratagems of war, for ultimately beating them; much less, did he form a plan of defence in its own nature so radically weak, as to require the desolation of his own country wherever his enemy appeared as a means of retarding their advancement. He did not, in short, rely either upon desolation, upon a calculation of chances, or upon a navy for that defence of the state, which it was the common duty of all his people to secure by their courage and their swords; notwithstanding his navy had done for him so much.

And can a navy, I ask, do more in respect of defence than was actually done by the navy of *Alfred*? In the *English* navy I was bred; towards that navy I retain the partiality of my youth; in honour of that navy I have exerted my talents, such as they are; and, provident for the permanence of its glory, in conjunction with the honour and best interest of our nation, I can safely challenge, on evidence now before the public, the most passionate of its admirers, or the most faithful of its friends, for zeal in its service. But, in respect of a navy towards national defence, I think, and I would act, precisely as *Alfred* thought, and as *Alfred* acted. My present allusion is to a work entitled “*THE TRIDENT; or, the National Policy of Naval Celebration;*” a work comprehending the celebration, not of the achievements of our own day alone, but that of nine centuries of naval glory and prowess; on a design embracing the whole compass of naval genius and hardihood from the victories of *Alfred* to those of *Nelson*, and likewise patronizing military fame; a design striking out employment and patronage to the fine arts, that should speedily raise them to a successful rivalship with those of *Rome* and

Greece; and laying solid foundations in the excitement of a fervid emulation, for such excellence in the pursuits of genius, and the application of knowledge, as must raise to the highest pitch the reputation of our country. Whatever may be the merit of the national design here spoken of, to which his Royal Highness the Duke of *Clarence* endeavoured, in the year 1802, to attract the attention of the prime minister, it is certain that what the *French* senate have recently established in the form of a triennial festival, in honour of their emperor, and as a grand engine of state policy for the aggrandizement of their country, is a copy, in all its principles and outlines, of the design proposed in the **TRIDENT** for the aggrandizement of *England*. That the author should suffer mortification in not seeing his country foremost in this race of national honour, is a consideration not worthy of a thought: but the effect it may have upon her destiny, should she not enter the lists in this competition, is to him a painful reflection.

Circumstances, I am ready to grant, may justify during their continuance a departure from the strictness of principle in any system; wherefore until we shall be completely armed agreeably to our constitution, we ought to avail ourselves of the best exertions of our navy for defending our coasts; although that navy ought to be more properly employed in protecting our commerce, our colonies, and foreign dependencies. But all the naval aid in respect of defence that is necessary to a rightly-defended country, are a few small squadrons of frigates, sloops, and smaller craft, as mere scouts to watch the motions of an enemy, and give early intelligence of his movements and apparent strength. We ought therefore to accelerate as much as possible a constitutional arming of the people of *Great Britain*, the coasts of which now occupy so large a proportion of our naval force; that a double protection may be afforded to the coast of *Ireland*, whose circumstances unhappily would not as yet war-

rant a similar arming; and that our trading fleets might have much stronger convoys than the necessities of our defence have hitherto been able to afford them.

As to any thing in the nature of *reliance* for protection on a navy, the only ends answered by propagating the notion seem to be these three, first, to furnish ministers with a pretence for continuing that which Lord *Liverpool* calls “the detestable policy” of the *Stuarts*; secondly, to betray us into an abandonment of the common duties of manhood; and thence thirdly, to *cause* the real danger of invasion. Let all *England* but once arm, according to the duty of every man as a member of the *County Power*, would *Napoleon* for one moment longer talk of invasion, and of settling the terms of a peace in *London*? Or would he then, by continuing his camp at *Boulogne*, expose himself to ridicule, by having the tables turned upon him, he continuing at an enormous expense in threatening invasion, while we, by a right system, and resorting to that which without figure or flourish is really “the cheap defence of nations,” might greatly reduce our expense, at the same time we set him at defiance? Were we once put in that dignified posture of defence, the emperor of the great nation, recollecting how much occasion he has for his armies, for keeping in subjection to his authority the many enslaved states he has brought into his dependence, would be too wise to send them to die on the shores of *England* by the swords of freemen.

It is not necessary to my argument against relying for defence upon a navy, to maintain that, so long as we shall act upon a wrong system, a navy *cannot* disconcert those projects of invasion which that very system generates. A navy *may* confine to their ports, embarked armies in *Cadiz*, in *Ferrol*, in *Rochfort*, in the *Villaine*, in *l’Orient*, in *Brest*, in *Boulogne*, and the other flotilla harbours, in *Dunkirk*, or in the multitude of *ports* along the coasts of *Belgium* and *Batavia*;

or—as wind and weather may fall out—IT MAY NOT!—
I repeat—IT MAY NOT!

By ample experience of late we are pretty well cured, I trust, of the folly of considering naval blockades like the locking of a turnpike gate; and I hope the brilliant victory of *Trafalgar*, where the enemy intentionally faced you in a trial of strength, will not induce any sober-minded man thence to infer, that invasion is impracticable so long as our navy is mistress of the sea.

Although we have not very recently had one of those tremendous tempests which sometimes baffles all the skill and courage of the hardest seamen, and makes sport of the stoutest ships; yet we have had, as a memento, a tolerable specimen of *wrecked ships* employed in blockading since the commencement of the war in 1793.—I myself, however, remember a dreadful storm in the month of December 1763, of the description to which I allude. I then commanded a cutter. She lay at single anchor in the *Rolling Ground* before the mouth of *Harwich* harbour. It was my purpose to put to sea, on a cruise towards *Yarmouth*; while heaving in the cable, I watched the clouds which betokened, as I judged, an approaching storm; as the anchor came out of the ground, the cutter, contrary to my intention, *cast* with her head towards the harbour instead of the sea;—saying to the master who stood near me, ‘I believe she has more sense than I have,’ I allowed her to sail in; where in the succeeding night, such was the fury of the tempest, it was all that all her anchors, all her cables, and all her crew could do to keep her from driving ashore in the course of a dreadful night, in one of the securest harbours in the kingdom. When two days afterwards I got to sea, the whole coast from *Harwich* to *Yarmouth* was one shocking spectacle of shipwreck; I saw afloat whole decks of *Baltic* ships, the hulls of which were gone to the bottom, with

masts, yards, spars, and fragments of vessels without end; and from one of the ablest and boldest pilots with whom I was ever acquainted, who was wrecked near *Harwich*, I learned that in the height of the tempest all pilotage and seamanship were equally unavailing; that nought but a sound ship and sea-room afforded a possibility of weathering the storm, and that merely by driving at its mercy. Had the gale which so soon succeeded the battle of *Trafalgar* been such a tempest as this, and blowing right for the shore, the whole fleet under Admiral *Collingwood*, situated as it then was, must have miserably perished;—not a ship of them could have escaped; and possibly not a man of its many thousands, to have told the tale of horror.

In such a tempest, according to the direction of the wind, and the relative situation of our blockading ships, an entire North Sea Fleet might be sunk or dashed in pieces, or driven afar off; leaving the sea open for *one or two hundred thousand French* to reach unmolested the coast of *Lincolnshire*, where the whole might land, even from *transports*, in *a single hour*; and their artillery and ammunition in *a single tide*.—Our own loaded colliers from *Newcastle* and *Sunderland*, as they come to the southward for a market, examine with their glasses the flagstaves along this coast, and wherever the accustomed signal appears, they run their vessel at high water on shore. Before she is dry, all the carts and waggons of the adjacent villages are alongside, taking out her coals. *Her whole cargo is discharged in a tide*, and at the return of high water she hauls off again, and sails away. A cargo of impatient soldiers would be discharged in two minutes. Is the fate of our country to be hazarded on the cast of such a die? And when *French* armies may be held in readiness from the north of *Holland* to the Bay of *Biscay* for pouring into *England* wherever they can find entrance, such a tempest as I have noticed might lay your coast open to two, or three, or four, or more

armies and invasions at the same time, in parts of the island widely distant from each other ; which, on the constitutional system of defence, might all be resisted and defeated with equal ease and certainty, while the capital, all the interior of the kingdom, and those military districts not attacked, would remain assured and tranquil, whereas, on the present system, were but *fifty thousand French* to make good a landing in *Norfolk* or *Lincolnshire*, '*Change Alley* and *Lombard Street* would tremble as with an earthquake. While these *fifty thousand French* are penetrating towards the heart of the country, an *English* army from a distant quarter must be sent to meet them, or to follow them, according to the enemy's plan of operations ; that *English* army must be drawn from positions thought necessary to be defended, and part of it at least must be better trained and better disciplined than the raw levies under the ministerial system of general defence, who have not yet had a firelock in their hands.

While '*Change Alley* and *Lombard Street* are in no very pleasant suspense on the issue of this first descent, news is brought of a second invasion somewhere between the *Isle of Wight* and *Exmouth*. Thitherward must be dispatched another *English* army ; weakening still more the great points of our previous defence. Our naval force speeds to the places of descent, to capture or destroy the empty vessels, and cut off a retreat by sea. But while thus occupied, enemies' ships of war with troops on board steal out of *Brest*, and *Rochfort*, and *l'Orient*, and *Ferrol*, and *Cadiz*, or some of them, leading our blockading squadrons to *Ireland*, or to the *West Indies*, or on some other uncertain chase ; possibly to the west of *Scotland*. And if by all, or several, or some of these operations, our channel fleet can be drawn off, a convoy of *French* coasting craft and transports may issue from *Brest* and its vicinity with a third army of invaders and proceed up the *Severn*. A third *English* army must now be drawn from our main points of defence ; and

it is possible all these *French* and all these *English* armies may respectively unite at some distance north-west from *London* in the heart of the country. By this time *'Change Alley* and *Lombard Street* will begin to think serious war in the bowels of *England* a matter not to be trifled with; and will begin to doubt of the wisdom of Mr. *Pitt* and Mr. *Dundas* (now Lord *Melville*), and the rest of that cabinet who plunged us into the war, and who never once thought of restoring the *posse comitatus*.

The grand objects of protection by the marching away of three considerable armies have now lost much of their previous defence on the coast side, and consequently some attack, or attacks, may be that way looked for. In such a state of things, will those turtle-fed gentlemen of the city, who measure the strength of a nation by its money, with whom the circulating medium is the only life-blood of a state, and who feel for the pulse of health only in the consols, will these gentlemen, I ask, now feel their accustomed approbation of *war*? Will they still preserve their philosophic temper amidst the conflict of armies a little way north, and the apprehension of new invaders in the south? Will they still preserve their idolatry for “the first financier in the world,”—“the pilot that weathered the storm,”—“the deliverer of *Europe*,”—and “the guardian angel of *England*?” Their hearts I hope will not yet sink within them; their countenances will not yet, I trust, betray any symptoms of fear; because, now that all these distant attacks have made a convenient diversion of our defensive forces, there yet remains the main strength of the enemy, the immense army of *Boulogne*, its right extending to *Dunkirk*, its left to *Cherbourg*, to be thought of. At what premium will the patriotic gentlemen at *Lloyd's* underwrite in these circumstances a policy of insurance for the safety of *Kent*, of *Sussex*, or even of *Essex*? Have these calculating gentlemen ever calculated the difference between the military

genius of a *Napoleon*, and the furniture of such heads as have planned our defence? Would any of our insurance offices, at any premium, insure against housebreakers the property of a banker, who barred and double barred, who bolted and double bolted, the front of his house, and who left all his back doors and windows accessible to every passenger, and without even a watchman in the street, wide open? Can any of these calculating gentlemen calculate all the motions and all the changes in the elements? Can they satisfy us that neither by genius, nor by fortune, nor even by fighting his way and sacrificing even fifty thousand of his men to carry his point, he shall not succeed in landing twice or thrice that number on our coast?

When we perspectively view all these possibilities—and it is sufficient to my argument that they *are* possibilities—and contemplate the system under which *England* may thus be attacked at so many points by enthusiastic veterans, and be obliged to fight for her existence up to the knees in her own blood, with what sensations must we think of the military drivelling, and of the “detestable policy,” of that herd of courtiers who have cast from them, who have arrogantly rejected, the impenetrable *Ægis* of the Constitution from the divine hand of an *Alfred**, that *Ægis* which had so recently been a subject of profound admiration, and of high encomium, to “the most enlightened of the sons of men†!” How unspeakably disgusting the vanity and presumption of these men, who “have betaken themselves to state affairs “with souls so unprincipled in virtue and true generous breeding, that flattery, and court shifts, and tyrannous

* The Duke of *Richmond*, in his “Thoughts on the National Defence,” p. 50, evidently suspects the ministers of 1804 were “unable to carry” even the shield of their own making.

† The words of Dr. Johnson applied to Sir *William Jones*.

“aphorisms, appear to them the highest points of wisdom*,” who, in the place of that “surety, safeguard, and continual defence of this realm of *England*, and an inestimable dread and terror to the enemies of the same †,” give us a flimsy pasteboard shield, of their own miserable invention, made up of périlous novelties patched together, and engaged upon a *temporary* contract “during the present war,” and just as fit to stand the tug of warfare and battle, as any of themselves are fit for the command of armies against the *Murats* and the *Massenas*, the *Berthiers* and the *Napoleons*, by whom we may expect to be invaded!

What should we think of a governor of *Gibraltar* who, confiding his outworks to one tenth part of his garrison, and, in order to enrich himself by customs and excise, and taxes on the traffic of the other nine tenths, were to corrupt them into an absolute oblivion of every thing appertaining to their military duties, to bribe them to sell their arms, and by frauds and impudent falsehoods were to possess them with an idea, that even to maintain it as an opinion, that they ought to be kept armed and in good discipline, was a proof of disaffection, and a “dangerous proceeding” little short of rebellion‡, and who, by such conduct, were to suffer himself to be surprised, his garrison massacred, and his fortress taken? What, I ask, should we think of such a governor? And would this, to use once again the words of Lord *Liverpool*, be a more “infamous policy” than that whereby, in defiance of the constitution, not more than *one tenth* part of the proper garrison of *Great Britain*, now besieged by one who has threatened her state with extinction, and whose threats to other

* Milton.

† 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6.

‡ See the comment on the impudent letters of Mr. *Dundas*, (now Lord *Melville*) of the 9th and 15th of May 1798, to the lieutenants of counties, in the Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Constitution, 195.

states and empires have been dreadfully fulfilled, are kept armed, organized, and disciplined to meet the invader?

December, 30, 1805.

I am interrupted by a confirmation of the complete triumph of *Napoleon* on the 2d of this month, in the tremendous and decisive action of *Austerlitz*.

CHAPTER IV.

Reflection on Standing Armies. Warning to England. Mr. Pitt. The Factions. Consequences of the Loss of Liberty. Fundamental Reform necessary. Reliance on a Navy further considered. The Author's Hopes. Caution. Facility of all necessary Reformation.

WILL this din in our ears of dreadful battle yet burst the bands of our lethargy? Shall we yet wake, instructively to contemplate the miserable fate of legions of slaughtered mercenaries, and the capitulation of fugitive armies, the miserable machinery of despotism?—to behold the humiliation of arbitrary monarchs; and the prostration of enslaved nations, at the foot of an instrument, permitted by Divine Providence to inflict vengeance on those who have played the tyrant, and to scourge those who had not virtue to assert their freedom! Shall we, I ask, look on events such as these without instruction? How awful such warnings to a KING and to a PEOPLE of *England*!

Such, however, are the first fruits of our FIVE MILLIONS for continental aid! Such “THE DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE” by Mr. Pitt! And is this man still the ruler of my country?—this man, whose want of wisdom, deplorable as it is, is absolute merit, compared with his want of virtue?—This man, who rose to power by perfidy, whose whole ministry has been a war against the constitution and the finances of *England*; and his wars against *France*, her aggrandizement even beyond the dreams of her ambition! But we must not forget who have been the uniform supporters of this man, and the objects of that support. If we seek *the deliverance of England*; we must rescue her from the fangs of three servile, sordid, and inveterate factions; the faction

behind the Throne, the faction of the *Boroughs*, and the faction of the '*Change Alley Jews*, of whom this man, like the golden calf which the stupid *Jews* of ancient times made with their own hands and then worshipped, is still the idol.

Circumstanced, O unhappy *England*, as thou art, thy heroism and god-like attributes, while in the snaky folds of the reptiles, availing nought to thy preservation, to what or to whom can I compare thee, but to a *Hercules* writhing in the agonies of death, from having been wrapped in the poisoned tunic of the Centaur! Where then are the ancient nobility of the land? where her honourable landed gentlemen? where her sturdy yeomanry, disdainful of servitude? to rescue their country from the serpents—to tear away the tunic of corruption—to arrest the fatal poison—to avert the threatened calamity? *Austria*, *Moravia*, *Bohemia*, and *Hungary*, how are ye fallen! Be your fate *England's* instruction! Suffering your sovereigns to trample on your liberties, to disarm ye, to bridle your spirits and to ride ye by their mercenary standing armies,—the hateful concomitants of despotism!—your capacities of self-preservation all lost, to the lowest of human conditions ye now sink; slaves of a slave! the degraded subjects of him who, in respect of you, is still an absolute monarch, himself a slave of insolent *France*! *England*, awake! Assert all thy prerogatives of freedom! Exert all the energies of thy liberty! Taught by the dreadful example before thee, of all curses keep from thee *despotism*, of all poisons guard thyself against parliamentary corruption, or thou canst not preserve to thyself the means of salvation! Allies, thou hast none now to help thee. In thyself alone, thy safety must be found. Even **ARMIES** cannot defend thee, if, by *armies* we are to understand a part of the people hired, or selected to fight for the rest. *England* in a state of siege, ought she to dispense with a single man of her garrison?

Nor is it only true, that mere *armies* cannot save our

country ; and that therefore the entire garrison of the community must return to the performance of those duties of defence, and to the manly habits of their arms-bearing ancestors ; but corresponding reforms in other particulars must also take place, or even that will not avail. An army can only exist and do its office, by means of a *system* for its appointments, its maintenance, the direction of its operations, and the preservation of its discipline. If the system be undermined, corrupted, or defeated ; the army of course is ruined. So it is in a free state, with its armed community. It must have its system correspondent to its own nature, or the proper ends of its institution cannot be obtained. What is *England's* COUNTY POWER ? It is the *military* branch of her CONSTITUTION. It is but *one half* of the institution of government. And is it possible to restore that to health and strength, or to experience its benefit, if the *civil* half be paralytic and dead ! and while the government shall continue to be in the hands of a minister by whose perfidy, and the poison of whose corruptions, that palsy has not only been denied its cure, but dreadfully aggravated ? No : the whole constitution must be restored to life and health, and constitutional ministers appointed, or the state must perish. Nature furnishes not any other means of national salvation, but what are expressed in the concluding words of my late essay, “ *The State of the Nation* ; ” — “ TO CHANGE THE MINISTRY ; TO REFORM
 “ THE PARLIAMENT ; AND TO RESTORE TO FULL VI-
 “ GOUR AND ENERGY the military BRANCH OF THE
 “ CONSTITUTION.”

I must not yet take my leave of the dangerous policy of relying upon a *navy* for defence against invasion. Perhaps the Christian world are already sufficiently disposed to contemplate *Napoleon* as one of those instruments in the hands of the Deity, by which, from time to time, his dispensations for the punishment of nations, and for throwing down proud

states and empires, are brought about; and he himself seems well disposed to propagate such a persuasion*. Should we therefore, in consequence of fog, or calm, or storm, laying open to him our shores, behold him in *England*, at the head of the same *veterans* and their legion of skilful generals, by whom, in a few hours, without so much as calling his reserve into action, he made mince-meat of the armies relied on for “*the deliverance of Europe*,” and overpowered two mighty emperors; while at the same time our own whole dependence must be on a small comparative regular force, aided by that perilous novelty, a volunteer army, officered by merchants, shop-keepers, and clerks; and the yet-uncreated soldiers to be hastily levied on the emergency under the General Defence Act, who never yet have handled a musquet; who, I ask, can assure us that on such an occasion the hand of an over-ruling Providence would not, in imagination be seen by the people, and a universal panic deprive them of all powers of resistance? or even suppose, instead of panic, the most determined bravery? Were not the *Austrians* brave? Were not the *Russians* brave? But what availed their bravery, while their commanders were but as children compared to the commanders of their enemy?

Believing myself that Providence favours those nations which act wisely and virtuously; and persuading myself that *England* is not so far gone in folly, as not in the present condition of *Europe*, and in the present strength and inveteracy of *France*, to see the propriety, the policy, and the rectitude of restoring her constitution, *civil* and *military*, as her only means of security; nor so far lost to virtue, as to be incapable of such an effort; I cannot but kiss with

* See his Circular Letter to the French Bishops, &c. dated *Austerlitz*, December 3.

humility the rod of our chastisement; drawing from the present calamity and unexampled peril, the balm of a pleasing hope that they will, under Providence, be the means of reformation both to state and people; whereby our liberties shall be more firmly established than ever, and the national character and prosperity receive correspondent improvement.

But, should our government and legislature be brought to a conviction; that, in the present shock of empires and tumbling down of thrones, the state cannot long stand on the crumbling ruins of a perishing constitution; and should thence be disposed to begin in good earnest the work of reformation; let them be warned against tinkering expedients; and be exhorted to look, on one hand, at *the constitution itself*, contemplating its beautiful simplicity and its venerable majesty; while, on the other hand, they survey the obstructions, the perversions, the corruptions and violations, by which all its beauties are deformed, and its benefits are intercepted, so that the people, after having been long grievously oppressed, are now exposed to the danger of a bloody war on their own soil, and at the hazard of subjugation to a power, under whose insolent tyranny existence would be worse than death.

I would particularly urge a caution, not to attempt any *amendment* of the Act for Defence and Security of the Realm, 43 Geo. III. c. 55; as well as other Acts, c. 96 and 120, afterwards introduced to give it practicability. Look not at such statutes, but at *the constitution itself*. Keep in your eye nature's simplicity, and you will obtain her force. But let us hope that those who formed the late continental coalition, and gave their millions for *Austrian*, *Russian*, and *Swedish* armies; that those who either left the plan of the campaign to be settled by each general for himself, or agreed upon a plan in which at the outset one of the allies was first beaten before the other was at hand to sup-

port, and that those who had not an *English* soldier to co-operate before all was lost; that those who had no knowledge of the respective characters and capacities of the different armies of the three emperors, and of the science, talent, and energy with which they were respectively conducted; that those sagacious persons who in the *fortune* of *Bonaparte*, “the child and champion of Jacobinism,” found reasons for denying that he possessed *military genius*; let us, I say, hope that no such men as these shall have the framing of the laws for restoring to its pristine vigour and energy that venerable *English Power* to which the defence of the nation ought to be committed! Shall they be confided in to restore the *constitution*, whose daggers have so oft attempted its destruction!

In urging a change of ministry, a reform of parliament, and a restoration of the military branch of the constitution, I beg not to be misunderstood by the well-meaning. As for being misrepresented by writers calling themselves Anti-jacobins, I have no other concern on that account, than as it may prevent that part of the community, who only read and decide through the optics and the understandings of such creatures, from forming a true opinion of the situation of their country; and understanding how easy, *with the support of public opinion*, it would be to effect all these changes. A change of ministry rests in the will of the king. His majesty has lately made one change, and as many think for the worse; and if in the present conjuncture he should make another, it would probably be for the better. The arrangements might take up a very few days, during which time all official business would be transacted as usual. A single statute might effect a parliamentary reformation; nor need that take effect till the present parliament had dispatched all the necessary business of the session; whereby that important change would not, as it should seem, be any hindrance to public measures and the concerns of a single-handed war be-

tween *France* and *England*; seeing that the last reformation of parliament by Mr. *Pitt*, when he added one hundred members to the House of Commons, was enacted during war, and in a year in which *two hundred and fifty-one* acts of parliament were passed; besides all the business of settling the union with *Ireland*: and the restoration of the military branch of the constitution, might also be dispatched in one other single statute; although by a judicious distribution of the matter into two or three statutes the business would probably be done better, and in less time.

CHAPTER V.

Condemnation of Defence on Calculation. A great Tempest. Expostulation. But one Way of Insuring the State. Uncertainty of the Elements. Sir William Jones. Milton. Mr. Dundas. Mr. Pitt. Saxons and Danes. A Comparison.

IN providing for the assured security of *England* from either conquest, or becoming *the seat of a bloody and doubtful war*, not having been brought up in *'Change Alley*, I am no *calculator* of chances upon winds and weather; and I hold it to be the duty of all ministers, kings, and parliaments to abstain in the like case from all such *calculations*. They need not be ashamed herein to follow the example of an *Alfred*; nor need they claim to be wiser than the ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTION, by which all such *calculations* are forbidden. And in proof that the idea of our being laid open to invasion in consequence of a great storm is not quite an imaginary danger, I will beg leave to remind my reader of that storm in particular, that arose on the 27th of November, 1703, which gave occasion to *Addison's* sublime simile:

So when an Angel, by divine command,
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land,
Such as of late o'er pale Britannia past,
Calm and serene he drives the furious blast:
And, pleas'd th' Almighty's orders to perform,
Rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm.

The compliment of this simile was paid to the Duke of *Marlborough*, for his genius in directing the storm of war

against *France*; but has not *France* now a general to whom a compliment on guiding the storm of war might be equally well applied? By the tempest alluded to, “the city of *London* was shaken as with an earthquake;” and the damage it experienced “was computed at near two millions;” and at *Bristol* at about two hundred thousand pounds.”

Sir *Cloudesley Shovel** lay at anchor in the *Gunfleet* with six sail of the line, of which *four* drove ashore; one escaped to sea and was driven to *Gottenburgh*, where she took shelter. And the historian says, “the best part of our navy was at that time upon the sea, which filled all people with great apprehensions of an irreparable loss. And indeed, IF the storm had not been at its highest at full flood and in a spring tide, the loss might have proved fatal to the nation. It was so considerable that *fourteen* or *fifteen* men of war were cast away, in which *fifteen* hundred seamen perished.”

Parliament being sitting, the commons, on this dismal occasion, presented an address to the queen, expressing “the great sense the House had of the calamity fallen upon the kingdom by the late violent storm; and that they could not see any diminution of her majesty’s navy, without making provision to repair the same: Wherefore they besought her majesty, that she would immediately give directions for repairing the loss.”

“The queen’s answer was suitable to the address, and two or three days after was issued a proclamation for a general fast, which was observed throughout *England* on the 19th of January ensuing, with great signs of devotion and sincerity; and the terror the tempest had left on the

* It was in foggy weather on the 22d Oct. 1707, among the rocks to the westward of *Scilly*, where this great man, with *three ships* of the line and their crews, all perished, and others escaped as by a miracle.

“ people’s minds contributed much to their affectionate discharge of that religious duty*.”

On this awful occasion neither roadsteads nor harbours were sure safeguards. Rear-Admiral *Beaumont* with a considerable squadron, at anchor in the *Downs*, were wrecked on the *Goodwin Sands*, almost every soul perishing. The *Arundel*, the *Canterbury*, and *Suffolk* hospital-ship; drove from their anchors at *Bristol*, and were wrecked. The *Reserve* of 40 guns was cast away in *Yarmouth Roads*; and the *Newcastle* of 54 guns, and *Vesuvius*, at *Spithead*; the *York* of 60 guns was lost in *Harwich* harbour; and the *Vanguard* of 90 guns was even wrecked at *Chatham*.—What a dreadful visitation!

After such an experience, I again ask of the advocates for defence by a navy, if the fate of our country, with *Napoleon* and his tigers lying ready to spring on their prey, is to be hazarded on the cast of such a die; or upon a calculation of chances respecting wind and weather? and for no other earthly reason than that wicked ministers, uncontrolled by a parliament which it has been our *eight-and-twenty-years complaint, does not represent the nation*, may continue to trample on the constitution, and to govern the country—again, to use the words of Lord *Liverpool*—by a “detestable policy†.”

When the gentlemen of *'Change Alley* and *Lloyd's Coffee House* have, by calculating *chances respecting winds and weather*, natural and political, raised themselves to a copartnership with their sovereign in the administration of the government, and the conferring of honours and rewards for

* See *Belsham's Hist. of Great Britain*, ii. 166 and 284; and *Tindal's Continuation of Rapin*, i. 625.

† Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, 8.

naval and military services, we have reason to fear that these habits of *calculating* are in their minds become too inveterate to be shaken by argument; otherwise we might suggest to them a material distinction between what is *called* insuring a ship, and what is *in fact* insuring a state. In the former case, the parties insuring and insured are different, and in different interests; in the latter case, they are the same, and have but one common interest. In the former case, the ship and her crew may go to the bottom, while to the *insurers* it is a mere scratch; whereas in the latter case, if the state shall sink, the insured and the insurers all go to the bottom together.

To what I have advanced as matter of fact, in respect of destructive tempests, such as might lay the coast open to invasion, I am aware it may be observed, the two cases I have instanced were distant from each other *half a century*. To those who in such a matter are capable of resting on such an argument, it is but fair to reply, that *another half century* is about to expire. Such reasoners and such calculators may also, I know, oppose to all that I have said on the danger of invasion, in consequence of calms and contrary winds, fogs and dark nights, their doctrine of *chances*; but can these gentlemen, I ask, give us,—not a pecuniary security against a pecuniary loss, but—a real matter-of-fact political insurance of our state and ourselves against all sinking together? Have they such a command over the elements, or such a foreknowledge of their motions, as to demonstrate to us the impossibility of a hundred thousand of the enemy issuing from their ports as Mr. *Thomas Paine* has described, when he was to have accompanied *Bonaparte* in an intended invasion of this country, and to have officiated no doubt in quality of writer of manifestos? Should our heroic naval defenders, if charged with the preservation of our island, be so unfortunate as to miss the invaders until they should have made good a landing, what pangs of un-

availing mortification must they feel! But, should these brave men behold those invaders leave their ports, row away for *England* in open day, pass clear out of sight with the means of arriving unmolested on our shores, they all the while denied the power of loco-motion by a dead calm in the elements, raising in their minds a tempest of agonizing passions, what pen could describe their misery! On the late occasion, which has shed around our navy such a blaze of glory, when a combined fleet of above thirty ships of the line, *French* and *Spanish*, braved our inferior fleet and was destroyed, had the enemies' force been *Mediterranean row-gallies*, and the weather calm or nearly so, they might in perfect safety have paraded past our fleet, and have pursued their destination in despite of even a *Nelson*.

But storms and calms, fogs and darkness all out of the question, such capricious sprites are the elements that, while depending on a navy, whole systems of defence may be frustrated by a mere change of wind, and the destiny of a nation may hang on the wind being fair or the contrary. According to *Burnet* and *Rapin* the Prince of *Orange's* "first scheme was to anchor in the mouth of the *Humber*," but a change of wind carried him to *Torbay*; that is, from *Yorkshire* to *Devonshire*. And the *English* fleet, having been ordered by the king to ride at the *Gunfleet* off the coast of *Essex*, and it having been determined by a council of war "to continue there in order to intercept the *Dutch* fleet;" when that fleet ran past with "a violent east wind*," the *English* could not with the same wind get to sea; whereupon it has been observed, by a modern historian of great merit, that "while the *English* fleet was confined to its station off *Harwich*, the prince with six hundred transports and ships of war

* *Rap.* ii. 776.

“ passed with an east wind through the straits of *Dover*,
 “ in the presence of wondering multitudes, who gazed at
 “ the sublime spectacle from either coast ; and disembarking
 “ on the fifth of *November*, at *Torbay*, afforded a signal
 “ proof to the nation, that *its navy will not always pre-*
 “ *vent an invasion, nor a standing army insure the sta-*
 “ *bility of a throne* *.”

The *English* fleet on that occasion might indeed have begun to sympathize with the best part of the nation in its fears from the arbitrary conduct of *James II.* and his designs with regard to religion ; yet, before the nation or the parliament had taken any part against the king, the fleet, had it fallen in with that of *Holland* coming to invade *England*, would doubtless have fought with bravery, and totally disconcerted, in all probability, the intended descent ; so that the fact, of its being unable to attack the *Dutch* by reason of a contrary wind, still remains in proof, that a navy “ cannot always prevent an invasion.” Its failure on that occasion was our deliverance ; at this time, unless we do by land what our situation requires, such a failure might prove our ruin.

Now what, after all, is the idle notion of surrounding this good island of ours with wooden walls, but inveterate habit grown into a prejudice so strong, as to deny us the use of our senses, so that seeing, we cannot see ; and even feeling, we cannot understand !—Was not recently the whole strength of the *French* armies drawn off to the very confines of *Hungary*, and did we not at the same moment annihilate her proudest fleet ? Seeing all this, did we at the same time see our way into the heart of *France* ? Did we not on the contrary feel that, in respect of the power of invading her, we were just where we had been ? And why

* Laing's Hist. Scotland, ii. 173.

this feeling, when we recollect that an *English* king did once march to *Paris*, and there put upon his head the *French* crown? The plain answer is, *France* was then internally weak; she is now internally strong. Our prejudice I have said is the fruit of habit, and that habit, as fact and reflection will inform us, has wholly grown out of the court system of “these three last centuries” and the “detestable policy” of evil rulers, whereby our natural means of internal strength were artfully suffered to fall into disuse, and even into oblivion;—until a great and virtuous man—*England’s* brightest luminary since the setting of *Milton’s* glorious sun!—dug his way through the lava and rubbish under which this palladium lay buried, and placed it once more in all its antique simplicity and perfection before our admiring eyes*.

How similar the fate of things too exquisite in their perfections for the general apprehension, or for the taste of an age! *MILTON’S PARADISE LOST* attracted at the time of its first publication no public notice. The copyright was sold for twenty pounds, to be paid at four instalments of five pounds each, and the second, third, and fourth only conditionally each on the sale of thirteen hundred copies; and *Milton* himself lived but to receive twelve pounds of the money, the remaining eight having been received by his widow. As baits to public curiosity the bookseller gave the first edition successively five different titles; but to little purpose: and this divine poem, now the poetical glory of our country, was scarcely known to the public until made the subject of a popular criticism by *Addison* in the *Spectator*, about forty-five years after its original appearance. Similar is the case of the *ENGLISH COUNTY POWER*, brought again to light

* See Sir *William Jones’s* Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence. Sold by Mawman, Poultry.

after an oblivion of centuries by Sir *William Jones*. His pamphlet was sold for eighteen pence by *Dilly*, twenty-five years ago, immediately after the memorable riots in *London*. As the contemplation of those riots was the immediate cause of the publication, so the fearful remembrance of them carried this little pamphlet into a second edition. But when the information it contained as “to the legal mode of suppressing riots” had produced a few volunteer corps, and the fears of similar disturbances in the capital were thereby removed, this legal gem, containing in a few pages an invaluable treasure, was no more thought of, and to this day I believe there are copies of the second edition unsold. The learned and able author, conscious of the times in which he wrote, exercised extreme caution in unfolding the doctrine of our law and constitution on the subject of arms-bearing, although he perfectly knew it to be as necessary to the safety of the kingdom from invaders at home, as from invaders from abroad. *Milton*, who knew the value of his own work, waited with patient dignity for the applause of posterity. That posterity, finding its own honour in honouring the poet, gives it with gratitude and sincere admiration. So, when *Napoleon* shall have compelled the people of *England* to consult their learned countrymen on “the legal mode” of resisting invasion, and they shall therein find their safety, *Jones* will universally be honoured to all posterity, not merely as worthy of a seat by the side of *Milton* in *Paradise*, by piety Regained, for the splendour of his genius, but for his kindred soul of patriot virtue!

Without patriot virtue, where is there any political wisdom? It does not, it cannot exist. Wisdom is the union of mental talent with moral rectitude. Talent without rectitude is not wisdom. Has Mr. *Dundas*—has Mr. *Pitt* wanted talent? No: But, devoid of moral rectitude to control the selfish passions of ambition and the lust of sway,

they have proved lamentably deficient in wisdom, and the greatness of their talents has given its present greatness to the calamity of their country. Instead of such pernicious children of faction, such immoral patrons and practisers of foul corruption, governing by the instrumentality of even a greater curse than such ministers themselves—A BOROUGH PARLIAMENTARY FACTION, had our unhappy country for the last twenty years been governed by such men as Sir *William Jones*, (bred like each of the others a lawyer) under control of such parliaments as he desired to see, on what a rock of stability would its safety at this hour have been placed? How completely would its debt have been discharged? to what a feather would its taxation have been reduced? How loftily among the nations would her head have been carried? And how much might such an *England*, under counsels of patriot virtue and political wisdom, have aided in consolidating for the good of mankind the early reforms and blessings of the *French* revolution, and in preventing all its subsequent atrocities and curses *!

With regard to political wisdom exerted in defence of the state, treading in the hallowed steps of a *Jones*, and applying the doctrine to *Great Britain* only, I have endeavoured to show what it is. But, in consequence of the pernicious counsels which have produced in *Ireland* an alienated spirit, it is not quite so easy to apply our doctrine at the present season to that much injured country. At all events, patriot virtue must be the prime ingredient, and then we need not despair. Kindness, protection, and time, are the essentials of the balm for healing the wounds that now rankle. And until we can apply that balm, doubly are we called upon to dispense, as soon as it shall be safe, with every ship and with every regular soldier now thought necessary for the defence of our own island.

* See The State of the Nation.

As there can be no history so proper, nor so desirable, wherefrom to draw examples of political wisdom as the history of our own nation where it affords them, so in that history, and in the reign of *Alfred*—that exhaustless mine of whatever in government is most excellent!—we have a case in point singularly applicable. The ravages to which at the time he ascended the throne the greater part of his country was perpetually subject, and the deadly hate and animosity between *Saxon* and *Dane*, are the theme of every historian. These disorders began eleven years prior to the commencement of his grandfather's reign; and when he himself was quite overpowered by their numbers and obliged to hide himself in *Athelney*, the whole country was one scene of wild disorder, rapine, rape, murder, and brutality; and the imagination cannot picture to itself a more inveterate antipathy, than that which then subsisted between the *Saxons* and their ferocious and devouring oppressors.

The genius of *Alfred* having at length accomplished what to inferior minds must have been deemed impossibilities; the navy of his own invention and creation having checked the new invaders, while his military talents prevailed over those already in the island, who covered after they were conquered a great part of *Mercia*, *East Anglia*, and *Northumberland*, then comprehending what we now term the northern counties, or the country north of the *Humber*, he now sat down to frame that very system of the *county power* which has been the great subject of this work.

His object was to *unite* his people for the common defence. But how was he to reconcile fire and water? How was he to unite, in the bands of amity, the robbed and the robber? the oppressed, and the oppressor? the children of the murdered, with those who murdered them? How, in

short, was he to make ONE PEOPLE of *Saxons* and *Danes*, two races of men breathing towards each other nothing but hatred and extermination? How could he hope to keep the *Danes* in quiet obedience, and even to make them pledges of security to the *Saxons* against new comers of their own *Danish* name and nation, of the same blood, the same laws, the same habits, and the same religion? Had he not found these very *Danes*, before he had reduced them to obedience by the sword, a race as faithless as they were ferocious, as perfidious as they were rapacious and cruel? pirates and freebooters, whom no generosity could attach, no treaties could hold, no oaths could bind? miscreants, who, when defeated, swore peace and submission, but, on sight of new hordes from their native hive, had ever fallen again to war and pillage?

Tell me, Lord *Castlereagh*, how *Alfred* was to form a union between these *Saxons* and these *Danes*?—What! are you dumb!—Then I will tell *you*.—It was not by employing his *Saxons* to disarm, to pillage, to insult, and goad to resentment his *Danes*: It was not by scourgings and half-hangings, by cutting of throats and infernal tortures: It was not by giving their habitations to the flames, and selling the unhoused wretches as slaves, for recruiting the armies of foreign despotism: It was not by turning loose upon the *Danish* parts of *Mercia*, *East Anglia*, and *Northumberland*, a mercenary soldiery, a part of them chosen foreigners to teach the rest the work of butchery in cold blood; nor was it by that soul-appalling engine of terror, martial law, to be administered by beardless striplings for loading the gibbets of the mourning land. No, my Lord: It was by the light of that wisdom which beams only on the soul of the truly good, of the patriot lawgiver, and which to the wicked and the base, to the tyrant and his pander, how brilliant soever their mere mental powers, is alike unknown. Con-

scious of his own benevolent intentions, and of his plighted faith to those who from enemies had become his liege men, he determined to act with pure fidelity. By the mildness of his laws and his inflexibility in their execution, by his vigilance and his energy, his *Saxons* felt they had a sure protector ; wherefore ceasing to fear the *Danes*, they gradually ceased to hate them. These, deterred by his ever-wakeful administration from returning to their former habits of plunder, sought a quiet subsistence on the lands allotted them. Noting these first rudiments of civilization, which he assiduously improved by introducing Christianity among them ; and confiding in those eternal principles of nature by which human beings, once brought to acknowledge a common law, founded on pure freedom and impartial justice, become disposed to delight in peace and order, and soon acquire the grand political idea of A COUNTRY, and to feel for it the warmest attachment, he determined to sow no seeds of jealousy by showing any partiality, and guided by that wisdom, which has deservedly placed him first among lawgivers, he soon wrought that miracle of legislation which has been the wonder of all succeeding ages ; he cured the antipathies, he extinguished the animosities, he even eradicated the jealousies of the two nations, embittered towards each other by a war of more than a hundred years and aggravated by the greatest cruelties, and of *Saxons* and *Danes* made ONE PEOPLE, happy and contented, linked and bound together, by his new system of admirable simplicity, in which between man and man, tithing and tithing, hundred and hundred, up to the aggregate of the county, all were *Frank-pledges* one for another, to protect and be protected, whether against disturbers of the peace, or violators of property, inward or outward enemies, robbers or invaders. Truly a father to his people, he became their idol ; and his once alienated children became one family, dwelling together under his

protection in a degree of concord, amity, tranquillity, and security, that puts to the blush the best administered of modern reigns ; affording him all the latter part of his life a felicity and a glory that is without a parallel.—Go, Rulers, and if *Ireland*, if the strength and defence of the united kingdom be your care, and do ye likewise !

CHAPTER VI.

A Comparison of the two Systems of Defence, that proposed by the Duke of Richmond in "Thoughts on the National Defence;" and that of the Constitution exhibited in this Work.

I CANNOT close this work without expressing my sentiments on a pamphlet entitled "*Thoughts on the National Defence*," which, not only from strong internal evidence, but from the information of the bookseller, I understand to come from the pen of the Duke of *Richmond*.

It has ever been my opinion, that the defence of *England* cannot be understood, and consequently cannot be provided for, I mean by furnishing a right system, unless by one in whom the knowledge of a soldier is united with that of a constitutional statesman; for a mere soldier, while he fortified *London* might undermine our liberties, and while he preserved the soil might destroy the constitution of our country. It has, therefore, been with very great satisfaction, mixed a little with occasional dissent, that I have read and considered the valuable work I have mentioned, and upon which I shall now venture to give at some length an opinion.

It has appeared to me, that the defence of our land and of our liberties may go on hand in hand, and that in every step we take our first consideration ought ever to be—the Constitution—which I trust has not on this occasion suffered in my hands. So far as I had ventured in my first volume to lay down military principles, I felt indeed great confidence

of the solidity of my ground, because I thought I had not gone out of my depth, and had bent the force of my mind to do justice to my subject ; and it is with singular satisfaction that I find myself in no small degree supported by one so able to advise as the noble author of the “ *Thoughts*.”

Setting apart a few naval opinions, I do not at this moment recollect either any principle, or any measure of defence, in which we differ, except in mere *degree*; and this I incline, from expressions in the work, to attribute more on the part of the noble author to a prudent consideration of the opinions of other men than as a proof of his own. It is therefore highly probable that the late disastrous events upon the continent, and the consequent sense of the peril attending our own island, will bring us much nearer together than we at present are upon paper. The efficient arming for coping with invaders proposed by myself, extends to 1,200,000 men ; that proposed by the Duke, to only five twelfths of that number. The question for the nation is, which is most right ? And, on the ground I have already taken, and on which I think myself immoveable, I apprehend the answer must depend, upon which, in the arming proposed, has most closely adhered to the constitution, and to the laws of nature for repelling with ease any attack that can be made upon us.

Although nothing, as I think, can be imputed to the noble author of the “ *Thoughts*” as *unconstitutional*, but very much the contrary, yet his Grace, I confess, does not appear to me sufficiently to have attended to that important truth which I have laboured not a little to establish and to impress on the public mind, that “ the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION is, in fact, a two-fold and admirable system of *civil* “ and *military* polity most happily combined ; whereby “ these two characters, like the faculties of intellectual ability and bodily force in man, are *inseparably* interwoven,

“ and constitute a complete state, or *free government* *.”

If his Grace admitted the truth, but yet thought it good policy in corrupt times not to speak out, but to say only as much as those times would in his opinion be likely to give ear to, it is only one more instance added to the million that have gone before, to show that nothing is gained but much endangered by too much caution against shocking corrupt times with honest truth. His Grace's *moderate reform* of a mischievous military system has been equally despised and rejected by the all-knowing, all-wise, all-virtuous Mr. Pitt, of Parish-Bill Memory, as the system of the constitution itself roundly recommended by the author of this work ; and the mischief now is, that unless his Grace shall proclaim aloud, that he now sees the necessity of going further, such a minister, finding himself at length driven to take advice, will be more likely, in reforming our system of defence, to stop half way with his Grace, than to adopt any thing so hateful to him as the constitution itself. But had his Grace, after having lent his great authority to a half-way measure, unfortunately died, he could not have amended his own advice when the necessity for doing it arrived, and an ill-intentioned minister might in his name have done irreparable mischief.

It is with the criterion of the proper character of our constitution, as equally *civil* and *military*, ever in my eye, that I shall draw a comparison between the system of defence proposed in the “ *Thoughts on the National Defence*,” and that of the constitution which is explained and vindicated in “ *England's Ægis*.” If I am not mistaken, it will be found that the *measures* of the “ *Ægis*” are completely supported by the *reasoning* of

* Appeal, Civil and Military, on the Subject of the English Constitution, 1799. Page v.

the "Thoughts." If so, it will be a fair conclusion, that the noble writer restrained himself only from considerations of prudence, arising from a fear that the public mind was not ripe for the whole truth of the case. Although I should have thought that, from a pen of so much authority on the subject as that of his Grace, the cause of national defence would have derived more advantage, had the full extent of the constitutional principles of defence been as fully set forth as by Sir *William Jones*, yet, although I have expressed my thoughts already, I wish not to pronounce a sentence of absolute condemnation on this prudence. In the opinions of many I doubt not it will be preferred to speaking the truth as they may think too plainly. So various indeed are the minds in a nation, that various may be the modes in which they ought to be addressed. Some, we are taught, should be fed with meat, some with milk. Some can bear the whole truth at once, others shrink at it, as bats at the light of day. When writers of both kinds, having the same object ultimately in view, take up a subject of great interest to the public, the greatest good is perhaps likely to result. The whole truth is set before them, and every palate may be pleased. And when the arguments of the prescriber of milk are equally applicable to the use of meat, there is no fear of its being long rejected; and when reason once begins to operate, the baby of to-day who can digest only milk, will be of full age to-morrow, and readily take that strong meat which enables him to exercise his senses for distinguishing wrong from right. By a powerful reasoner, and one zealous for the truth, we are told that "every one that useth milk, is unskilful in the word of righteousness; for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil*."

* Heb. v. 13, 14.

As this is no time for idle criticism; and as I am writing under the strongest impression my mind ever felt, that not a moment is to be lost in proclaiming and circulating the necessary truths respecting our defence, I will be as brief as justice to my subject will possibly admit. The questions to be examined are these; 1st, what are the grounds of urgent necessity on which we are called to improve our means of defence? 2dly, what is the primary object of attention? 3dly, in what degree ought we to confide for defence in our navy? and 4thly, to what extent ought we to arm?

First then, ‘*What are the grounds on which we are called to improve our means of defence?*’

The noble author and myself are perfectly agreed, that these grounds arise from the imperious necessities of our situation; and that we must exert our best energies to preserve “the sources of our navy in our arsenals, to guard “from plunder the capital of our empire,” to keep “our “armies from being overcome in the heart of our country*,”—“to save the crown, the constitution, and our “all†.” Thus at the time of writing both authors thought‡: Events, I apprehend, have made this the universal opinion.

Secondly. ‘What is the primary object of attention?’

Much had been said, and particularly by one who had been a minister during the greater part of the late war §, “on offensive operations being the best defensive system.” To this the “*Ægis*” opposes some argument; strongly recommending first of all to make successful invasion an impossibility ||; and it is the doctrine of the “*Thoughts*” that “security at “home must universally and unquestionably be felt to be

* *Thoughts*, 2.

† *Ib.* 137.

‡ The *Ægis*, vol. i. written in 1803, and first published 7th December of that year. The *Thoughts* in the spring of 1804.

§ *Ib.* xxv.

|| *Ib.* xxvii.

“ the first object of the nation*.” That work then says,
 “ It is next to be considered, what are the means by which
 “ it can best be made to answer our purpose of establishing
 “ once for all, and for ever, *perfect security* for our island,
 “ against *any* force that, under *any* circumstances, *can be*
 “ brought against us. Till this has been done effectually,
 “ no *Englishman* can or ought to sleep quietly in his bed †.”
 But the author of the “ *Ægis*” thinks more is necessary than
 to propose a right system of arming, for unless other changes
 can be brought about, there is no prospect of obtaining even
 this. He therefore says “ Change the ministry, reform the
 “ parliament, and restore to full vigour and energy the mili-
 “ tary branch of the constitution ‡.”

When the noble author shall reflect on the whole conduct
 and character of Mr. *Pitt*, who, from a state of high com-
 parative prosperity and superiority over *France*, has brought
England into her present situation, and shall likewise recal to
 his recollection that succession of Borough Parliaments by
 which that minister has been uniformly supported while
 ruining his country, I trust he will not withhold his assent
 to any of the means here stated as requisite.

Thirdly. ‘ In what degree ought we to confide for de-
 fence in our navy ?

In the “ *Ægis*,” with a very slight qualification, and
 with reference only to *Great Britain*, it is uniformly said,
 ‘ *Not at all.*’ In the “ *Thoughts*” much stress is laid
 upon naval defence, as applied to *Great Britain*. We
 must always, it seems, have “ such a powerful naval defence
 “ *at home* as shall afford *every reasonable prospect* of de-
 “ feating all attempts that can be made by an enemy to cross
 “ the channel §.” “ No expense or money should be
 “ spared to put every part of our fleet, and particularly that

* *Thoughts*, 2.

† *Ib.* 41.

‡ *The State of the Nation*, 173.

§ *Thoughts*, 2

“ for home defence, in the most perfect state possible *.”
 “ *France, Spain, and Holland* are increasing theirs †.”
 —Our “ navy which is *the best* defence of our coasts ‡.”
 —“ Our navy on which our *all* depends §” —Such is the language which runs through the “ *Thoughts* ;” but surely without due and complete consideration ; for in the same book we find it spoken of as a thing not at all incredible, that the enemy should be “ *superior at Spithead* ¶ ;” and again “ those from the *Texel* to *Brest* are generally admitted to be very considerable. Some reports go so far as from three to 400,000 men, and *it is within the reach of possibility, that, from unfavourable weather or untoward circumstances that no precautions may be able to guard against, a large proportion of these forces from these several ports may be directed to, and reach England* ¶¶.” —I therefore repeat, that it is *not* on our navy we must rely in the day of trial, but on the courage of *England in arms*, determined to live free or to die fighting.

Again. “ If therefore there is a possibility (*which can scarcely be denied*) that by various accidents our ships of the line and frigates *may not be able to act*, and that in dark nights, fogs, or calms, the enemy’s flotilla of rowing vessels from *Boulogne* or other harbours, *may cross the channel* without our ships being able to intercept them (and in the last case of a dead calm possibly within their view) there does not seem to be any solid reason why to guard against such accident, we should not be prepared to meet the enemy with *a superior flotilla* of the same sort as his own, without at the same time in the least diminishing the number or size of our other ships in com-

* *Thoughts*, 4.† *Ib.* 6.‡ *Ib.* 23.§ *Ib.* 40.¶ *Ib.* 83.¶¶ *Ib.* 9.

“ commission, on which, if they have an opportunity of acting, we may justly place our greatest reliance*.”

Here, then, unless we extend our naval defence to the construction of a new species of vessel with which we are not yet provided, is a complete admission of my argument against any DEPENDENCE for preserving the existence of our state on a navy ; and if “ solid reasons” can be given against that extension, then, after all that the noble author has said of a navy being “ the best defence of our coast,” and that “ on which our all depends,” he will perhaps be convinced that we have a *better* defence, and one to which we must resort without reserve ; and against which neither the framers of the General Defence Acts, nor any person whatever, has yet given a “ solid reason.”

With regard to the *French* flotilla of “ rowing vessels,” I am not for paying it the compliment of thinking it worth our serious notice. Arm, as our constitution requires, and it becomes instantly useless. Why then go to the expense of building “ a superior flotilla,” merely that we may *possibly* fight the invaders one hour sooner ? I say *possibly*, because here again we have only a *chance* of intercepting them unless we have twice or thrice their number. Mr. *Paine* tells us the original design was to have “ a thousand gun-boats ;” but, circumstanced as our enemy now is, perfectly freed from any reserve in his means or projects for our destruction, in consequence of having laid prostrate our continental allies, will he not, if we continue our present insane conduct, endeavour to make sure of his object by proceeding until he has increased his flotilla to two or three thousand such vessels, capable of bringing over two or three hundred thousand men, or as many of them as can elude our cruizers, or fight their way over ; for rats, we know, if but

* Thoughts on National Defence, 5.

sufficiently numerous, will fight their way through either cats, dogs, or men * ?

I will suppose him provided with three thousand of these gun-boats ; of which in his *Belgic* and *Batavian* harbours he has room and convenience for twenty times the number ; and along the coast of old *France*, from *Dunkirk* to the westward, numerous small harbours in which considerable numbers can shelter. At present I will contemplate only the *Belgic* and *Batavian* ports, not only because Mr. *Paine* has very frankly told us “ it is there the descent will be carried on,” but because I believe our enemy perfectly understands his business. Here I will suppose him to have a flotilla of two thousand for the grand attack ; but for the reasons given in my speech at *Boston*, it will be impossible to know from what outlet in that coast, extending from *Dunkirk* to the N. E. above two hundred miles, this flotilla will issue ; but what is still more to the purpose, to what point of *Essex*, *Suffolk*, *Norfolk*, or *Lincolnshire*, a space also, as Mr. *Paine* remarks, of “ more than two hundred miles,” it intends to direct its course ? How then can we oppose it on the sea with full effect, or give complete secu-

* On making an observation to this effect to Mr. *Holcroft*, that gentleman related a fact of his own knowledge, which may not be wholly uninteresting to the defenders of *Britain* who treat gun-boat flotillas with contempt. The store of corn belonging to a stable was much threatened with invasion by a numerous body of rats ; but as the defence was committed to a cat, a very hero of his species, who daily slew such of the enemy as he could get at, no apprehensions of serious mischief were entertained. But the grooms before day-light one morning, having heard loud shrieks of death, and sounds betokening serious conflict, repaired afterwards to the chamber which had been the scene of action, where to their surprise they found dead the faithful defender of the granary, who had fallen covered with wounds amidst the carcases of all he could slay before he himself, overpowered by numbers, was slain. I have likewise been informed that on *Rat Island*, one of the *Scilly Isles*, no man would be daring enough to pass a night ; and that bull-dogs, landed there in an evening, have been found next morning perfect skeletons.

urity to every part of this long line of coast, without having ourselves *many* such flotillas? But nature has denied us the means of having many such, or even an equality with *France*. Our gun-boats could not cruise upon the enemy's coast. An *English* flotilla in the harbours of any one of these four above-mentioned counties could not defend the coast of any one of the other three. Supposing we had only one opposing flotilla equal to that of the enemy, it ought in that case to be centrally stationed; but although the enemy, as I have observed, has harbours for twenty such flotillas, we have not in such a situation a harbour for even one. For such craft *Yarmouth Roads* are too exposed, and the *Yare* is a miserable tide haven of small capacity; out of which at low water I question whether even gun-boats could proceed to sea. *Boston Deeps* again are not for such craft sufficiently safe; and *Grimsby* has not accommodation. *Harwich* is the only place of security I know; but in the creeks along the coast of *Essex* there may be, for aught that I know to the contrary, convenient shelter.

But how could an *English* flotilla from *Harwich* or the *Essex* creeks oppose a *French* flotilla directed against *Norfolk* or *Lincolnshire*; where, on every account, I most expect one of the grand attempts at invading us to be made; whether I advert to the circumstance of this coast, lying directly opposite the enemy's best ports of preparation; to that of its being, I believe, the best coast in the whole world for the purposes of an invader who may bring a large army and a numerous artillery; or to that of its being at a convenient distance from *London*, convenient I mean to an invader, who sees the strength of our defence drawn to the south coast, and those points which may be termed the outposts of the metropolis? And from the character of the Emperor *Napoleon*, and the situation in which he now finds himself on the continent, what have we to look for, sooner or later, but such an attempt, unless we shall completely re-

store to "full vigour and energy" *the military branch of our constitution*; unless to avert it, we make such a peace as *Austria* has just made at *Presburg*? And how long would *such* a peace put off the return of war and the storm of invasion?

I have taken no notice of the lost time, the inconvenience, and the cost attending our building "a superior flotilla" to that of *France*. To create such a flotilla would take more time, many times over, than to pass an act of parliament for arming according to the constitution, and carrying that measure into execution. The timber for such a purpose, considering how scarce and dear it is become, would add to those inconveniencies already too severely felt both in the public and private dock-yards. Three thousand only of such gun-boats as Mr. *Paine* describes would require *one hundred and fifty thousand* men to row them; and not much less than two millions and a half to build and furnish them with the necessary tackle and artillery; and all this for no other end or purpose, as I conceive, than the mere *chance* of fighting your enemy an hour or two sooner, by meeting him on the water, instead of opposing him at land. But is not this to persist in error? Is it not to look for defence, and to seek security, in every thing, and any thing, except that which nature and common sense point out, and which our constitution *prescribes*? Is it not this radical error of relying upon our navy, and upon the fooleries of a volunteer system, while we persist in rejecting the system of *Alfred*, than which human wisdom never produced its equal, to which we owe the very *dangers of invasion* at all? Let *England* but once raise on her potent arm the true *Ægis* of her Defence, and wield the birth-right sword of her freedom, she will then hear no more of invasion or invaders; nor be insulted with demands, as the conditions of peace, that would degrade our country, and prove the sure preparative of her final and speedy ruin.

Fourthly. ‘To what extent ought we to arm?’

In the “*Ægis*” it is maintained that we are absolutely required by our constitution, to have at least 1,200,000 men completely armed; and that here “is not one man or one musquet too much*.” Although the author feels confident that his reasons, both political and military, are unanswerable; yet as he has now to support his doctrine against a more limited scale of arms and plan of defence, which plan, as far as it goes, is excellent, of very great intrinsic value, and such as bespeaks the hand of a master; and which plan, by mere implication, in the minds of many of those who know what respect is due to the experience and great talents of its noble author, may be thought to invalidate the extended plan of the “*Ægis*,” I feel called upon for a few further observations, tending to show that the *scale* of defence of the “*Ægis*” is the scale of *safety*, and that of the “*Thoughts*” the scale of *danger*, and possibly of *ruin*. If I thought myself the best general in the world, I should not dare to offer any plan of defence, which should tend to keep arms out of the hands of a single *Englishman*, who is bound by the common law of the land, as well as by every duty a man can owe his country, and kindred, and posterity, to bear arms for the public defence.

I begin with desiring the reader to recollect that the 500,000 men provided by the plan of the “*Thoughts*,” are, according to that plan, distributed around the whole coast, and along the whole interior of *England*; and, from the dreadful experience at this moment before his eyes, to observe, that it is the *concentration* of military force on the proper point by which countries, in the perilous game of war, are lost or won. I entreat that this remark may not for a moment be lost sight of.—By

* Vol. i. 37.

this criterion, then, let us try the merits of the plan to which the noble author is reduced, by reducing the number of men to be armed to so low a scale as he proposes. Superficial observers may think it superior to the plan explained in the "*Ægis*," because on the secure and rocky shores of *Cumberland* and *Westmoreland*, where I admit there is at present little danger, there is in the "*Thoughts*" less provision against it, and in *Kent* where, according to the noble author, the danger is greatest, he opposes the greatest resisting force; but without adverting to the *constitutional* and very solid reasons for a different distribution of arms* bearing shown by me to be *necessary*, let it be observed, that I am not without a *military* reason for leaving the western coast of *England* in full possession of their natural and constitutional strength; for I have said "seeing the enormous power to which *France* has attained, and looking forward to that period when she must have at her command a powerful navy, as well as to the *possible* separation of *Ireland* from our empire (unless justice be done that much-injured country) it has appeared to the writer to be the truest wisdom not to lose a moment in forming arrangements, whereby *every portion* and *every point of our coast* would, at all times, have the most complete security *."

Where the plan of the "*Thoughts*" gives the greatest strength, it is mere weakness compared with that which to the same point is given on the system of the constitution explained in the "*Ægis*." The noble author himself talks of 3 or 400,000 men having been reported near two years ago as held in readiness for invading us; and he well knows the *French* ideas of a concentration of force. He has also admitted that, through various accidents, "the enemy's" "*flotilla may cross the channel* without our ships being

* Vol. i. 28.

“able to intercept them* ;” and yet the defences he proposes appear to me very inadequate to the danger to be provided against.

Let us begin our comparison where the Duke is the strongest, as apprehensive of greatest danger; including *Essex* and *Kent*.

I have carefully extracted the whole force assigned for the defence of these counties, including the militias of <i>Kent</i> , <i>Sussex</i> , <i>Surrey</i> , <i>Berkshire</i> , <i>Oxfordshire</i> , <i>Buckinghamshire</i> , and half <i>Middlesex</i> , making a force of 26,863, besides yeomanry 5021, and 6600 regulars; total	}	38489
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Then for <i>Essex</i> , he provides its own militia, and those also of <i>Hertfordshire</i> , <i>Bedfordshire</i> , and half <i>Middlesex</i> , 14,240, besides yeomanry 2053, and 3200 regulars; total	}	19493
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For <i>London</i> he allots its own volunteers, 13,443, and 3,200 regulars; total	}	16643
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74625

But there is an unembodied militia; which, in case of real attack, is to be immediately collected and brought forward, equal in number to the embodied, namely, 200,000; besides 100,000 of a more aged class; which are not to be instructed in any thing but firing at a mark, and are not proposed to leave their own vicinities. But I will suppose these also to be among his Grace's auxiliaries in case of necessity. Then, in this case we must add to the militia already enumerated, a reinforcement in the proportion of three to two. The collective militias being 41,108, we must therefore add 61,662 to the above collective total of 74,625; which gives in the whole 136,287 men.

Now in page 60 and 61 of my first volume, it will be seen that the city of *London* and all these counties, except *Berkshire* and *Oxfordshire*, are comprehended in my third military district; but to make the comparison strictly just, the constitutional system must have the advantage of those two counties; which therefore I shall now include in my calculation. The entire number to be provided with fire-arms according to the *Ægis* being 1,200,000 for a population, according to the returns under the Population Act, as given in the *Monthly Magazine* for January 1805, of 8,331,434 souls; we shall easily find the relative armed force of each respective county compared with its population; and I follow authorities I do not at this instant recollect, in estimating the arms-bearers from 15 to 60 years of age at one fifth of the whole.

The population, and consequently the force capable of bearing arms, will be as in the following table:—

	POPULATION.	ARMED FORCE.
<i>Sussex</i>	159,311	31,862
<i>Kent</i>	307,624	61,524
<i>Surrey</i>	269,043	53,808
<i>Berkshire</i>	109,215	21,843
<i>Oxfordshire</i>	109,620	21,922
<i>Bucks</i>	107,444	21,488
<i>Middlesex</i> *	818,129	163,226
<i>Essex</i>	226,437	45,287
<i>Hertfordshire</i>	97,577	19,513
<i>Bedfordshire</i>	63,393	12,278
	2,267,793	453,558

* If in this table *London* be included in *Middlesex*, which it ought not to be, then my present argument will be correct; but if *London* have been omitted by mistake, then the constitutional plan will have in this comparison a very great disadvantage.

But as in the "*Ægis*" it is not proposed to give fire-arms to the whole, but only to 1,200,000; we are now to calculate how many of the 2,267,793 would be so armed, which we find to be 326,635; which of course is the true number to be compared with the number proposed to bear like arms in the plan of the "*Thoughts*."

Strength according to the " <i>Ægis</i> "	326,635
Strength according to the " <i>Thoughts</i> "	136,287
Difference	190,348

which is twice the number, and above 54,000 to spare; and thus we see the propriety of the encomium bestowed upon the long-bows used by our *county power*, in the act of parliament which passed in the thirty-third year of King *Henry* the Eighth, c. 6, in calling them "the surety, safe-guard, and continual defence, of this realm of *England*, " and an inestimable dread and terror to the enemies of the " same;" which they could not have been considered, had they not been the arms of the people; and to what extent they were so, we see by c. 9, of the same year, which enacts that all men " within the age of *sixty* years (except " the clergy and the judges) shall, from the feast of *Pentecost* " next coming, use and exercise shooting in long-bows, " &c."—" and that every man having a man-child or " men-children in his house, shall provide, ordain, and have " in his house for every man-child being of the age of " *seven* years and above, till he shall come to the age of " *seventeen* years, a bow and two shafts, &c."

It is a feature common to both plans to be the strongest where there is most danger, but that danger is rather differently considered and differently provided for. In the "*Thoughts*" the danger seems to have mere relation to the supposed facility by which an enemy can cross a narrow sea, rather than a

broadier one ; which may prove a delusive dependence ; and the greatest defensive force is provided accordingly ; while the coast of *Lincolnshire*, which I consider as of all others most likely to be invaded, is in that plan comparatively weak in the extreme. Both writers consider the wealth of the metropolis and its environs, and their importance to the state, as adding to the danger of the south-east part of the country, by the inducements they hold out to the rapacity and malice of *French* invaders ; but the principle of defence is materially different. By the constitutional system, where there is the greatest wealth, there is invariably the greatest strength, because there is the greatest population ; but a different principle too much prevails in the “ *Thoughts*,” as may be exemplified in *Lancashire*, where the wealth is immense, *Liverpool* being next to *London* in trade, and the county full of manufacturers. For this whole county the plan of the “ *Thoughts*” furnishes only a militia and yeomanry of 10,342 men ; although we recollect the attempt of *Thurot*, when there was not a *Napoleon* on the throne of *France*, nor was the *France* of that day more than an infant in strength, talent, and energy, in comparison with the *France* of our time. It ought not to surprise us, therefore, if a squadron should slip out of *Brest* or *Ferrol*, pass north-about and wide of *Ireland*, and make a sudden descent on *Liverpool* for mere depredation and mischief. The noble author, after very concisely mentioning the above force, adds, “ *Liverpool* or *Manchester* might also raise volunteer corps ;” a force, however, which he holds in sovereign contempt, as nothing better than mere associations for supporting the police. Now the constitution, which knows nothing of such inefficient novelties, provides for *Lancashire* 134,546 fighting men ; which reduced as above, according to the limitation of the “ *Ægis*,” for fire arms, would still be 96,871 musqueteers, instead of 10,342, with a surplus also of 37,675 pike and spear-men.

But let us return to the east coast. “Considering,” says the noble author of the “Thoughts,” “the *distance* of “the county of *Norfolk* from *London*, and the powerful “force that would be stationed between them, it is pre-
“sumed that 8156 men, stationary in that county, with
“about 2000 from *Cambridgeshire* at hand, might be suf-
“ficient to resist A FIRST LANDING; and *Norwich* and
“*Yarmouth* might have volunteer corps for their own pro-
“tection and the *police* of the country.

“*Lincolnshire*, still more remote from *London*, would
“have its own embodied militia 5432; and its yeomanry of
“713; to which might be added the militia of *Notting-*
“*hamshire* 2256, *Leicestershire* 2572, and *Rutland* 332;
“besides the yeomanries of those three counties, 472, 622,
“and 160; making a total of 12,559*.”

“A FIRST-LANDING,” if we do not well consider what
sort of a landing it may be, and prepare to crush all the effects
of it in the bud, may prove decisive of the fate of the king-
dom!

Now considering that *London* and the whole kingdom
is, in my judgment, in far more danger from a descent
in *Lincolnshire* than any other part of the coast, I must
here again, as before, enter into a close comparison of the
two systems of defence, as applying to the approach of an
enemy from this quarter. According to the plan of the

“Thoughts” we see here provided	12,559
Also, as above	10,156
<i>Suffolk</i> Militia	4,168
Yeomanry	769
<i>Huntingdon</i> Militia	636
	5,573
Regulars	2,200
Carried over	30,488

* Thoughts, 96.

Brought forward	30,488
<i>Cambridge Yeomanry</i>	163
<i>Huntingdonshire ditto</i>	166
	329
<i>Essex Militia</i>	4,976
<i>Yeomanry</i>	1,251
<i>Regulars</i>	3,200
<i>Half Middlesex Militia</i>	6,076
<i>Hertfordshire Militia</i>	1,920
<i>Yeomanry</i>	625
<i>Bedfordshire Militia</i>	1,268
<i>Yeomanry</i>	177
	19,493
Latent, or Supplementry Militia, to be } added in Proportion of 3 to 2 }	48,456
<i>London Regulars</i>	3,000
<i>Volunteers</i>	13,443
Total of Force for the present Object, according } to the " <i>Thoughts</i> " }	115,209

TABLE OF POPULATION AND ARMED FORCE.

	POPULATION.	ARMED FORCE.
<i>Lincolnshire</i>	208,557	41,711
<i>Nottinghamshire</i>	140,350	28,070
<i>Leicestershire</i>	130,081	26,010
<i>Rutlandshire</i>	16,356	3,271
<i>Norfolk</i>	273,371	54,674
<i>Suffolk</i>	210,431	42,086
<i>Cambridgeshire</i>	89,346	17,869
<i>Huntingdonshire</i>	37,568	7,513
<i>Northamptonshire</i>		
<i>Essex</i>	226,437	45,287
Carried over	1,332,497	266,491

Brought forward	1,332,497	266,491
<i>Middlesex</i>	818,129	103,626
<i>Herts</i>	97,577	19,515
<i>Bedfordshire</i>	63,393	12,658
	2,311,596	462,319

Although *Northamptonshire*, with a population of 131,757, belongs to this part of my distribution, yet I omit its force, because it does not fall within the corresponding distribution of the noble Duke; and for the same reason I also omit *Buckinghamshire*, whose population is 107,444; although as his Grace assigns it for the support of *Kent*, it would doubtless advance in support of *London* if approached by an enemy from the north. Here again I must reduce the number of armed men in this table by the same rule as before, which brings it down to 332,958, being still 217,749 more than provided by the noble author of the "*Thoughts*," for the defence of the capital if attacked by an enemy landing in *Lincolnshire*.

I will touch only on another point of comparison. The noble author of the "*Thoughts*" has followed the example of the "*Ægis*," in forming a *Reserve* of a certain number of central counties. His are,

		MILITIA.	
<i>Warwickshire</i>	3,412		
Its Yeomanry	708		
			4,120
<i>Derbyshire</i>	3,756		
Its Yeomanry	330		
			4,086
<i>Shropshire</i>	3,964		
Its Yeomanry	940		
			4,904
Carried over			13,110

Brought forward . . .	13,110
<i>Northamptonshire</i> . . .	2,896
Its Yeomanry . . .	1,037
	3,933
	22,665

The reserve of the “*Ægis*” is as follows:

	POPULATION.	ARMED FORCE.
<i>Derbyshire</i>	161,142	32,228
<i>Staffordshire</i>	239,153	47,830
<i>Shropshire</i>	167,639	33,527
<i>Herefordshire</i>	89,191	17,838
<i>Worcestershire</i>	139,333	27,866
<i>Warwickshire</i>	208,190	41,638
<i>Oxfordshire</i>		
<i>Northamptonshire</i>	131,757	26,351
	1,136,405	227,281

I strike out the force of *Oxfordshire*, because I have included it before, in order to make a fair comparison; but I have here added *Northamptonshire*, as, although it belonged to one of my foregoing districts, I did not then include it, because, in the plan of the “*Thoughts*,” it was not in any corresponding distribution, and is included in the reserve of that plan. And it must strike every attentive observer that, notwithstanding the constitutional system is every where so much more powerful upon the coast, I am still able to throw into a central reserve three whole counties more than the author of the “*Thoughts*,” namely those of *Hereford*, *Worcester*, and *Oxford*, now changed for *Northamptonshire*. My force here being reduced to the proportion that would bear fire-arms, proves to be only 163,679, which is

more than the central reserve of the other plan by 141,014 men.

Now, if the reader pleases, we will return for a minute to the county of *Kent*, that we may see in a proper light one main feature of the two plans. *Kent* is opposite *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Boulogne*, where the channel is very narrow; and it reaches from the coast to the very skirts of the metropolis, which a *French* army, if too powerful to be checked by the force in readiness for instant opposition, might reach in two days. Now, according to the plan of the "*Thoughts*," which is by far the best I have yet seen, except that of the *Constitution*, and to which I believe it to have been intended as an approximation, and as much as the noble author could expect from the miserable ministers of our country; according, I say, to the plan of the "*Thoughts*," we see armed and employed in defence of *Kent* no more of its own proper inhabitants than

Its own Yeomanry	1,650
Its embodied Militia	5,184
And its Supplementary Militia, to be collected on } the alarm	7,776
	14,610
Whereas it ought to furnish of fighting Men .	61,524
So here then remain	46,914

men of *Kent*, who, by this system, are doomed to remain helpless spectators of a *French* army, probably acting in co-operation with other powerful armies of invaders who have already landed in the north and in the west, pushing for *London*, on a march more properly counted by hours than by days, to overthrow the government, the laws, and liberties of *England*!

And instead of the 14,610 armed inhabitants of *Kent* being supported by these 61,524 men of *Kent* itself ready on the spot, they are to be supported by 6,076 armed inhabitants of *Middlesex*, posted near the *Medway*, and 2,396 of the *Buckinghamshire men* lying at “*Colcbrook* and its environs;” making together 8,472 men; to which we will add the proportions of supplementary, making 12,708 more, as soon as they can be collected; and giving a total of armed inhabitants of *Kent*, *Middlesex*, and *Buckinghamshire*, of 35,790, while, as already observed, here are in *Kent* itself 61,524 men unarmed!

Now, according to the system of the Constitution detailed in the “*Ægis*,” of these 61,524 men of *Kent*, 44,307 of them would have fire arms, and the remainder pikes and spears, and, without ever sending one unnecessary mile for men, the whole physical strength of the country would, in the first instance, be every where applicable to its defence; and according to the circumstances of danger any proportion of this force, on the admirable plan detailed in the “*Thoughts*,” p. 62, 65, might be kept as advanced guards in camps or quarters.

I have not here adverted to the noble author’s “central corps of 22,665 ready to march” to any part of the coast, because the nearest of them are in *Northamptonshire* and *Warwickshire*, and I suspect, before an enemy lands in *Kent*, will have been marched in other directions to meet other invaders.

In our present state, and under our present plan, I shall expect a double or triple system of military diversion to be attempted by the enemy. As he already sees that he has made his *Boulogne* army the object of our principal apprehension, he will endeavour to rivet there our attention, and in all the narrower parts of the channel will be continually making demonstrations of a descent, in order, if possible, to draw still more of our force to the coasts of *Kent* and *Sussex*,

in favour of his landing a powerful army in *Lincolnshire*, and a strong force in the west. If he shall succeed in such attempts, the diversion of our force from the south and south-east coasts, perilous as it may be, must of necessity take place to a most extensive degree; and if it be on this force so arranged on those coasts we rely for security against the *Boulogne* army, nothing will then remain to us but to pray to Heaven that, as we have neglected our proper means of security, neither storms nor dark nights, nor calms nor contrary winds, may aid the designs of our enemies.

That the reader may be the better able to estimate the two systems here compared, he will be pleased to recollect that, in respect of the limited plan which turns upon MILITARY CALCULATION—a system which the constitution utterly disclaims,—the greater the distance from *London* at which an enemy may land, the more it is in favour of that system, as allowing more time for raising up and collecting some considerable force to oppose the invaders. And that I may assign to the enemy who may land in *Lincolnshire* the greatest distance that is at all probable, I suppose the descent to be made seven miles beyond *Wainfleet Haven*, which haven is the central position between the open and the sheltered parts of the coast, and thirty miles more distant than a very commodious part of the coast of *Norfolk*. Should the wind be fair from *Holland*, he might land equally well seven miles on this side of *Wainfleet*; but I will still take the other supposition, in which case his landing will be 137 miles from *London*. Here, then, at the distance of 137 miles from *London*, on a shore where an army of two hundred thousand men, or of any conceivable magnitude, may land in a single hour, and its artillery and stores in a single ebb of the tide, let us imagine an enemy landed. Now, according to the "*Thoughts*," p. 84, the unembodied part of the militia, which is three-fifths of the whole, "may be assembled in every county in less than a week after the ene-

“ my appears in force off the coast;” but we are to remember that when the *Persians* were pouring into the *Athenian* state, with 100,000 chosen men, an army of *Lacedemonians*, flying to the aid of *Athens*, marched the same distance of 137 miles in *three days**.

The noble author of the “*Thoughts*” says, that “ when the fate of the nation depends upon the issue, and “ we have it in our power, perhaps by double and treble “ numbers to have that additional advantage, it would “ be MADNESS in us to neglect it†;” but, if the landing in *Lincolnshire* should be effected by *one hundred and twenty thousand* men, on looking a few pages back we find the whole force he has provided between *London* and this county is little more than *one hundred and fifteen thousand*; and that above *forty-eight thousand* of those are the unembodied militia to be collected from all parts of the several counties of *Lincoln*, *Nottingham*, *Leicester*, *Rutland*, *Cambridge*, *Hertford*, *Bedford*, *Norfolk*, *Suffolk*, *Essex*, and *Middlesex*, on their respectively receiving intelligence of “ the enemy appearing in force off the coast;” when perhaps (such are the facilities to an invader on the shore of *Lincolnshire*) that if he came with a fair wind, he might be landed before an express could get out of that county.

According to the “*Thoughts*,” p. 96, the only force supposed to be stationed in that county is its “ embodied militia of 5,432,” to be, I presume, encamped or quartered near the coast. As for its 713 yeomanry, they, of course, lie widely scattered. But such handfuls of men must fly with some speed to escape being captured by the light troops of the enemy, pushing forward with the utmost rapidity. As for the 5,160 from *Nottinghamshire*, *Leicestershire*, and *Rutland*, “ collected on the borders of *Lincolnshire*,” it cannot be their business to meet such an army, but to run a

* See vol. i. p. 27.

† *Thoughts*, 3.

race with it towards *London*, in order to join the gathering forces in the south. And the same must be the conduct of the *Norfolk* 8156 men ready under arms, and in short those of all the other intermediate counties; for, on the plan of the "*Thoughts*," no possible stand can be made, no possible impediment can be opposed, until the *French* army shall be in the immediate vicinity of *London*, and the fate of the kingdom shall come to be decided between an army of such troops, headed by such generals, as recently decided the fate of *Austria*, opposed by an *inferior* number of *English* forces, of whom only 10,800 are regulars, including the artillery, and the rest militia, led by country gentlemen, the major part of them imperfectly trained, and collected together in an extreme of hurry not unlikely to produce the utmost confusion; and when we consider the rapidity of *French* marches, the impossibility, in the supposed case, of either checking or diverting them from the shortest line of march, how can we suppose that one half of the 48,000 unembodied militia, of whom 16,000 would be of the most aged class, who, it is proposed "should be required only to practise firing ball on a Sunday, near or within some small given distance of their own parishes*," could ever arrive in time for even sharing in the action?

Good God! when shall we see an end put to all these systems of MILITARY CALCULATION, and have the sense and honesty to return to the long-neglected system of the CONSTITUTION, under which, if *Frenchmen* should then be so mad as to invade us, they would see, at every step they took, armed men spring up like grass, in their front, upon their flanks, and in their rear, countless for multitude, irresistible for number, and allowing them not a moment for rest, and no respite from fighting day or night, until they should surrender!

* *Thoughts*, 70.

Not to neglect any material point in which the two systems ought to be compared, let us now notice that of Horse Artillery. Mr. *Paine* has informed us that when he and *Bonaparte* formerly intended to land together in *Lincolnshire*, their *hundred thousand men* were to have had *one thousand field pieces*; and of course if an army of *one hundred and twenty thousand* should hereafter land on the same plan, they would have *twelve hundred* pieces of cannon. Be this as it might, on the plan of the "*Thoughts*," there appear to be attached to the troops from *Lincolnshire* to *London* only *one hundred* field pieces, whereas on that explained in the "*Ægis*" there would be *three hundred and sixty*; as a regular establishment at all times. In time of war, if ever there should be the smallest indications of a design to invade us, counties affording such facilities for invasion as that of *Lincolnshire*, ought to have their artillery proportionally augmented. It is however indeed the settled persuasion on my mind that, prepared as we should be, had we once restored to full vigour and energy *the military branch of the constitution*, the *French* emperor would from that moment desist from any idea of an invasion, whether it should be with a hope of subduing us, or for exercising upon us an expensive terror; and that of course we soon might have a peace at once honourable and secure.

Slight observers, who do not profess to have any great judgment themselves on the subject of this discussion, may be disposed to think more favourably of the system of the "*Thoughts*" than of that of the "*Ægis*," from observing that in the former it is proposed to keep embodied in time of war, in first and second lines of encampment or of quarters, and with a minute and scientific distribution of force proportioned to estimated danger, no less than 291,000 effective men*; whereas, except proposing "at all times of danger

* *Thoughts*, 118.

“ to furnish strong permanent succours” to *Cornwall*, and advanced posts of “ no more troops in actual pay than just sufficient for centinels on the coast,” is all that is in that way distinctly mentioned in the “ *Ægis* ;” besides slightly hinting at a possible “ camp, or collected force *”.

In reply I observe, that the author of the “ *Thoughts*” is an experienced general and engineer, from whom such distributions come with a good grace ; and that the CALCULATING SYSTEM of defence stands in need of all the science that all his military genius and experience can furnish ; and even then, if ever put to the test by a *Napoleon*, will in the hour of trial miserably fail. Such distributions from the author of the “ *Ægis*,” had his knowledge of the country been equal to them, would have been deemed impertinent. But he had neither the necessary knowledge of localities, nor does the system for which he is an advocate need them. He does not *appoint to the enemy the places at which he shall land, and there only* prepare to receive him ; because, land where he will, he shows how it may be rendered impossible for him to advance.

Showing the government the power, the machinery, by which it is self-evident that the most formidable attacks may be repelled, it is their business, not his, to apply that machinery, and wield that power ; and the means are too simple to need for the most part pointing at.

Now it is this very minute and scientific distribution of the force exhibited in the plan of the “ *Thoughts*,” which betrays its real weakness, and shows the system there unfolded to be a system of defence on a wrong principle. It proves it to be defence upon CALCULATION, instead of defence according to NATURE and the CONSTITUTION ; and far too much defence by SCIENCE, instead of defence by PHYSICAL FORCE. Give us, as our

* Appeal 102, 103.

solid basis, all the physical force which the constitution *provides* and *prescribes*, and then as much science in addition as you please! But when misgovernment the most wicked, as well as policy the most insane, have brought us to the dire necessity of preparing to fight upon *English* ground, that we may not become the slaves of a *French* tyrant, it is truly melancholy to see a nobleman of superior understanding, of great military knowledge and experience,—one who speaks with warmth of expression on “the excellence of the great “measure so nobly conceived by the proposers of the General Defence Act,” while he seems to suspect they “felt themselves unequal to carry it into effect*,”—a measure that would, as he presumes, have given us “a general armament “of the people, under a regular system of discipline†,” instead of our “never-to-be-made-orderly corps of volunteers‡,”—it is, I say, truly melancholy to see such a nobleman, evidently as a compromise with the folly and the want of honesty in our rulers, compelled to offer us science as a substitute for more than half our physical powers of repelling invasion! And now that our situation, in consequence of the battle of *Austerlitz*, must be better felt and understood by the *English* public than heretofore, it is to be hoped the noble author will no longer adhere to his reserve, but decidedly avow his whole mind on the important subject.

As for my pen, exerted as it has been in the “Appeal, “*Civil and Military*, on the Subject of the English Constitution,” and in this work, towards establishing the true doctrines of defence, it has not, I am conscious, such an authority as the public mind in military matters is disposed to lean upon; nor as ministers who feel themselves unequal to carry their own best military conceptions into execution are likely to be influenced by; but if it shall call the atten-

* Thoughts, 50.

† lb. 54.

‡ lb. 50.

tion of only a single leading parliamentary man to the subject, and satisfy him of the rectitude of the principle I maintain, that, in our own constitution, and in the common law of the land, we have the best and grandest system of national defence that human wisdom ever produced, I may not have written in vain.

I am aware that many readers may be disposed to ask me, if it be my real opinion, that we are in danger of such an armament, as I speak of, making a descent so far from *London* as the west of *Lincolnshire*. My answer decidedly is, that if we continue the war, and our present defensive system, it may be expected; and even to a greater extent than I have supposed; for the continuance of such a system would, to a mind of half the penetration of that of *Napoleon*, be a demonstration of the feasibility of a conquest. He is one who does not do things by halves; and now having no continental enemy, no rival who dares lift up a finger to thwart him, why should he not make the attempt? And if he should, although he will bring with him plenty of military science, he will not, we may depend upon it, leave behind him *more than half the physical force* necessary to his enterprise.

In case of a safe landing in *Lincolnshire*, I have supposed the *French* general to run a race with our collecting troops for *London*; but at what rate the troops of that nation, distinguished for lightness of baggage and celerity of movement, can execute a forced march of a few days for striking a great blow, I do not exactly know; but this we all know, that from the sea coast of *France* to *Austerlitz*, (which is a distance, according to my map, of more than a thousand miles) a *French* army, opposed by regular armies, by veterans against veterans, by science against science, physical force against physical force, found the way through the capital of their enemy, driving all before them, and over-running the country with a rapidity unparalleled

in history, ancient or modern ; and there at one stroke ended the continental war ; and that their general then sat down near the field of battle, to cut down *Austria* from a first to a second-rate power, and to new-organize at his pleasure all the kingdoms and states from *Naples* to the river *Weser*.

But what, if a *French* general landing with a *hundred* or a *hundred and fifty thousand* men in *Lincolnshire*, should NOT march for *London*, but take such a course and with such designs as I have supposed in page 50, what then must be the first fruits of a war thus brought into the bowels of our country ? If he carried the war into the West Riding of *Yorkshire* and *Lancashire*, abounding with strong military positions, have our *calculating* defenders calculated the mischiefs that might be done, or the period within which those mischiefs could, if ever, be repaired ? Have they calculated by what military skill he might be dislodged ? What regular, or other force to be relied on, could be left in the south for the defence of the metropolis ? And on what schemes for hermetically sealing up all the ports of *France* from *Dunkirk* to the Bay of *Biscay* we must depend for preventing the possibility of new invasions in the south-east, the south, and the west ?

But as I have already touched upon the possibility of other invasions before such an army could be stayed in its course of desolation, I will not return to that part of my subject. I may however demand of any advocate for the *calculating* system of defence, if he can give his country a demonstration—not a probability, but—a positive demonstration, that she cannot be invaded by the warrior that is collecting his armies for the purpose ? And I may again ask for another demonstration, that if so invaded, as I have supposed possible, the mischief and calamity that must happen would not be incalculable and extreme ? And I may go one step further, and demand a sound reason why, in the latter case, the state itself might not perish ?—And if I have proved

that, even without misemploying our navy on home defence, the plain system of the constitution is a complete and perfect security against all or any of these evils, then what a disgusting and contemptuous idea must we form of the pretended statesmen who for the last thirteen years have conducted the affairs of our country?

Now if, by respectfully bowing to the constitution, we obtain a solid superiority of force over the plan of the "*Thoughts*," to no less an extent than *seven hundred thousand* well-armed men, what can be more decisive of the superiority of the constitutional system? And under such a security, could we in war, unless the greatest preparations for invading us were in much forwardness, ever want more, as an advanced guard upon our *border*, than the armed inhabitants in their own houses? Should we then need to incur such an annual bill of costs for our defence, as we find presented us in the "*Thoughts*" (p. 76) amounting to "*nearly five millions and a half*," with its long train of "*extraordinary expenses*?"—I must needs think not; and I must also believe, as I have said over and over again, that we should hear no more of invasion or invader; that all the long faces in *England* would be changed into happy countenances, and all the aching hearts into bosoms glowing with the honest pride of conscious strength. Mr. *Thomas Paine* would then see the performance of his "*impossible*;" his friend *Bonaparte* would no longer see a "*weak and defenceless part of England*;" and *France* being taught that she could not any longer "*hold the English government*" "*in terror, and the whole country in alarm, whenever she pleases, and as long as she pleases*," we should soon be blessed with peace on terms of honourable equality with that mighty power, at whose feet so many states on the continent lie prostrate.

Continuing in this constitutional attitude, an attitude which can alone become a free people, those statesmen who

have lamented that “ at the commencement of war the state
 “ of our military preparation has never at all corresponded
 “ with the means of exertion which the country possessed,”
 would no longer have cause of complaint. And those persons, of whom the Duke of *Richmond* takes a slight contemptuous notice, who, either ignorantly, or wickedly, prate about “ a ferocious military nation *obliging* all other countries, at all times, to maintain large *standing armies* for “ their own defence”—“ as *Austria, Prussia, and Russia*,” which alone, according to these shallow, if not impudent praters, “ preserve any degree of INDEPENDENCE,” and which these contemptible beings pretend makes it “ particularly necessary that *England*, to maintain hers, should “ follow the same plan *;”—these persons, I say, who thus expose their ignorance, or their perfidy, would then be put to silence and shame. Yes ! to be sure, *Austria, Prussia, and Russia*, with a collective population to furnish FIFTEEN MILLIONS OF FIGHTING MEN, have shown us how serviceable STANDING ARMIES are for preserving national “ *independence ! !* ”—Proud *Austria* lies trampled under foot ; *Prussia* shrinks at the sight of the uplifted rod ; and *Russia*, to her frozen north again retires, winding homeward her mangled columns, like wounded snakes dragging their slow length along † !—Edifying sights, truly, for teaching the efficacy of STANDING ARMIES towards the independence of nations, and the honour of thrones !—Open, O infatuated *England*, thine eyes, ere thou sharest the *Austrian* fate !—The *Austrian* fate, said I ? No, no : no *Austrian* fate ; no intermediate rank among the nations to which inferior states may still look up. If *thou* fallest, to the lowest of the low will be thy descent ! If dead to the call of virtue, if lost to all sense of thy ancient freedom, if

* *Thoughts*, 21.

† *Pope*.

nor liberty nor glory can animate thee to shake off thy borough pestilence and regain the pure health of genuine representation ; if not danger in her most terrific form can arouse thee to snatch up thy *legal* sword, and wield thy *constitutional* Ægis, thy fall, thy degradation is at hand !—If thus insensible—if thus morally paralytic—if thus ungrateful to Heaven and ripe for destruction, then indeed mayst thou see in this *Napoleon* the bolt of divine vengeance to strike, to punish, to degrade, thee !

But, I am asked if, in the volunteering of the *four hundred thousand* men I see not the spirit I invoke ?—No : the courage I see is merely personal—animal. It is a courage common to the *English* volunteer, the *French* conscript, and the *slavish* soldier of *German* despotism ; ay, to the bulldog and the tiger. It is another sort of courage *England* needs ; not the courage of man, as he is an animal, but as he is a citizen ; the courage of combined knowledge and patriotism ; that courage which denounces the corruption of the legislator, and curbs the despotism of the ruler ! Until this courage shall appear, the state cannot be saved.—I am again asked, was not this the courage I witnessed at *Hackney* on the 2d of May last, and the voice of which resounded through the land ? True, true, I do now remember something of a right feeling, a transient glow of indignation ; but it was about money, not the constitution. There was great stir and much thunder against a *placeman* who had abused his pecuniary trust ; but not a bolt was hurled at TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN LEGISLATORS, who, believing the culprit merited *impeachment*, yet gave a profligate vote to skreen him from *censure* ! TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN men, calling themselves representatives of the people, whom yet no popular, no public sentiment could touch, nor any feeling, but a feeling in favour of those who plundered the public treasury ! Loud indeed was the cry, about the violation of a particular law ; but the violations of

the constitution by the same man and his compeer in power for twenty preceding years, made not the least impression, nor added a single note to the chorus of accusation! The deep and malignant treachery of both these men to the state, in the point now immediately under consideration—that of *the military branch of the constitution*—must now be seen in all its deformity, by every man who shall examine the state of our defence, and shall trace those ministers through all their scandalous progress in arming, to preserve the country from the dangers brought on it by their own pernicious counsels, from the first factious formation of their yeomanry corps, down to their contemptible Parish Bill, with all their intermediate frauds, and swindlings respecting the militia; while down to this moment not one military step was taken by them, but, rightly considered, was a stab to the constitution.

But let me return from this digression, and conclude my remarks upon the Duke of *Richmond's* “Thoughts on National Defence.” Freely, but I trust candidly, have I delivered my sentiments; for, as an individual *Englishman*, I feel constitutionally and highly indebted to his Grace. He and I appear to be so much agreed in principle, that all our difference seems to be in degree, unless in what respects the navy; and when the noble author of the “*Thoughts*” shall see completely restored *the military branch of the constitution*, I am confident he will instantly feel that our commerce and our colonies, our unhappy *Erin* and our eastern dependencies, may engross to themselves our whole naval force for their protection without the want being perceived towards *Great Britain's* defence.

From passages in the work which I have quoted, and from the whole essay being so remarkably free from that tincture of unconstitutional notions so common in the defensive systems of the day, it is my conviction that it was written under the impression of that maxim in common life, that half a loaf is better than no bread. But now that

the battle of *Austerlitz* has placed us in a new situation, a situation in which a common sense of danger, if not a general regard for the constitution, has disposed the public mind, as I trust, to a comparison of systems, it becomes important that this of his Grace, should not be considered as the best which his knowledge of the constitution could have produced, but merely as the best which at the time of writing he thought likely to be adopted. Hence the very merit of the system, so likely to gain approbation, has induced me to bring it into comparison with the plain old system of our common law and constitution; a compliment I have not thought it necessary to pay that of any other amongst the numerous writings on defence. If I have in any particular mis-stated its provisions, it has not been intentionally; and as the Duke is no admirer of "half measures*," nor am I to be contented with half a constitution, now the time is arrived when it is probable a complete system will be most acceptable, perhaps my humble labours may not be altogether disregarded.

After having fulfilled the very painful task of drawing a disadvantageous comparison, let me now render the praise that is justly due to this excellent performance. The reasoning in the "*Thoughts*" against those statesmen who have argued in favour of offensive war being our best defensive system, in which reasoning the relative condition and strength for land operations of *England* and *France* are extremely judicious, is perfectly unanswerable. The pointed observations of the noble author against that perilous novelty, a volunteer army, the magnitude of which is a mischief that may bring ruin on the country, are worthy of the deepest attention. All the rational volunteers themselves would hail the melting down of their system into a COUNTY POWER, or truly national and natural militia; for they, I believe, are completely con-

* *Thoughts*.

scious of the imbecility of the *institution*, and for that reason sufficiently weary of their situation ; not to speak of the very inconvenient expense incurred by some corps, which *has* prevented their numbers being kept up, and caused other inconveniences ; nor their optional drills, frequently attended by thirty or forty out of six or seven hundred ; which alone is sufficient to disgust all the most public-spirited of that establishment. Four hundred thousand men trained to arms will go a great way towards the formation of the true military POWER of the state ; the transition will be simple and easy, and the duties after the change light in comparison ; while one uniform, consistent, steady discipline will make the same men who now would be the sport, then a terror, to *French* armies.

The feeling and forcible manner in which the noble Duke has exposed the despicable policy, as well as the disgraceful perfidy, with which the militia and fensibles have been treated, entitles him to the warmest thanks of his country, and particularly of the country gentlemen. In the conduct reprobated, we see the rulers of a great country departing from every thing wise, honourable, and dignified, to act the shameful part of crimps, kidnappers, and swindlers. Such statesmen have been your *Pitts* and your *Melvilles* ! Nor is the noble author less deserving of praise, for judiciously parrying the thrusts at the constitution, made by unlearned men of his own military profession, and by all the unprincipled panders of arbitrary power, who have been so assiduous in recommending a rivalry with all the continental despotisms, and even *France* itself, in the magnitude of a STANDING ARMY ; or in other words, yielding ourselves up at home to a military despotism ; than which no greater curse could follow even conquest itself.

• Nor can I pass over the wise reflections on the subject of this country “ engaging itself in continental wars,” and “ courting every power great or small in *Germany* and

Italy to receive our guineas;" and towards an idea of what ought to be the policy of our alliances. And the noble author particularly shines in the mode he recommends for recruiting our regular army for foreign services; and in the simple but luminous maxims on which he everywhere organizes a militia establishment, for the convenience of the country, the comfort and satisfaction of the soldier, the order, regularity, and strictness of discipline; in all which I see over again in his book, what I saw six and twenty years ago in his own regiment of *Sussex* militia.

In short, to whatever statesman may devolve the task of restoring to full vigour and energy *the military branch of the English Constitution*,—which is the true secret for recruiting the army without trouble or expense, for the very overflowings of the martial spirit of an arms-bearing people would feed with recruits three such armies as *England* ever ought to keep in pay—better advice cannot in my judgment be given, than that the Duke of *Richmond* should, with the greatest deference, be consulted in the military legislation necessary to the execution of this grand design.

If it were possible to characterize in a few words the military system of the late ministers—if a farrago of all absurd and monstrous things can be called a system—I should attempt it by saying that we see stamped on it, in legible characters, ENMITY TO THE CONSTITUTION—CONTEMPT OF PUBLIC OPINION—MILITARY FOLLY—WASTEFUL EXPENSE—DEFENSIVE WEAKNESS—UNFEELINGNESS FOR ENGLISH DESOLATION—AND THE HAZARDING OF THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE STATE TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF A FACTION.

February 26, 1806.—The Reader is requested not to forget the observation with which the Preface to this Work commenced.

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
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VOL. I.

Page 104 line 23, *read*, Alfred's Bow [For a title to the Song].

VOL. II.

Page 7, line 6, *read* April 8, June 12 and 25.
47, line 29, *read* up; with Redents.
53, line 22, *read* mangled.
78, line 24, *read* countries.
81, line 13, *read* ever.
97, line 27, *read* "detestable policy."
129, line 34. *read* country.
148, line 10, *read* the coast.



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